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Abstract
Despite a wealth of research on how socio-economic factors such as underdevelopment or inequal-
ity influence armed conflict, existing research has paid little attention to how micro-dynamics
relating to armed violence and socio-economic factors affect post-conflict societies. This the-
sis builds on the observation that both socio-economic development and armed conflict vary
substantially across time and space and contextualises their relationship in the post-conflict
setting. Across three articles it examines the causes and effects of changes in socio-economic
marginalization and the variation in armed violence at a local level.
The first article looks at whether more equitable distribution of socio-economic development
across space can reduce the risk of future armed conflict in countries emerging out of war
using nightlight data to trace spatial inequality over time. Subsequent articles zoom in on this
relationship at a micro level. I empirically study the case of Peru and build on data collected
during fieldwork, human rights reports and historical census records. The second paper examines
how wartime economies affect subnational variation in armed violence between insurgent and
the state after armed conflict has come to a halt at a national level. The third article builds
on the finding that post-conflict socio-economic marginalisation matters and flips the question
to examine how differences in patterns of civilian victimisation affect local trajectories in socio-
economic development.
This thesis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the economics of armed violence
by placing a focus on the interplay between armed violence and socio-economic development
across time and space within the post-conflict context. The different theoretical arguments are
linked through their emphasis on the importance of civilians’ responses to adverse conditions such
as marginalization and violence. The thesis also contributes to existing literature by collecting
novel data and combining different methodological approaches.
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1 Introduction
One of the most pressing issues around intrastate armed conflict today is its resolution. The
majority of contemporary civil conflicts take place in countries that previously experienced
armed intrastate conflict (Walter, 2015). If one looks at the UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset, which defines an active armed conflict as a “contested incompatibility which concerns
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least
one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Gleditsch et al.,
2002), about half of armed conflicts today are recurrences. This rate of recurrence is no longer
surprising if one considers the extensive literature that has studied the difficulties of conflict
resolution, the legacies of civil war or post-conflict stability.
The experience of armed conflict contributes to the normalisation of violence, fractures rela-
tionships between the state and the population, creates a pool of fighters, or contributes to the
entrenchment of wartime economies (e.g., Themnér, 2011; Suhrke and Berdal, 2013; Bateson,
2017; Deglow, 2016; Themnér, 2017; Karim, 2020; Cheng, 2018). These are just a few of an
extensive set of risk factors that make it difficult for countries emerging out of war to simply
transition to peace. In fact, most post-conflict countries appear to never fully pacify and in
the absence of recurrence other forms of violence take a hold instead, such as organised crime
or intimate partner violence (e.g. Deglow, 2016; Cheng, 2018; Østby et al., 2019). This thesis
contributes to the literature on post-conflict stability and reconstruction by going back to one
of the most debated causes of political violence: inequality.
The relationship between (economic) inequality (or concepts related to it such as relative de-
privation or poverty) and different forms of political contention (e.g. armed conflict, revolution,
or protest) has been the subject of famous works from Aristotle to Machiavelli. For decades it
has been a topic for debate in the field of conflict research with the aim to give an answer to
the question: Does (economic) inequality breed political violence?
Various scholars have been important in shaping this debate. For instance, Gurr’s (1970)
seminal work on relative deprivation , which drew on the idea that aggression arises out of
frustration and proposed that collective violence is the result of a collective perceiving a large
gap between what they have and what they deserve. This idea became criticised by Charles
Tilly and others, who emphasised that while political violence hardly occurs without shared
dissatisfaction, it requires opportunities for mobilisation and financing warfare (Snyder and
Tilly, 1972; Tilly, 1978). In the early 2000s the works of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon
and Laitin (2003) were essential in pushing towards the narrative that violent mobilisation is the
result of opportunity and not necessarily ‘grievances’ or relative deprivation, which was usually
operationalised as income inequality and measured as GDP/capita or using the Gini index. But
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in parallel the end of the Cold War had brought a rise in armed conflict mobilised along ethnic
lines. This motivated scholars to contextualise how and in which forms inequality matters. Gurr
developed his work further and now emphasised the role of ethnic minorities (Gurr, 1993, 2000).
This offered a way to understand when grievances are perceived collectively and are more likely
to be acted upon.
Today a large part of the literature on inequality and political violence has been influenced
by the seminal work of Frances Stewart (2000; 2005; 2008; 2016). She proposed that inequality
is most salient for collective forms of violence if it runs along group identity lines, such as
ethnicity or religion. She coined it horizontal inequality – in contrast to the traditionally studied
vertical inequality, which emphasises inequality between individuals, and also highlighted various
dimensions along which inequality matters: political, economic, social and cultural. Based on
the her work a body of literature developed linking horizontal inequalities to political violence
(e.g. Langer, 2005; Murshed and Gates, 2005; Østby, 2008; Cederman et al., 2011; Hillesund,
2015).
This literature has been essential in highlighting that perhaps the question is not whether
there exists a relationship between inequality and political violence but understanding the mech-
anisms that link them to each other. Surprisingly though, despite a wealth of work on inequality
and armed conflict, the literature has been rather limited in regards to systematically studying
how inequality shapes post-conflict dynamics. The conventional wisdom across scholars and pol-
icymakers is: grievances need to be addressed to end conflict and consolidate peace. Nonetheless,
due to the emphasis of most econometric studies on the opportunity for violence, scholars have
been focused on the effect of economic growth, employment opportunities or democratisation
(Collier et al., 2003, 2008; Blattman and Annan, 2016; Walter, 2015).
Even less consideration has been given to understanding how intrastate armed conflict affects
inequality. Instead, also here the work on the economic effect of armed conflict has been limited
to a discussion on economic growth (Collier et al., 2003, 2008; Hegre et al., 2017; Costalli et al.,
2017). Yet, studying how inequality developed in post-conflict societies is crucial, not only
because it is likely to affect future political violence but because inequality shapes political
organisation, representation and civic life (e.g., Verba et al., 1995; Boix et al., 2003; Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006; Ansell and Samuels, 2010; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011).
Further it is important to better understand inequality within post-conflict contexts because
these tend to offer exactly the conditions which scholars such as Charles Tilly emphasised for
explaining when grievances matter, i.e. in the presence of opportunity. Mobilisation has already
taken place before and previous armed conflict leaves behind structures of violent organisation
that do not simply dissolve as the result of a peace agreement, the presence of international
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peacekeeping operations, or other conditions which have facilitated a halt to hostilities. This is
what makes post-conflict countries so vulnerable to relapsing into armed conflict. For instance,
Daly (2012) and similarly Osorio et al. (2021) show that the organisational capacity developed
during previous episodes of violent mobilisation can endure for centuries. The political en-
trepreneurs, which are necessary to coordinate and mobilise recruits into armed conflict often
remain present during ‘peacetime’ (here loosely defined as the absence of active armed conflict)
(Tilly, 1978; Gurr, 2000; Themnér, 2011; Themnér, 2017).
Given the extensive risk factors post-conflict countries face and what we know thus far about
inequality and political violence, this thesis does not set out to answer whether inequality shapes
post-conflict dynamics. Instead, I aim to situate the relationship between inequality and armed
conflict within the post-conflict context. Specifically, this dissertation studies socio–economic
inequality with a particular focus on aspects of marginalisation. In other words, I look at the
bottom part of the distribution: what happens to those that have been historically excluded
from (socio-)economic power post-conflict? How does this affect prospects of armed violence?
And how did conflict dynamics shape socio–economic conditions of the most marginalised? This
is not to undermine the relevance of other dimensions of inequality, for instance political (e.g.,
political representation) or cultural (e.g., recognition of cultural practices). Nor does it imply
that the socio-economic position of the middle class or the most wealthy do not affect conflict
dynamics or prospects for stability. Similarly, I focus on studying politically motivated armed
violence between the government of a state and an organised violent non-state actors (also
referred to as insurgent or rebel group from hereon out). While other forms of political or
organised violence would be just as important to study, adding in these forms of violence would
have made it more difficult to discern possible causal mechanisms and by far exceeded the scope
of this dissertation project.
1.1 Main Concepts
Post-Conflict The lines between war and peace are blurry and thus for good reason, what
exactly constitutes ‘post-conflict’ is generally not clearly defined in most scholarly work. Some
works talk about post-conflict and speak to the phase immediately after armed conflict ends.
But even defining the endpoint of armed conflict itself is often difficult (see Kreutz, 2010). More
commonly the end of conflict is often denoted by the signing of a peace agreement or ceasefire
agreement, the military victory of one conflict party or a ‘prolonged’ phase in which intensity
of violence has dropped below conventional levels considered to define armed conflict as active.
But even here scholars employ varying thresholds, the most common being 25 battle related
deaths (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset) or 1000 battle-related deaths (Correlates of War
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Project) reported annually.
Instead of providing a clear-cut definition of post-conflict, I refer to a country as post-conflict
when it meets two criteria. First, it experienced an intrastate armed conflict.1 Second, it is in a
phase of sustained absence of armed violence or at least is experiencing a sustained drop in the
intensity of armed violence, i.e. armed confrontations between the government security forces
and a politically motivated insurgent group results in less than 25 battle related deaths in a
given year.
What is even more problematic than defining the starting point of the post-conflict era,
is the end point. When does a post-conflict country cease to be ‘post-conflict’? This is a
question I have been consistently contemplating on during the writing of this thesis. Some
scholars use arbitrary rules of thumb such as 5 years after conflict termination to declare that
‘peace’ is consolidating. But this inadvertently assumes a false dichotomy between conflict
and peace. Thus, for the purpose of this dissertation, I do not put an explicit time limit on
what constitutes a post-conflict setting as I believe this to be counterproductive, particularly
considering the extensive literature on the legacies of armed conflict that are likely to echo for
years after conflict termination. This enables deeper inquiry into understanding the continuities
between war and peacetime and an analysis of countries, which have experienced an end to civil
conflict many years ago but that are clearly not peaceful, though at the same time do not meet
the criteria for being classified as within active armed conflict either.
Inequality, and Marginalisation This thesis relies heavily on the terms of inequality and
marginalisation. When talking about inequality, I refer to the the unequal distribution of eco-
nomic power (e.g., wealth, income, land) and/or social power (e.g., access to public services such
as education or health services). Across the different chapters I put differing emphasis on certain
aspects of inequality and measure it differently depending on data availability and the specific
argument put forward. However, throughout the chapters I theoretically and empirically stress
two aspects.. First, the role of marginalised populations in the context of inequality. In other
words, I give particular weight to the socio-economic position of the people at the bottom part
of the distribution (e.g., do they have enough income to survive? do they have access to public
services?). Second, the collective experience of marginalisation. In this regard, I conceptualise
inequality across geographic space rather than between individuals or ethnic groups.
This builds on several observations. First, vertical inequality, which measures the distribution
amongst individuals, might not be helpful to understand collective forms of violence, which are
more likely to be the result of a set of individuals who share the same grievances. Second, while
1Empirically, I rely on the operational definition of armed conflict by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
(as cited in the first paragraph), to classify which countries could potentially come to be considered post-conflict.
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horizontal inequality has been more useful to capture the collective element of inequality that
drives political violence, it has only limited explanatory value in post-conflict contexts where
armed conflict did not run along fixed identity group lines (such as ethnic or religious groups)
– which is at least more than half of all contemporary armed conflicts. Moreover, others have
observed that horizontal inequality is most salient when it coincides with geographic patterns
of exclusion. Thus by focusing on spatial inequality, I am able to capture to a certain extent
potential horizontal inequalities but at the same time also analyse contexts in which the collective
experience of exclusion does not run along group lines. Marginalisation is a process of historical
exclusion and discrimination and often tends to agglomerate in geographic space, specifically
when we look at patterns of distribution of socio-economic power (e.g., income levels and access
to public services).
1.2 Theoretical Arguments and Main Findings
A central question within Political Science is how do people overcome the problem of collective
action (cf. Olson, 1965)? Armed conflict and socio-economic inequality are both outcomes that
have been studied through this lense. While elite organisation and other structural factors play
a considerable role in understanding both these phenomenons, the main proposition of this
thesis is that civilian behavior matters. It can shape variation in the viability of armed conflict
and prospects for socio-economic development in post-conflict societies and help us understand
how problems of collective action are overcome in conflict-affected societies. I examine this
proposition across three separate outcomes: conflict recurrence, post-conflict armed violence
and post-conflict socio-economic development. Rather than seeing civilians and specifically
marginalised communities as passive actors, I propose that their influence over these outcomes
and specifically their role in contributing to resolving or reinforcing problems of collective action
is more complex. Within the three papers I consider different conditions under which civilians
can come to have an important role in understanding post-conflict countries, their trajectory of
violence and socio-economic recovery. In the following I give an outline of the respective papers.
The first paper of this thesis analyses the effect of changes in the distribution of economic
power across space on the risk of conflict recurrence in a cross-national analysis. I posit that
improvements in the economic status of marginalised areas can affect the probability that coun-
tries will experience repeat armed conflict by increasing the opportunity costs for participating
in armed violence. In contrast, persistence in the patterns of distribution or even an aggravation
of the concentration of economic power can lead to a higher risk of recurrence by lowering oppor-
tunity costs of violence across populations most vulnerable to be re-mobilised. The argument
builds on the findings that economically marginalised populations are usually the ones who fight
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and that perceptions of exclusion matter. I combine this with insights from Economics and Psy-
chology and refer to work on loss aversion and risk preferences after the experiences of trauma,
which highlight that people tend to prefer certainty after trauma and assign more value to not
loosing something, even if what they could gain would be much bigger. I empirically test this
argument using nightlight data. Specifically I assess how luminosity (averaged across popula-
tion density) is distributed before conflict and compare it to how it is distributed in post-conflict
years. I operationalise distribution by relying on the Theil’s L index, which gives more weight
to changes in the bottom part of the distribution (in this case geographic areas with little to no
light). The empirical analysis supports the claim: countries, where spatial inequality decreased
see a significantly reduced risk of recurrence. Put differently, improvements in the net level of
economic power across marginalised areas reduce the likelihood of renewed armed conflict.
The second paper of this thesis is motivated by the fact that in the absence of recurrence,
armed violence does not necessarily cease and asks: Why do some conflict-affected areas remain
an arena of violent political contestation with the state, while others do not? It builds on the idea
that armed conflicts leave behind a legacy of social and economic structures and that these tend
to manifest locally. I thus focus on analysing subnational variation in post-conflict violence. My
theoretical argument builds on the first paper but puts it into perspective. Improvements in the
economic power of marginalised populations influence post-conflict stability but it matters what
or who sustains local livelihoods to understand the characteristics of the post-conflict violence.
Specifically, I analyse the role of wartime economies as an important source of variation in post-
conflict violence. I propose that the continuation of armed violence between insurgents and the
state can be explained by the economic inter-dependencies between communities and insurgents
that have evolved during wartime as result of insurgents taking control over the extraction or
trade of lootable resources in that area. Insurgents often sustain control of these areas during
peacetime, which shapes civilian support because they still depend on these resource streams
to sustain their livelihoods. In absence of the continuation of the ‘wartime economy’, local
communities would be economically much worse off. This creates at least tacit civilian support
for insurgents, which informs the ability of insurgents to stage attacks against the state but
also shapes how costly counterinsurgency is for the state. Thus areas which were involved in
the wartime economy will see more armed violence than other areas post-conflict. I test this
argument empirically using the case of Peru. I develop a novel coca suitability index to serve as
an instrument for local presence of a wartime economy and collect original data on post-conflict
armed violence and cultivation of coca at a subnational level. I also rely on original interview
data I collected during field work to give evidence of causal mechanisms. My findings lend strong
support to the argument and additionally highlight that the links between economic motivations
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for supporting an insurgent and armed conflict are far more complex than accounting only for
grievances and financial feasibility to explain armed violence.
In light of the findings of the first and second paper, which both highlighted that local socio-
economic conditions matter for post-conflict stability, the third paper set out to understand how
armed conflict affects local socio-economic development and is motivated by the question of how
civilian behavior influences local level socio-economic development. Building on an extensive
literature that links social cohesion to various political and economic outcomes, I propose that
how communities are targeted matters. While armed conflict is extremely destructive, collective
civilian victimisation reinforces collective action capacity by creating a shared threat that can
be better tackled together. I posit that these reinforced social bonds can facilitate post-conflict
socio-economic development and explain why some areas are better at recovering from the detri-
mental destruction imposed by armed conflict than others. I study this argument empirically
using the case of Peru and collect novel data on civilian victimisation and socio-economic de-
velopment. Given tremendous concerns of endogeneity, my research design leverages geographic
variation in emergency zones, which resulted in subnational variation in the propensity of be-
ing exposed to collective victimisation in a regression discontinuity design. The analysis lends
support to the argument and is further supported with a a case study of the district Tambo to
illustrate the causal mechanisms.
1.3 Methodological Approach and the Case of Peru
Studying inequality and political violence is demanding because the two dynamics have been
major forces in shaping each other. Separating the effects from each other is difficult and perhaps
impossible. To better understand how they interact with each other, this thesis relies to a large
extent on the collection of new data and employs strategies of causal inference, where feasible.
Most of all, however, this thesis has benefited from exploring different levels of analysis: while
the first paper conducts a cross-national analysis, the second a third paper take a micro level
perspective. This is motivated by the fact that armed conflict dynamics and socio-economic
inequality vary across geographic space. To fully understand their interaction, we need to
consider micro level dynamics. For this purpose insights and interview data gathered during
fieldwork in Lima and the department of Ayacucho in Peru were essential. I explain my data
collection strategy and analysis of the interview data in the second paper. Observations from
the field and interviews with experts and civilians in historically excluded areas of Peru have
majorly influenced this dissertation’s perspective on how and to which extent socio-economic
marginalisation matters for understanding violent action against the state.
The case of Peru is a focal case throughout this dissertation. The case was strategically chosen
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with the dissertation’s underlying research interest in mind. Peru experienced an extremely
deadly armed conflict between 1980 and 2000.2 Several characteristics made it a theoretically
and empirically interesting case to analyse subnational dynamics of armed violence and socio-
economic development, discern existing arguments around inequality and political violence and
also put my initial ideas from the first paper into perspective. First of all, armed conflict had
ended but in an ‘unclear end’ rather than a peace agreement or military victory. This type of
conflict end is the most susceptible to recurrence, an aspect and ending to conflict that remains
largely understudied in the literature, which has been rather focused on peace consolidation when
conflicts end in peace agreements and/or with international involvement (e.g., peacekeeping
operations) (cf. Kreutz, 2010). Second, although Peru is an ethnically diverse country, armed
conflict was not organised along ethnic group lines. This offered a way to understand links
between socio-economic marginalisation and armed conflict outside the context of an ethnic
conflict or a country, where politics is largely organised along ethnic lines.3 This allows me
to at least to some extent more clearly analyse certain mechanisms as ethnicity in itself is
often a very important factor in explaining political violence and development. Third, several
macro level factors existed which had been emphasised by the existing literature as ‘pacifying’:
Peru had repeat democratic elections since the end of armed conflict, experienced high economic
growth, displayed strong coercive state capacity, and had implemented a truth and reconciliation
commission. However, inequality remains rampant and the insurgent group Sendero Luminoso
has remained active and continuously attacks state security forces. Which leads me to the fourth
and final reason: Peru displays interesting subnational variation in post-conflict armed violence
and also exhibits subnational disparities in post-conflict socio-economic development. It thus
offers an interesting case to understand micro-dynamics and interactions between inequality and
armed violence in a post-conflict context.
1.4 Contribution
Inequality is one of the most defining issues societies have historically faced and also one of
the most debated causes for armed conflict. Yet, very little research has actually discerned
its impact on post-conflict trajectories of violence and how patterns of violence may come to
affect inequality in post-conflict societies. This dissertation contributes to different strands of
literature but primarily the study of post-conflict countries by demonstrating 1) how differences
in development across space (i.e. spatial inequality) influences the risk and subnational variation
in post-conflict armed violence and 2) studying the effect of patterns of violence on local post-
2The second and third paper offer more detailed information about the case itself.
3This is not to undermine the fact that indigenous and Andean communities have been historically excluded
and discriminated against. Rather this is to say that ethnic cleavages are not a major mobilising factor in the
organisation of political life.
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conflict trajectories of socio-economic development. This contributes to a growing awareness in
the literature on inequality within Political Science that suggests how inequality is structured
has perhaps more explanatory value than the levels of inequality a society experiences (e.g.
Stewart, 2016; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011). With regard to this, the theoretical propositions
emphasise the role of civilian agency and thus speak to a growing literature on processes and
consequences of civilian preferences during armed conflict (e.g. Arjona, 2016; Kaplan, 2017;
Krause, 2018). This dissertation also constructs and presents new data on the case of Peru. I
collected data on post-conflict armed violence, constructed a coca suitability index, compiled
and created a cohesive dataset on socio-economic development from 1981 to 2017 using census
data and identified events of collective civilian victimisation during the armed conflict using
data from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR, 2003). Moreover, interview data
collected during field work has been essential to construct and test theoretical mechanisms.
More broadly, the theoretical arguments and empirical findings are central to two broader
questions in Political Science. First, they speak to debates on the origin and maintenance of
monopoly over the use of violence (cf. Weber, 1948). The dissertation suggest that even in
countries with high coercive capacity, states will be unable to regain the monopoly over the
use of force without winning over civilian populations. Similarly, insurgents will be unable to
gain or maintain a (local) monopoly over violence without the support of civilians. While tacit
support can leave both actors space to operate, it is insufficient to be able to escalate violence
without accumulating extensive costs. For insurgents, this can mean their military demise if it
is not strong enough to sustain attacks from the state. For the state it implies loss of political
power, unless it can leverage other benefits for the price of causing instability. Civilians favor
stability and while entrepreneurs of violence can exploit grievances to mobilise people into armed
conflict the links between grievances and armed violence are more complex. The findings thus
caution to understand arguments on the ‘feasibility’ of violence and grievances in the context
of legitimacy. How is legitimacy constructed by armed actors and under which conditions do
civilians perceive armed actors as legitimate? The dissertation suggest that one elemental piece
to the puzzle is meeting local needs such as the security to livelihoods as civilians. Particularly
in historically excluded areas communities are predominantly concerned with their survival.
Second, the findings also speak to an extensive literature that relates to the question of why
some groups organise and others do not (cf. Olson, 1965). It does so by relating how and
why adverse conditions such as armed conflict or socio-economic marginalisation affect civilian
preferences. Specifically the dissertation identifies collective threat perception as an important
mechanism and highlights how economic and social bonds are created or sustained because of
it, during and after armed conflict.
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The following chapters are organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents the first paper of this
thesis and analyses the relationship between spatial inequality and conflict recurrence. Chap-
ter 3 presents the second paper, which looks at the legacy of wartime economies to discern
how economic dependencies within marginalised communities inform where we see post-conflict
armed violence. Chapter 4 presents the last paper of this thesis and analyses how patterns of
civilian victimisation affect post-conflict socio-economic development. Finally, Chapter 5 recaps
the purpose of this thesis, identifies main findings and discusses the main limitations of this
research project. It concludes with a discussion of research questions that emerge out of the
dissertation and considers possible policy implications.
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2 Spatial Inequality and the Risk of Conflict Recurrence
Abstract
Countries emerging out of intrastate armed conflict have on average a 50% chance of
experiencing recurrence. Can changes in the distribution of economic power affect the
ability of countries to sustain peace? This paper uses nighttime light data to study the
effect of changes to spatial patterns of inequality on the risk of conflict recurrence. I
argue that more equal distribution of economic power across space can substantially affect
chances of peace consolidation by reducing the re-mobilisation capacity of violent non-state
actors. In contrast, when patterns of distribution persist or concentration of economic
power grows, countries escalate their risk of recurrence by reinforcing existing grievances
and perpetuating feelings of exclusion. The empirical analysis supports this claim. For
instance, in post-conflict countries where spatial inequality stays the same, about half of
all countries will relapse into conflict. If inequality was halved the probability decreases by
over 20 percentage points. Contrastingly, if inequality is doubled, the risk increases to over
80%.
2.1 Introduction
Can changes in the distribution of economic power affect the risk of conflict recurrence? Despite
widespread conceptions amongst policy makers that addressing economic drivers of conflict is
crucial for peace consolidation, we know very little about the link between economic inequality
and conflict recurrence. Most research to date focuses on the existence of a ‘conflict trap’, where
the immense economic costs of armed conflict perpetuate low economic growth, which in turn
facilitates recurrence (Collier et al., 2003, 2008; Hegre et al., 2017; Costalli et al., 2017). Conse-
quently, emphasis has been put on economic growth as a deterrent against conflict recurrence.
But growth is not necessarily always inclusive and may fail to addresses the economic root causes
of conflict often grounded in unequal distribution of power. 4
To contribute to our understanding of post-conflict stability this paper studies whether the
economic inclusion of marginalised populations can help consolidate peace. Power sharing is
generally understood to be an import tool for the consolidation of peace after armed conflict,
for instance through power sharing provisions in peace agreements or democratisation (e.g.
Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003a; Matanock, 2017). While these types of ‘redistribution’ efforts may
come to decrease the risk of recurrence, they do so by primarily benefiting elites. Yet it is
marginalised populations who are typically most affected by armed conflict and also most likely
to be (re-)mobilised into fighting (Murshed and Gates, 2005; Justino, 2009; Acemoglu et al.,
4For instance, Dahl and Høyland (2012) show that depending on model specifications, economic growth might
actually increase the risk of recurrence.
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2011; Lin, 2021; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008). Inclusion of marginalised populations could
hence be key to understanding why some countries are more successful at consolidating peace
in the long term than others.
Building on prominent literature that stresses the role of grievances or opportunity costs
for motivating armed conflict, I link the distribution of economic power to the risk of conflict
recurrence (e.g. Gurr, 1970; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Stewart, 2016). But in contrast to
existing research, which looks at absolute levels of economic deprivation (e.g. income levels,
employment opportunities, or access to public goods), my theory emphasises the role of change
in the distribution or in other words the extent to which the net level of economic power held
by marginalised populations increases or decreases. Particularly, I situate existing theories on
inequality and conflict within the post-conflict context by drawing on theories on loss aversion
and risk preferences after the experience of trauma (Kahneman, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman,
1992; Callen et al., 2014). I posit that changes to the economic standing of marginalised areas
within a country can play an important role in affecting perceptions of the opportunity costs
of renewed conflict. This is because it affects the preferences across marginalised populations,
which are most vulnerable to be mobilised into participating in violence.
Additionally, this paper contributes to existing literature by assessing inequality across ge-
ographic space rather than between individuals (vertical inequality) or identity-based groups
(horizontal inequality)5. While group identity is an important cleavage across many political
contexts, it is not always a key factor in generating shared perceptions of marginalisation. Sim-
ilarly, relying on individual-level measures of inequality tends to disregard the importance of
collective action for violent mobilisation. Instead, I exploit that salient patterns of exclusion
are often concentrated in space, also when they run along fixed group lines.6 Thus, by focusing
on spatial inequality, I am more likely to account for collective experiences of marginalisation
(ethnic and non-ethnic), relevant for understanding violent mobilisation.
To empirically test whether changes to the distribution of economic power across space affect
the risk of recurrence I rely on high resolution nighttime light data (Elvidge et al., 2014; NASA,
2013). In comparison to alternative data on local level economic development, for instance
derived from government agencies or surveys, nighttime light data is available for all countries
which experienced an end to armed conflict between 1992 and 2012 and allows me to track
temporal changes to the distribution across years. I operationalise spatial inequality as the
distribution of nightlight across space, but use an index that gives particular weight to changes
5See Murshed and Gates (2005) and Buhaug et al. (2011) for interesting exceptions in considering space a
crucial factor for assessing inequality.
6This is evident by looking at countries around the globe, where political and economic exclusion can be
mapped geographically, also beyond differences of urban and rural areas. One prominent example for instance
being Italy, with a wealthy North and poor South. But examples extend beyond the Western hemisphere, e.g.
India, China, Turkey, Peru, or Bolivia, just to name a few.
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in the bottom part of the distribution. This way I am able to account for whether economic
power is shifting towards previously marginalised populations rather than whether middle-class
citizens are becoming economically more powerful7 I combine this data with the UCDP Conflict
Termination Dataset (Kreutz, 2010) and apply a Cox proportional hazards model. My results
show that changes in the distribution of economic power, which result in improvement in the
net level of economic power across previously marginalised areas, significantly reduce the risk of
conflict recurrence.
In the following I will first review existing literature on conflict recurrence. I then introduce
my theoretical argument and offer some examples to illustrate the proposed mechanisms. Next,
I present my research design and discuss the empirical findings. I conclude with ideas for future
research.
2.2 Existing Literature
Research on conflict recurrence often overlaps with work on post-conflict stability, or conflict
duration as scholars diverge on defining the starting and end points of a given civil war and
employ different concepts of what they consider ongoing armed conflict or peace. However,
within this thematic sphere, three strands of literature seem particularly salient to understanding
trajectories of armed conflict in conflict-affected societies.
One strand focuses on the role of bargaining failure or commitment issues: Fighting often
resumes despite the costs of war because there are no credible guarantees. They posit that
third-party involvement can provide an incentive to commit to peace, for instance in the form of
peacekeeping operations (e.g. Walter, 2004; Fortna, 2004; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). However,
when conflicts involve various veto players they are harder to resolve because there will be fewer
acceptable terms of agreement for everyone (Cunningham, 2006). Similarly, scholars emphasise
the need to consider potential spoilers to the peace process Stedman (1997); Greenhill and Major
(2006). But for instance the inclusion of civil society in the peace process may make it more
likely that peace will endure (Kew and John, 2008; Nilsson, 2012).
A second strand highlights the role of unresolved grievances. It argues that if grievances at
the core of a conflict are not addressed, recurrence is more likely. Some scholars highlight low
economic or human development levels (Collier et al., 2003, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000;
Walter, 2004; Quinn et al., 2007; Kreutz, 2010). However, particularly in the conflict onset and
duration literature scholars have repeatedly stressed the role of grievances formed along ethnic or
religious group lines, positing that conflict between competing identity groups is more intractable
(Horowitz, 1985; Fearon, 2004; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). But systematic research of the link
7For instance, the commonly used Gini index is particularly sensitive to changes in the middle of the distri-
bution.
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between inequality and post-conflict stability has been surprisingly limited (e.g. Langer et al.,
2012) with a more substantive literature focusing on individual-level incentives to refraining to
participate in armed violence, for instance through employment opportunities (Blattman and
Annan, 2016).
This is linked to a third strand of literature, which highlights how different structural factors
shape opportunity costs of violence and thus can explain why some armed groups remobilise
for conflict or sustain rebellion. In essence, as conflict continues to be feasible, it will recur.
Post-conflict stability can be explained, for instance, by the availability of contraband financing
(Fearon, 2004), the type of conflict termination (e.g. Toft, 2009; David Mason et al., 2011;
Caplan and Hoeffler, 2017; Kreutz, 2010), the characteristics of the negotiated settlement (e.g.
Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003a, 2019), or the institutions in place (e.g. Walter, 2015).
Overall, the literature shows that consolidating peace after armed conflict is difficult and
requires addressing the root causes of conflict. This paper adds to the existing literature by more
closely linking recurrence back to one of the most debated causes of armed conflict: inequality.
While some scholars have questioned the importance of inequality for understanding mobilisation
into armed resistance against the state (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003),
a plethora of studies has established that inequality matters. Either by generating shared
experiences of marginalisation, which allow entrepreneurs of violence to mobilise on the basis of
perceptions of collective exclusion such as unequal access to political power along group lines
(i.e. horizontal inequality), or if it reduces opportunity costs of violence because people lack
employment opportunities or ways to finance their livelihood (e.g. Justino, 2009; Blair et al.,
2013; Østby, 2008; Cederman et al., 2011; Dube and Vargas, 2013). Yet, systematic studies on
inequality have been widely missing from the post-conflict literature.
Instead the literature on the economics of post-conflict stability has been predominantly
focused on the need to foster post-conflict growth; if anything scholars only emphasise the need
to consider uneducated, young males as important targets of ‘inclusion’ (e.g. Collier et al., 2008;
Blattman and Annan, 2016). But a country can experience high economic growth, leaving some
groups better off, while inequality remains the same or is even increasing. So far the literature
seems to assume that this would not matter, although extant literature on conflict onset and
mobilisation provide extensive evidence for a link between inequality and political violence.
Particularly in a post-conflict context, where countries face on average a 50% chance of ex-
periencing recurrence, it is conceivable that addressing inequality may be an important pathway
towards consolidating peace. In the next section, I situate existing arguments on inequality and
conflict in relation to the post-conflict context and draw on economic theories of loss aversion
after the experience of trauma to argue that changes in the distribution of economic power are
21
crucial to understanding conflict recurrence.
2.3 Theoretical Argument
The role of inequality in explaining armed violence has long been subject to controversy. Some
scholars posit that not all unequal countries experience intrastate conflict and thus it is in
fact feasibility of armed conflict (e.g. access to lootable resources, availability of arms, weak
state capacity) rather than grievances which explain armed conflict (e.g. Tilly, 1978; Collier
and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). In contrast, an extensive set of qualitative and
quantitative studies suggest that inequality can be a driving force behind mobilisation into
armed conflict (e.g. Gurr, 1970; Lichbach, 1989; Stewart, 2008; Østby, 2013). Though they do
emphasise the need to consider when grievances are experienced collectively, for instance when
grievances coincide with group identity and create horizontal inequalities (cf. Stewart, 2008).
Further, scholars also acknowledge that even collective experiences of marginalisation do
not always translate to violence. Armed conflict is costly and thus requires resources and
organisation to fight (cf. Tilly, 1978). Yet, if entrepreneurs of violence exist, that are able
to mobilise resources and recruits, it is usually the most marginalised populations that will
participate in violence (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008; Justino, 2009; Buhaug et al., 2011).
This is why the following argument emphasises the need to consider that the post-conflict
context is substantially different from contexts where armed conflict has yet to take place in that
entrepreneurs of violence exist and organisational capacity as well, e.g., wartime networks and
collective capacity to mobilise violently usually remain intact years after conflict termination
(see Themnér, 2011; Daly, 2012; Osorio et al., 2021). But the question is are those who will be
most likely to be mobilised still willing to fight?
Economic theories of violence usually build on the idea of opportunity costs: participating
in violence is more lucrative when the costs of violence are smaller than the loss associated
with the alternative option of refraining from violence. However, perceptions of cost subject to
change and might be reconsidered given the circumstances. For instance, literature on horizontal
economic inequality, meaning the distribution of economic power across identity-based groups,
finds that improving the economic situation of a marginalised group relative to other groups
decreases the risk that this group will initiate armed conflict (Østby, 2008; Cederman et al.,
2011, 2013, 2015). Similarly, an interesting body of literature has examined the effect of re-
distributive policies such as land reforms, which affect the economic standing of marginalised
populations, on intensity of violence; they find that areas where previously excluded populations
are assigned land see less violence (Albertus and Kaplan, 2013; Albertus, 2020). It appears that
addressing grievances, or in particular economic marginalisation, can prevent conflict onset.
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Additionally, scholars which have investigated more carefully when and how perceptions of
inequality translate to violent action have found that objective measurements of inequality do
not necessarily overlap with subjective perceptions of marginalisation and subsequent willingness
to participate in violent action against the state (Langer et al., 2012; Rustad, 2016). A key
mechanism linking one’s economic status to armed conflict is likely the perception of unfair
treatment by the government (cf. Cederman et al., 2013; Miodownik and Nir, 2016; Kirwin and
Cho, 2009; Rustad, 2016).
Following this, I suggest that to better understand the relationship between economic in-
equality and armed violence in post-conflict settings, we need to consider how perceptions of
marginalisation are constructed and how these play into the willingness to participate in armed
violence. To construct this argument, I build on research in economics and psychology, which
emphasises the logic of loss aversion to understand why some people choose one option over the
other. In short, people prefer to avoid losing compared to gaining the same amount (see Kah-
neman, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). For example, the psychological costs associated
with loss of for instance 100$ are larger than the gains experienced by winning 100$. This effect
is further amplified after the experience of trauma as people assign more value to certainty or
security. For instance, Callen et al. (2014) run an experiment amongst conflict-affected com-
munities in Afghanistan and find that individuals exposed to violence are more risk averse and
have a higher preference for certainty than others. This is in line with research in economics and
psychology, which points to a relationship between experiences of trauma and risk preferences
in decision making. Even after comparatively less ‘severe’ episodes of insecurity, such as early
life experiences of financial insecurity, people become more risk averse (Malmendier and Nagel,
2011).
I argue that changes to the extent of economic marginalisation relative to the past (rather
than relative to other individuals or an out-group) is important for understanding violent mo-
bilisation. The ‘costs’ people assign to repeat armed conflict are conditioned by the traumatic
experiences lived and the loss already incurred, e.g. human lives lost, economic losses and psy-
chological trauma experienced. Perceptions of potential gains of participating in armed conflict
are (at least in part) shaped by how beneficial peace has been to one’s economic standing. Con-
sequently, assuming that perceptions matter, the link between inequality and repeat violence
could be more sensitive to changes in inequality, i.e. the improvement or worsening of the eco-
nomic position of marginalised populations, rather than just being a function of the absolute
level of inequality or deprivation relative to others. If previously marginalised populations –
which are most likely to participate in armed conflict – experience an improvement in their
economic position, the likelihood of conflict recurrence will drop because their preferences for
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supporting armed conflict as a viable strategy to achieve political change have changed.
Put differently, improvements in the economic situation of marginalised populations might
increase the chances that a large part of the most vulnerable people to be mobilised into fighting
the state will not want to join an insurgency. This is for instance the case in Peru, where the
insurgent group Sendero Luminoso continues to exist and perpetrate violent attacks against the
state – though at very low intensity. While the country remains characterised by high levels
of inequality, the economic position of some of the most marginalised populations (which were
simultaneously also the most targeted during armed conflict) has improved significantly, thanks
to development programs (Orihuela, 2012; Schady, 2000). In conjunction with the high costs
associated with the past armed conflict, this has affected the ability of Sendero Luminoso to
recruit people into participating in its insurgency and limited its capacity to escalate violence
against the state (Taylor, 2017).
I propose that conflict recurrence is in part a function of whether a sub-population considers
the additional costs of violence (economic and non-economic) acceptable given the potential
returns of restarting conflict. How much potential gain renewed armed conflict must bring
for a significant subset of the population to consider restarting armed conflict less costly than
keeping the status quo is difficult to say. Nonetheless, following the logic of opportunity costs, it
is plausible that if the share of people who are economically marginalised further increases after
conflict termination, i.e. inequality increases, this will heighten the risk of recurrence. When
economic grievances do not only persist but actually worsen, the benefits associated with peace
will be more likely to be perceived as negative and also enlarge the potential pool of recruits.
Mozambique illustrates this argument. After a long and bloody war, rebel group RENAMO
and the government signed a peace agreement in 1992. The country subsequently saw a UN
peace mission, a security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
programs (DDR), as well as its first democratic elections with Renamo as a political party. For
twenty years the country experienced economic growth and regular elections, yet armed conflict
was reinitiated by Renamo. In spite of positive development, inequality had persisted for years,
leaving particularly formerly rebel-held areas underdeveloped and marginalized. This allowed
the insurgent elite to maintain dependencies and wartime networks and consequently easily
mobilize ex-fighters on the grounds of marginalization (Themnér, 2011; Themnér, 2017). While
other factors such as the discovery of natural resources played a role – particularly to incentivise
elites (i.e. entrepreneurs of violence) to take up arms, inequality has facilitated mobilization of
marginalised populations for renewed armed conflict.
From this I derive the following testable hypothesis:
H:A decrease in spatial inequality, i.e. an improvement in the economic standing of marginalised
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populations, reduces the risk of conflict recurrence, while an increase in spatial inequality in-
creases the risk of conflict recurrence.
2.4 Research Design
To assess the impact of temporal changes in spatial inequality on the risk of conflict recurrence,
I construct a time-series cross-sectional dataset that includes all countries, where an intrastate
armed conflict ended between 1992 and 2012. My unit of analysis is the post-conflict-year. I
rely on a Cox proportional hazards model to analyze the relationship between changes in spatial
inequality and the hazard of conflict recurrence.
The Cox proportional hazards model assesses the risk that a conflict will recur conditional
on the length of time the subject has been at risk. I allow for multiple failures, given that in
practice some countries experience repeat armed conflict multiple times. An observation enters
the analysis every time a conflict episode has ended and is observed until conflict recurs or the
period of observation ends, in which case it becomes right-censored. I use robust standard errors
and cluster the observations by country, considering that recurrences might be interrelated (Box-
Steffensmeier et al., 2004). This dependence is also captured by stratifying the results by the
number of previous recurrences.
The advantage of using a Cox proportional hazards model rather than a linear probability,
logit model or similar, is that survival analysis allows for censored observations. This means
that the model includes countries that did not experience conflict recurrence during the time
of analysis. The Cox model also has specific advantages: it does not pre-determine a baseline
hazard, it makes it easy to incorporate control variables, and it does not impose too much
structure on the data. Also, it is able to handle recurrent events (i.e. repeat conflict recurrence
across years) (cf. Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2004).
Armed conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility over government and/or territory
between a government and a non-state actor, where the use of armed force between them results
in twenty-five or more battle-related deaths in one calendar year (Gleditsch et al., 2002). A
country is considered post-conflict after experiencing at least one year in which no conflict is
active. I draw on the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz, 2010), which gives specific
start and end dates to conflict episodes to measure my main dependent variable conflict recur-
rence. It is a dummy variable, coded as 1 for a post-conflict year in which armed conflict with
the same incompatibility across a previously active or a new conflict-dyad, reaches 25 battle
related deaths.
Change in spatial inequality is the main independent variable and assesses temporal
differences in the distribution of economic power across space. Deriving an operational measure
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for inequality is challenging due to a general lack of reliable data, particularly for post-conflict
countries. Many conflicts take place in countries for which we do not have very reliable data
on local economic conditions even before the conflict. If anything, data on economic wealth or
income is usually collected through household surveys or possibly government agencies. Yet,
insecurity in post-conflict countries often makes it difficult to conduct such surveys and govern-
ment data is often unreliable and biased. While survey data can often give access to interesting
aspects of economic power, they are often only collected in certain countries, every couple years
and often does not sufficiently cover all regions equally.
To overcome such limitations, I assess spatial inequality using high-resolution satellite data
on night light emissions. Light emission is a quantity that can be measured instantaneously,
objectively and systematically with great potential for assessing subnational variation and par-
ticularly short-term changes in economic power. Global data is available from the U.S. National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and was collected by the US Air Force
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS). I take
the nighttime light (NTL) data from the PRIO GRID 2.0 dataset (Tollefsen et al., 2012) which
has already standardized the pixel (light) gain values for the Saturated Light to range from 0 to
1, instead of from 0 to 63, where 1 is the highest observed value and 0 is the lowest. The data
has also been calibrated to eliminate variation across years due to atmospheric noise or sensor
drift, using the regression-based intercalibration technique developed by (Elvidge et al., 2014).
This makes it possible to compare distribution of night light emissions across time.
Different studies have shown that nighttime light data is useful for assessing local economic
development and even human development outcomes such as health and education in countries
where disaggregated data is lacking (e.g. Chen and Nordhaus, 2011; Weidmann and Schutte,
2017; Henderson et al., 2011, 2012; Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Chand et al., 2009). For instance,
Weidmann and Schutte (2017) show that night light emissions can successfully proxy local wealth
with correlations in developing countries averaging around 0.73, while Henderson et al. (2011)
demonstrate that changes in nightlights correlate with economic development. Similarly, Chand
et al. (2009) find that nightlight highly correlates with electrification rates. Areas that are more
illuminate are also more likely to have access to other public goods as well such as water, health,
roads, and education (Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Alesina et al., 2016). This validates the use
of nighttime light as a tool to assess spatial inequality.
To measure spatial inequality, I employ the Theil’s L Index, a generalized entropy inequality
measure. It is often used to measure economic inequality but also racial segregation or other
forms of inequality. It’s advantage in contrast to the more commonly known Gini index is the
possibility to include a parameter alpha, which makes it more sensitive to differences in income
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shares, or in this case luminosity shares, among the poor or rich. Given the hypotheses in this
paper, which focuses on inclusion of marginalised populations, I assign the parameter alpha to
be 0. This makes the index more sensitive to changes at the bottom of the distribution. The










where y is given by the luminosity per capita and N stands for the number of observations.
I calculate per capita luminosity for each grid cell in a country by dividing the gain value (i.e.
luminosity) by the population density (i.e. average number of people per square kilometer).8
Change in spatial inequality is calculated by assessing whether the Theil’s L Index has





where SIpre indicates the level of spatial inequality before conflict onset and SIpost indicates
the level of spatial inequality in each post-conflict year. I log-transform the variable in order to
create a continuous variable, where 0 denotes no change, positive numbers indicate an increase
in inequality and negative numbers a decrease in inequality.
I also include a set of covariates, which are conceivably correlated with changes in spatial
inequality and the risk of conflict recurrence. I include VDem’s Equal Access Index, which
measures whether all people in society can de facto enjoy participate in politics and influence
policymaking on a scale from 0-1 (low to high) (Coppedge et al., 2017). Political inclusion, which
makes countries less susceptible to repeat conflict but could also contribute to more economic
inclusion. I also consider natural resource production since this not only generates extraordinary
luminosity but also increases the likelihood of conflict recurrence due to the increased economic
benefit associated with control over such areas. I use data on gas and oil production from Ross
(2004). Further, I also include a measure of electoral democracy using V-Dem data (Coppedge
et al., 2017). Given that particularly anocracies are very likely to experience instability, include
a squared term. This accounts for a curvlinear relationship between democracy and conflict and
similarly democracy and accommodation of grievances of marginalised populations, with very
strong democracies or autocracies better capable of preventing conflict. I also account for several
characteristics of the armed conflict. I include the duration of the previous conflict episode. After
8It is necessary to divide it by population density rather than population count because each 30 arc-seconds
grid does not correspond to an equal area at the surface of the earth. Population density is calculated by dividing
population estimates from the Gridded Population of the World version 3 (CIESIN and CIAT 2005) by land area
of that grid cell. Data on population is only available every five years from 1990-2010 and was extrapolated using
linear regression to obtain yearly estimates.
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very long conflicts countries are less likely to see recurrence because of war weariness (e.g. Fortna,
2004) but they are also more likely to have experienced more destruction, potentially affecting
particularly the poorest members of society and thus resulting in an increase of inequality. I
also include dummies for types of conflict termination (Kreutz 2010). Agreement indicates that
conflict ended in a peace agreement or cease fire agreement; Unclear end indicates that conflict
activity continues but does not reach 25 battle related deaths or that the conflict actor has
become another conflict actor or has ceased to exist; Victory indicates that conflict ended in
rebel or government victory. Peace is thought to be harder to maintain when war ends in a
compromise settlement than in victory, because actors are more likely to resume violence if they
eventually no longer are satisfied with the terms of the peace. Inequality is perhaps most likely
to persist when there is no clear end to the conflict. Note that all variables except for duration
are lagged by one year. Further, the results are stratified by the number of times the subject
(conflict) is at risk of experiencing recurrence.
2.5 Analysis
Do changes in spatial inequality, i.e. the geographic distribution of economic power, affect
the risk of conflict recurrence? Table 1 presents the main results from the Cox proportional
hazards models that capture the effect of changes in inequality on the risk of conflict recurrence,
conditional on the time the country has remained at peace. I report hazard ratios: values above
1 indicate that the particular variable increases the risk of conflict recurrence (i.e. shorter peace
spells) while a value below 1 indicates that it decreases the risk of recurrence (i.e. longer peace
spells). Model 1 shows the bivariate relationship between a change in inequality and the risk of
recurrence. Model 2 includes all covariates specified above. Given that data is missing for several
countries for the production of natural resources, Model 3 omits these variables to demonstrate
robustness of results.9 I find support for my hypothesis that changes in inequality affect the risk
of conflict recurrence. The results indicate that moving towards more inequality puts a conflict
at a higher risk of relapsing into armed conflict: a one unit increase in the change of inequality
10 is associated with around 2.25 to 3 times the risk of conflict recurrence.11
To see the results in more substantive terms, I visualize these effects over time. Figure 1
shows the Kaplan-Meier survival rates across time at peace for when inequality does not change
compared to when it is doubled or when it is halved. Survival rates are estimated with all
covariates set to their mean value; since conflict outcome is a categorical variable, I set it as
9Note that data on covariates remains missing for Yemen, Serbia and Sudan
10One standard deviation of change in inequality equals 0.3, so about 30 percentage point increase in inequality.
11This is quite substantial, if we compare it for instance to the effect of an unclear end to conflict on the risk
of conflict recurrence, which has been shown to be the most unstable type of conflict outcome (Kreutz, 2010).
See Figure A1 in Appendix.
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Table 1: Table 1: Change in Inequality and Risk of Conflict Recurrence
Cox Proportional Hazards Model
(1) (2) (3)






















Previous conflict duration 1.028**(0.011)
1.029***
(0.011)
Conflicts 86 76 83
N 159 141 155
Note: Hazard ratios reported. Robust standard errors clustered at the conflict level.
* p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p <0.01
unclear conflict end given that this is the most likely outcome amongst contemporary conflicts.
About 5 years after conflict ended close to 70% of conflicts will not have recurred when inequality
is halved. In contrast, if inequality was doubled only about 90% of conflicts will have recurred.
Meanwhile, if inequality levels stay the same about 40% of conflicts will have restarted.
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier survival curves by change in inequality observed
How applicable are these results to understanding recurrence or absence thereof in practice?
Unfortunately, most post-conflict years see little improvement in the distribution of economic
power. In Figure 2 I show the average change in inequality after conflict termination. 12 While
most post-conflict years see on average a decrease in inequality by about 8 percentage points, this
is notably a fairly small decrease. We can see that most post-conflict countries remain about as
unequal as they were, regardless of how unequal they were prior to conflict onset. Note that for
the pre-conflict level inequality, I use the Theil’s L index, where 0 indicates perfect equality and
higher values represent more deviation from an equal distribution of economic power. Only few
countries record strides towards including marginalised communities economically post-conflict
(e.g., Russia, Angola, Myanmar, Nigeria, Serbia, Ethiopia). The same seems to hold true for
worsening economic conditions and further marginalisation (e.g., India, Azerbaijan, Lesotho,
Ivory Coast, Turkey, Bangladesh).
12I omitted Bosnia-Herzegovina from this graph for purposes of better visualisation, since inequality decreased
tremendously by 1,7 and is thus an extreme outlier.
30
Figure 2: Mean Change in Inequality by Pre-Conflict Levels of Inequality
Closer analysis of different post-conflict countries where inequality increased or decreased,
recurrence or absence thereof is never explained by inequality alone (as with most factors that
shape armed conflict or human interaction). Ultimately, it appears to be a necessary condition
but not a sufficient one. This reinforces an argument made in extant literature: experiences of
grievances are perhaps not enough to translate into violent action in the absence of ’organisa-
tional capacity’ (cf. Tilly, 1978; Gurr, 1970). Macro-level processes that affect power distribution
among the elites are an important factor in understanding when we see conflict recurrence. But
if these do favor recurrence then how inequality developed is an important determinant for un-
derstanding recurrence and possibly even the intensity of repeat armed conflict. I use the case
of Mozambique to clarify this dynamic.
Mozambique experienced a particularly long and bloody civil war between the rebel group
Renamo and the ruling party Frelimo. The peace process in the beginning of the 1990s led to
a UN peace mission, multiparty elections with Renamo as a recognized party, a power sharing
agreement and the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs
as well as a security sector reform. Mozambique saw twenty years of ‘peace’ (meaning absence of
armed conflict), strong and steady economic growth and regular democratic elections. However,
in 2013 violence resurged.
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Figure 3: Distribution of nighttime lights in Mozambique: 1992 vs. 2012
Researchers point to fraudulent elections, the loss of political power on part of Renamo due
to the rise of a new opposition party and most importantly fear to lose out on the economic
profit of the newly found gas reserves. Although all of these factors can be argued to have played
a role, inequality has also been crucial to explain why the elite was able to remobilize for conflict
(Themnér, 2017). While Mozambique was economically on the rise, the areas formerly held by
Renamo – shaded in grey in the maps – were still lagging behind the rest of the country, as we
can see in Figure 3.
The map illustrates variations in per capita luminosity across Mozambique. The darker the
color, the more light they have in that area. By the end of conflict in 1992 most parts of the
population do not have light or live in extremely poorly lit areas. Over the years, economic de-
velopment brings higher absolute levels of luminosity, reflected in the overall increase in darkness
of the colors in the map. However, the former Renamo strongholds, particularly concentrated in
the provinces Manica, Sofala, Zambezia and Nampula, are still the most poorly lit areas. The
persistent inequality and specifically the marginalization facilitated the continuation of wartime
networks in the post-war period and provided Renamo’s leaders with a pool of ready, seasoned,
often frustrated and marginalised recruits and also popular support for its rebellion, particularly
because the attacks perpetrated by Renamo were mainly focused on damaging infrastructure,
rather than harming civilians.
It is difficult to know whether in a counterfactual world, where Mozambique would have
channeled economic development programs towards the most vulnerable populations, it would
have remained stable – despite the loss of power experienced by Renamo as a political party or
the discovery of natural resources. An interesting counter example is the case of Peru. Similar
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to Mozambique Peru experienced a very long and deadly civil war but saw steady economic
growth and repeat democratic elections after conflict termination. Although some important
differences in the post-conflict context should be highlighted: Peru did not implement a peace
agreement, nor did it see a UN peace keeping operation, or the development of the insurgent
organisation into a political party.
Conflict involving the insurgent group Sendero Luminoso ended in 2000, though violence al-
ready waned in intensity following the capture of the group’s leader in 1992.13 At conflict onset,
Sendero’s discourse resonated mainly with young, educated people in historically marginalised
areas. Its violent campaign against the state rapidly gained traction as a result of widespread
economic and social inequalities at the beginning of the 1980s (CVR, 2003; Del Pino, 1993;
Degregori, 1998; McClintock, 1984). The rebellion was in large parts led by middle-class, ed-
ucated professionals, while the lower ranks were filled by poor, provincial youth and popular
support came mostly from the most marginalized (Orihuela, 2012; Degregori, 1991). However,
as conflict progressed Sendero’s popularity plummeted as a result of i) a quite harsh counterin-
surgency campaign that left many communities severely victimised, as Sendero did not offer
any protection, and ii) the imposition of harsh rules by Sendero, which severely limited rural
livelihoods, e.g., they banned local markets and fairs due to the capitalistic exploitation they
represented (McClintock, 1984; Degregori, 1998; Coronel, 1996).
As Sendero had to rely more on coercion to hold on to territory, the government started
to become more popular across marginalised areas in the 1990s with the election of Alberto
Fujimori (1990-2000), who enacted widespread development programs. His policies appeared to
be more considerate of local issues: “they were conscious of the risk of capture of projects by the
local bosses, and incorporated what they hoped was a solution: building a direct relationship
between the central power and the rural communities” (Paredes and Thorp, 2015, :12). Local
communities started to develop economically and policies acknowledged the legacy of inequality.
Although projects often disproportionately targeted areas that were most likely to increase
support in elections (i.e. more densely populated areas) and did not address extreme poverty in
many rural areas, living standards across previously marginalised areas increased (Schady, 2000;
Orihuela, 2012). As a result, acceptance and support for the democratically elected government
increased as people that had previously lived in areas completely secluded from electricity, water
or education, now had roads, hospitals and schools (Orihuela, 2012). Though inequality remains
high and poverty remains an important policy issue in Peru, many previously marginalised areas
have seen an improvement in economic development – compared to levels experienced before
13Note: Sendero remains active until today and has still not been completely defeated, after mid-1990s armed
violence has been concentrated in the main coca-cultivating valleys and has caused only few deaths compared to
the death toll of over 70,000 victims during the conflict.
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conflict onset. The development experienced across previously marginalised areas has been key
in limiting the success of Sendero’s ongoing propaganda campaign to recruit new members in
impoverished areas and escalate its violent campaign to a level, which would be considered
‘recurrence’ of armed conflict (see Paredes and Thorp, 2015).
2.6 Limitations and avenues for future research
The analysis suggests that contrary to previous theories on conflict onset, levels of inequality
alone are less indicative of the risk of recurrence than how inequality developed.14 A more
dynamic relationship might be at play after conflict termination, further conditioned by the
context of the armed conflict which shape opportunity costs of violence amongst entrepreneurs
of violence, or in other words the elites. Yet, this analysis must be considered given the limita-
tions that relying on nightlight data brings. Nightlight data are ultimately a rough measure of
economic activity and do not fully capture income levels, or access to public services like water,
health facilities or education. While the analysis suggests that there is a strong relationship,
future research would gain from disaggregating more closely different factors associated with
economic power, such as income levels or living standards. 15
Further, lack of data across cases on which areas where previously controlled by insurgents
does not permit me to analyse a link between the improvements of economic standing in previous
rebel-controlled areas, where insurgents would conceivably be most likely to access recruits, and
renewed conflict. The cases of Peru and Mozambique show that these might be specifically salient
areas for understanding the link between changes in inequality and the risk of conflict recurrence.
Although, for instance, Mozambique is currently experiencing intense violent campaigns by
Islamist militants in the northern province of Cabo Delgado (Figure 3 shows that this is also an
area which continues to be marginalised), which was not a Renamo-controlled area.
Additionally, it might be important to consider why living standards improved or worsened.
Previous research on relative deprivation has shown that it matters whether being economically
marginalised is directly attributed to the government (e.g. Rustad, 2016). Presence of insurgents
could be a driver behind socio-economic development if they provide access to public servives
such as health facilities or other forms of governance relevant to socio-economic development
such as a reliable justice system, which could give rise to secure property rights, which are
essential for development (cf. Dell, 2010). And in fact, the emerging literature shows that many
14In figure A2 and A3 in the appendix I also show model estimates using inequality as the main independent
variable instead of change in inequality. The results suggest that higher levels of inequality, whether measured
using the Theil’s L index or the Gini index increase the risk of recurrence but the effect is not distinguishable
from 0, allowing me to not reject the null hypothesis that inequality has no effect on recurrence.
15Specifically, other research associates nightlight with state capacity, which could ultimately be linked with
a better capacity to enact counterinsurgency campaigns (Koren and Sarbahi, 2018, cf.) but also better public
service provision. Other research suggests that both are crucial for winning armed conflict (Beath et al., 2012;
Mikulaschek et al., 2020; Lyall et al., 2020, e.g.)
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rebel groups do provide such services, though to varying extent (e.g. Arjona, 2016; Stewart,
2018). An interesting question to pose here would be: if rebels are attributed the improvement
in living standards will local populations still support escalation of violence or will they be
inclined to restrain violence that could threaten their newly gained economic standing? These
are all questions and dynamics that need to be carefully studied and require more fine-grained
data at the subnational level.
Further, the identification strategy employed here does not allow me to rule out problems
associated with selection on observables designs such as omitted variable bias or reverse causal-
ity. Future research would benefit from understanding how armed conflict ultimately shaped
socio-economic development. While existing literature emphasises the negative effects of armed
conflict on economic growth or human capital, we know very little about how armed conflict
shapes development more broadly and at a subnational level (cf. Collier et al., 2008). Those
most marginalised, are often the ones most affected by armed conflict. Does armed conflict just
reinforce marginalisation? Is this perhaps the mechanism explaining the ‘conflict trap’ and also
why even countries that do not go back to war, see extremely high crime rates instead? Interest-
ing research at the intersection of economics and psychology seems to suggest that the picture
might not be so grim: communities most victimised by armed conflict reinforce social cohesion
and display more altrustic behavior, which could be linked to more socio-economic development
(e.g. Blattman, 2009; Voors et al., 2012; Gilligan et al., 2014).
2.7 Conclusion
Armed conflict changes societies and the end of violence is often an opportunity to address old
structures and make space for peace. Yet countries are faced with a multitude of competing
priorities post-conflict and also many threats to peace. Much of the existing literature and
donor practice supports (either explicitly or implicitly) a liberal peace building approach, in
which democracy, economic liberalization and rule of law are promoted as the foundations for
peace. This paper has set out to understand to which extent the economic inclusion of previously
marginalised populations can contribute to the prevention of conflict recurrence and whether not
addressing inequalities poses a significant risk to conflict recurrence. The findings suggest that
there is a strong effect between changes in inequality and the duration of peace. If inequality
is taken seriously and policies are implemented towards addressing grievances and needs of
marginalised populations this can help prevent recurrence. However, it might not be enough to
prevent the activity of violent non-state actors. But case study evidence suggests that at least
it restrains the extent of violence. Violent non-state actors need local populations to operate,
at least their tacit support is necessary to be able to launch attacks against the state military.
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Inequality or relative deprivation of a sub-population is arguably quite important for un-
derstanding why people join a rebel group, Many post-conflict governments do not necessarily
address this issue sufficiently. While economic development and multiparty elections are often
at the forefront of policy making, the findings of this paper highlight the necessity to not only
spur economic growth or democratization but make sure larger parts of the population profit
from peace. These findings are also relevant to policymakers, as international donors pour mil-
lions into war-torn countries every year in a quest to secure peace. If efforts to rebuild these
societies were to focus on also addressing the exclusion of marginalised populations, beyond only
ex-insurgents or young males, countries could be more likely to see peace or at least stability.
The findings of this study suggest that cases like Mozambique or Peru are not necessarily
unique but part of a wider pattern. Although other studies have explored the role of inequality
as a motivation for violence, this paper has shown that strides towards addressing inequality can
reduce the risk of renewed conflict, i.e. high-intensity violence. The findings are hopeful in that
they show that it is not necessarily absence of inequality in itself that reduces the risk of conflict
but relative improvement over time. People update their outlook on life or to put it in economic
terms, their preferences, if confronted with change and it appears that this is specifically the
case after traumatic experiences such as war. The experience of ‘profitable peace’ across the
wider population could help make conflict too costly.
Yet, while an emerging literature highlights the need to win ’hearts and minds’, i.e. through
development, many efforts to build peace are not based on permanently addressing inequality
but solely on spurring economic growth and democratization, potentially in the hope that this
might lead to the reduction of grievances. Future research would also benefit from studying
marginalisation beyond the economic dimension. For instance, issues around cultural recognition
could be extremely important to understanding motivations for resorting to violence, even if
living standards are high, as is for instance apparent in the case of Spain and the conflict in
Catalonia (though this is not classified as an armed conflict).
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3 Linking Wartime Economies to Armed Violence in Post-
Conflict Countries: The Role of Civilian Support
Abstract
Why do some conflict-affected areas remain an arena of violent political contestation
with the state, while others do not? I explore how the legacy of wartime economies shape
where we see armed violence after conflict termination. Wartime economies help insurgents
create economic inter-dependencies with civilians, which decreases incentives to inform on
insurgents. Counterinsurgency, which relies heavily on intelligence, is thus specifically costly
in areas where civilians depend on the wartime economy to secure their livelihood, also
during peacetime. Simultaneously, mounting attacks and hiding in these areas is less costly
for insurgents as long as they enjoy civilian support. Using novel subnational violence data
for Peru, I apply an instrumental variables approach and demonstrate that areas which were
involved in the wartime economy see more violent attacks in years after conflict termination.
3.1 Introduction
Why do some conflict-affected areas remain an arena of violent political contestation with the
state, while others do not? This question is central to understanding conflict recurrence, insur-
gent survival and more broadly the conditions under which the state can regain monopoly over
the use of violence. Post-conflict societies are peculiar contexts because factors that facilitate
the resurgence of armed conflict, such as conflict capital (e.g. abundance of ex-fighters), lack
of trust in the state, the normalisation of violence or the entrenchment of wartime economies
tend to coexist with other factors, which have contributed to the end of armed conflict at large,
such as peace agreements, peace keeping operations, or military victory of one side (e.g., Them-
nér, 2011; Suhrke and Berdal, 2013; Bateson, 2017; Deglow, 2016; Themnér, 2017; Karim, 2020;
Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003b; Nilsson, 2008; Fortna, 2004; Toft, 2009). This tension becomes
particularly apparent when we focus on the local level: peace may have been reached and even
sustained at a national level but this is not necessarily true subnationally.
Extant research shows that previously conflict-affected areas are more likely to be the stage
of future insurgency or other types of organised violence due to dynamics that armed conflict
perpetuated such as lack of trust or organisational feasibility (e.g. Daly, 2012; Deglow, 2016;
Osorio et al., 2021). But it remains unclear why we would observe different trajectories of armed
violence across conflict-affected areas. In this paper I propose that subnational units may differ
in the continuation of armed violence between insurgents and the state given their involvement
in wartime economies.
Wartime economies encompass the “organisation and development of a society’s legal and
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illegal resource flows in support or as a result of conflict and violence” (Kurtenbach and Rettberg,
2018, p.2). Based on extant literature on the ‘feasibility’ of conflict, we would anticipate that
areas of resource extraction will witness more violence because they enable insurgent’ financing
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Ross, 2004). In contrast, I emphasise
that wartime economies in addition to revenues, they provide insurgents something far more
important: a source of legitimacy. To consolidate and retain control over resource extraction
and trade during war, insurgents were motivated to provide governance functions such as security
(Felbab-Brown, 2005; Cheng, 2018; Krauser, 2020).16 Inadvertently, this shapes a dependency
with local communities as wartime economies provide swathes of populations with sources of
livelihood 17. By protecting resource flows insurgents can create and retain civilian support
because this protects their livelihoods.
In the post-conflict era, communities usually remain reliant on revenue streams linked to
wartime economies and as a consequence also count on insurgents to provide protection. I argue
that these dependencies inform civilians’ cost-benefit calculations in providing intelligence to
the state about the insurgent, even in areas where the state’s coercive capacity is extremely
high.18 To successfully defeat an insurgent the state requires local intelligence (Kalyvas, 2006;
Berman et al., 2011). Plus, without local intelligence counterinsurgency is extremely costly.
This is even the case when insurgents operate on reduced capacity, e.g., due to lack of access
to resources or recruits. 19 The state is thus likely to to opt to contain the insurgent and only
invest minimal resources in active counterinsurgency operations. Insurgents, however, have an
incentive to continue to attack the state, not just to maintain control over the wartime economy
but to retain civilian support. But mounting attacks is too costly beyond areas where they do
not enjoy civilian support and could be informed upon.
I empirically test this argument using the case of post-conflict Peru. It offers a useful context
to study why armed violence continued in some conflict-affected areas and not others. According
to existing macro-level research we would not expect to observe continued armed violence.
Peru displays relatively high coercive state capacity, has seen record high economic growth and
development and has held repeat democratic elections. Crucially, apart from the insurgent
group Sendero Luminoso20, no other violent non-state actor remains active or has taken control
16The level of governance, e.g. the extent of public goods provision, varies by type of actor, capacity, location
and previous governance structures (e.g., Arjona, 2016; Arjona et al., 2015; Kaplan, 2017). Providing security to
the wartime economy is the most basic level of governance needed to retain support.
17Not just resource extraction generates income, but also resource trade spurs local economic activity by
positively affecting income of local businesses like restaurants, hotels or pharmacies – in areas of extraction but
also along trading routes.
18This is important because informants often put themselves and their families in danger. However by informing
on insurgents they do not only threaten their physical security but their livelihood, unless the state offers physical
and economic protection.
19Active counterinsurgency might be perceived as particularly costly in contexts where the insurgent is per-
ceived to not pose a threat to the incumbent government’s political survival.
20English translation: Shining Path; recently renamed itself to the Militarized Communist Party of Peru
(Militarizado Partido Comunista del Peru)
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of territory, e.g., there is no record of Peruvian cartels or other violent non-state actors that
might pose a serious threat to the state or Sendero and could lead to infighting or explain attacks
on the state security forces. This allows me to trace the mechanisms more carefully in absence of
turf wars that could alter the attitudes and experiences of civilians and also the tactics employed
by the insurgent and the state.
For the empirical analysis, I introduce new data on violent clashes involving remnants of
Sendero Luminoso and Peruvian state security forces from 2004-2020. I also collect subnational
data on coca cultivation during and after the conflict. To estimate the effect of coca cultivation
on armed conflict, I exploit the fact that coca leafs are only suitable for drug trafficking if they
contain the alkaloid cocaine and compile a novel coca suitability index (CSI). I employ the CSI
in an instrumental variable (IV) approach to exploit plausibly exogenous spatial variation in
suitability of land for cultivation of coca for drug production to assess the effect of wartime
economies. The results show that districts involved in the wartime economy see far more violent
clashes post-conflict than those that were not. Further analysis also demonstrates that districts
which are involved in the drug production today but were not involved in the wartime economy
do not see insurgent violence post-conflict. This lends support to the claim that the social legacy
of wartime economies matters rather than just feasibility alone. To understand the mechanism
underlying the results, I also provide illustrative examples using interview data I collected during
field work in Peru in the Spring of 2020.
Understanding why we see violence in some conflict-affected areas but not others is central
to a classic puzzle in political science: the origin and maintenance of monopoly over the use of
violence. The findings of this paper suggest that even in countries with high coercive capacity,
states will be unable to regain the monopoly over the use of force without winning over civilian
populations. This speaks directly to the literature on “winning hearts and minds” as a coun-
terinsurgency strategy and other literature that studies the importance of civilian populations
in shaping armed conflict dynamics more broadly (e.g. Beath et al., 2012; Berman et al., 2011;
Arjona, 2016; Kaplan, 2017; Hirose et al., 2017; Krause, 2017; Schubiger, 2021). The findings
suggest that insurgents are highly dependent on civilians and can exploit economic marginali-
sation to foment their role. This extends upon existing research that has mainly focuses on the
enduring nature of ethnic ties between insurgents and civilians.
The findings call researchers and policy makers to not overemphasise the relevance of coercive
state capacity alone. This is important to consider in other contexts like Afghanistan, Sierra
Leone, or the Democratic Republic of Congo, where international efforts have been focused on
training security personnel and coercive state capacity. While donors often also provide economic
assistance they have payed less attention to the fact that legitimacy is ultimately drawn from
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meeting local needs – economic needs being just one of them. Especially if insurgents already
meet these economic needs, providing some economic assistance and services may not be enough
if civilians do not credibly conceive that there will be a long term shift in the state’s policy towards
addressing their needs. Rebuilding state-civilian relationships requires extensive effort on part of
the state due to the long-term legacies of war (see Karim, 2020; Daly, 2012; Osorio et al., 2021;
Deglow, 2016). Unless the conditions which foster the need to retain wartime structures are
addressed, these legacies will likely survive and can ultimately also facilitate conflict recurrence.
The article is organized as follows. I first discuss existing literature and present the theoretical
framework to illustrate why and under which conditions areas involved in the wartime economy
see more violent clashes than others. Next, I introduce the case of Peru and describe my research
design and data collection efforts. I then report the main results, followed by a discussion of the
mechanisms and alternative explanations. I conclude with suggestions for future research.
3.2 Literature Review
What explains post-conflict violence? Motivated by the fact that about half of countries emerg-
ing out of civil war will experience armed conflict again, a large body of literature has looked at
what explains conflict recurrence (e.g., Walter, 2015; Fortna, 2004; Nilsson, 2012). But also in
the absence of active armed conflict most post-conflict countries usually experience continued
armed violence, new forms of violence and instability (Suhrke and Berdal, 2013). Only recently
have scholars started to study why some countries experience violence beyond recurrence. Below
I give a short overview.
One strand of literature focuses on structural factors. Particularly, weak state capacity, weak
state institutions or bad governance is often emphasized as a culprit in the conflict onset and
recurrence literature (e.g., Richani, 2010; DeRouen Jr et al., 2010; McBride et al., 2011; Walter,
2015; Mason and Greig, 2017). In other words the ability of the state to enforce its monopoly on
violence is important. Yet, Mukherjee (2014) finds that middle to high capacity states are more
likely to see longer, low-intensity armed conflicts. He traces this back to resource constraints
politicians face. Even in states capable to defeat an insurgency, incumbent governments often
prefer to contain peripheral ethnic conflicts as long as their political survival is not threatened.
Meanwhile, Kleinfeld and Barham (2018) argue that violence is not a function of weak capacity
but lack of political will: violence often maintains elites in power – also in democratic states.
Democratisation as an important element on the path towards peace has also become highly
debated; research highlights that it is decisive how and when democracy is introduced after
conflict to prevent election violence (e.g., Brancati and Snyder, 2011, 2013).
Another strand of literature emphasises the legacy of armed conflict and factors pertaining
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to the conflict, which continue to affect post-conflict dynamics. Simply the fact of having
experienced armed conflict, makes countries also more susceptible to experiencing other types
of violence such as homicides or interpersonal violence (Archer and Gartner, 1976; Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004; Rivera, 2016; Østby et al., 2019). Linked to this, the organizational legacies of war
may be central in enabling future collective action (Daly, 2012; Osorio et al., 2021). Violence
also leaves behind a psychological legacy. Bateson (2017) looks at how civilians in conflict
zones in Guatemala were socialised into use or acceptance of extralegal violence and shows
that this sentiment prevails until today. Likewise, perceptions of the “enemy’ but also bonds
formed during armed conflict matter. In ethnic conflict, threat perception can spur violence
Balcells et al. (2016). And in fact if minority and majority groups share power, violence can
be even more likely (Blair et al., 2017). In turn, social ties among ex-combatants, who are
an important residual element of armed conflict, are extremely important as well. They often
have the training and also network to continue to engage in violence and can have different
incentives to do so (Kalyvas, 2015a; Themnér, 2011, 2015; Themnér, 2017; Nussio, 2018; Daly
et al., 2020). Armed conflict also erodes trust in the state and specifically trust in state security
forces, which is important to understand why the state is unable to regain its monopoly over the
use of violence. This can for instance explain where we see post-conflict crime (Deglow, 2016).
Interestingly, Karim (2020) shows that in areas of limited statehood positive direct interaction
between civilians and the police can lead to improved perceptions of the state, while unfair
treatment reinforces negative views.
Existing literature has demonstrated quite clearly that armed conflict imprints certain psy-
chological, social and political dynamics which can explain why previously conflict-affected areas
are more susceptible to future armed violence. But the explanations have predominantly been
focused on the rationale of one warring actor, although it takes two to fight. Another limitation
is that theories which highlight links between insurgents and civilians usually emphasise only
ethnic ties. Rarely do scholars consider the relevance of non-identity based ties in the civil war
literature. While ethnic ties are certainly important, not all conflicts are ethnic and we have
seen a significant decline in the number of ethnic conflict in recent years (Cederman and Pengl,
2019). In the following I propose a theoretical framework that builds on the reviewed literature
but discerns more closely why some conflict-affected areas are more likely to see continued vio-
lence than others as a function of their role in the wartime economy. I argue that the wartime
economy creates economic ties between insurgents and civilians, which shape the costs of fight-




The presence of natural resources can play an integral part in post-conflict societies. In fact,
the potential spoils of natural resources can be used to negotiate peace deals (Rustad and
Binningsbø, 2012). Yet looking at the case study literature, we see that lootable resources in
particular tend to help violent non-state actors maintain themselves post-conflict (Rettberg and
Ortiz-Riomalo, 2016; Cheng, 2018). Scholars often attribute the presence or endurance of violent
non-state actors, especially in areas of resource extraction, to weak state capacity or absence
of the state. In turn, I put forward an argument that highlights the importance of the civilian
population, explicitly assuming that the state has the coercive capacity to defeat the insurgent
and is in fact present in extracting areas.
Scope Conditions I focus on understanding the logic behind armed violence within i) a
context of asymmetric conflict, meaning that the government’s military represents a real and
credible threat to insurgents (cf. Weinstein 2006) and ii) a context where armed conflict is
considered to have ended because intensity of armed violence has dropped significantly for
prolonged periods of time.21
Importantly, the argument put forward rests on the assumption that these conditions signify
that the overall power balance has shifted in favour of the state; to an extent that specifically
state’s with high coercive capacity should be able to defeat the insurgent. Under these conditions
civilian support for the insurgent denotes something more than reluctant acquiescence (cf. Blair
and Kalmanovitz, 2016), as the state offers a credible threat in disseminating the insurgent.
Additionally, the theoretical frame work aims to explain violence between the state and an
insurgent group who is ideologically motivated. I follow Guttierez-Sanin and Wood (2014:214),
and define ideology as “a set of more or less systematic ideas that identify a constituency,
the challenges the group confronts, the objectives to pursue on behalf on that group, and a
(perhaps vague) program of action”. If conflict ended, potential fighters likely assume and de
facto face a reduced likelihood of winning war, should they resume conflict. Thus they may
turn into criminal groups and leave their political agenda behind (Nussio, 2018; Cheng, 2018).
Especially if resource extraction financed warfare, ideological motivations of many members may
not have been so strong to begin with (Weinstein, 2006). I assume, however, that even if just
some members of an insurgent group remain unsatisfied with the political status quo and are
ideologically motivated to fight the state, this can yield a fruitful basis for future attacks against
the state.
21What constitutes the “end” of conflict is highly debated – here I define it as a relatively sustained drop in
conflict intensity below lethal levels used to classify armed conflict as “active”, i.e. below 25 battle related deaths.
This level is based on the definition of one of the most used conflict databases: the Uppsala Armed Conflict
Database, an armed conflict is active in years in which they record 25 or more battle related deaths.
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Although political and criminal motivated violence are difficult to differentiate and in fact
may often be connected, it is important to think about what ultimately motivates violence.
Insurgents continue to attack the state wanting to compete for political power as their end goal.
In contrast, criminal groups often also employ violence against political actors but violence is
motivated by economic factors not ideological motivation (Kalyvas, 2015b; Lessing, 2015) 22
3.3.1 Role of Wartime Economies
The experience of war leads to destruction and re-construction of infrastructure, social ties and
local economies. The presence of lootable resources in some areas, makes them more prone
to be targeted for control by insurgent groups. Ross (2004) suggests lootability to be a key
characteristic shaping the mechanism linking resources to conflict. Resources are cosidered
lootable when they are easy to extract, i.e., without much capital investment. For instance,
minerals, diamonds, gems, hydrocarbons, and drugs (opium, cocaine) are more likely to be
associated with conflict dynamics because they offer a source to finance rebellion (e.g., Lujala
et al., 2005; Lujala, 2009, 2010).
Wartime economies encompass the “organisation and development of a society’s legal and
illegal resource flows in support or as a result of conflict and violence” (Kurtenbach and Rettberg,
2018). If an insurgent group has gained control of the resource extraction or at least extracts
revenues from lootable resources in some way, they are likely to want to sustain territorial
control in these areas by offering some sort of governance, which guarantees that they will be
able to exploit revenues in the future (cf. Olson, 1993). This can come for instance in the form
of protecting against violent attacks from other violent actors (Sánchez De La Sierra, 2020),
reducing violence in extracting areas Krauser (2020), specifically also against civilians (Bellows
and Miguel, 2009; Salehyan et al., 2014).
Wartime economies are also crucial to sustain local livelihoods of communities. Specifically
labor-intensive extraction of resources, such as opium, coca, timber, or metals from artisanal
mines, often provides economic opportunities for a large number of civilians living in areas
of resource extraction or living along routes of resource trade. Not just resource extraction
generates income, but also the trade itself spurs local economic activity by positively affecting
income of local businesses like restaurants, hotels or pharmacies. Thus wartime economies do
not cease to exist just because armed conflict ended. In fact, I argue that both communities
in extracting and trading areas as well as the insurgent controlling these economies have a
strong interest in protecting these revenue streams, which creates and sustains an important
co-dependency, which can explain why insurgents remain able to operate in these areas.
22This explains why criminal violence is not always visible, see Duran-Martinez (2015) for an excellent take on
the visibility of violence by criminal actors.
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During conflict popular support for violence can explain subnational variation in armed
conflict (Linke et al., 2015). Once widespread violence has ended and some stability has set in,
going back to war can be hard to justify. Different studies in post-conflict contexts have explored
“war-weariness”. Using surveys they have demonstrated across different contexts that people are
less likely to support violence, the more violence they were exposed to (e.g., Colombia: Tellez,
2018; North Caucasus: Bakke, O’Loughlin, and Ward, 2009; Sudan: Hazlett 2020). Thus, both
the state and non-state actors have to constrain their use of violence, even if strong state capacity
or access to resource rents would allow them to finance violence, e.g., buy arms, recruit fighters.
Escalation of violence could threaten their political survival respectively.
I propose that areas with a legacy of being involved in the wartime economy see more
armed violence between insurgents and the state because the co-dependency affects civilians
willingness to share intelligence about the insurgent with the state. The mechanisms connecting
the wartime economy to post-conflict armed violence is not simply ‘feasibility’, i.e. resource
extraction enables insurgent financing (see Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004;
Ross, 2004). Instead, wartime economies can be a source of legitimacy for insurgents and help
them reduce the costs of staging an attack against state security forces. While legitimacy can
be drawn from various sources, in areas of resource extraction it is often performance-based, e.g.
based on the delivery of salient public goods for the local population such as security. 23
While, the level of public goods provision and other governance functions such as justice
provision by the insurgent varies by type of actor, capacity, location and pre-war governance
structures (Arjona et al., 2015; Arjona, 2016; Kaplan, 2017), I argue that provision of security
to the market, e.g., activities of resource extraction and trade, is sufficient for the insurgent in
order to retain civilian support not specifically because of the insurgents ideological agenda but
because civilians depend on the resource-related economic activity to sustain their livelihoods.
Civilian support could be tacit (e.g., not informing on the gang to the police) or explicit (e.g.,
agreeing to hide arms and drugs) (Wickham-Crowley, 1987), but specifically support is more
than reluctant acquiescence as civilians could inform on the insurgent (cf. Blair et al., 2016). So
even in cases where insurgents face constraints in operational capacity (e.g., number of members)
and states have sufficient military capacity to defeat the insurgent, areas involved in the wartime
economy will be more likely to see armed violence than other areas because of the attitudes of
the civilian population.
Dependencies between civilians and insurgents inform cost-benefit calculations in providing
intelligence to the state about the insurgent, even in areas where the state’s coercive capacity is
23I do not explicitly test the effect of war economies on violence against civilians. But data shows that
insurgents have refrained from victimising civilians indiscriminately after conflict termination. Likely because
this could lead to civilians either mobilising against the insurgent or siding with the state.
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extremely high. This is important because informants often put themselves and their families
in danger. However by informing on insurgents they do not only threaten their physical but
their economic survival. This argument builds on extant literature on counterinsurgency which
has highlighted the importance of civilian support or in other words legitimacy for each warring
actor (e.g., Berman and Matanock, 2015). Local intelligence helps state security forces to identify
and dismantle insurgent groups (Berman et al., 2011). Yet, counter insurgency campaigns are
extremely costly without being able to identify insurgents (Lyall andWilson, 2009). For instance,
should the state try to attack the insurgent without enough intelligence this could backfire.
Indiscriminate targeting could shift support in favor of insurgent and encourage individuals to
join (Findley and Young, 2007; Lyall et al., 2013). Additionally, handling insurgents badly and
incurring too many military deaths or even worse civilian casualties caused by state security
forces could also threaten incumbent governments’ political survival (Gartner, 2008). Thus,
counterinsurgency is particularly costly if the state lacks relevant information on its opponent,
which should be the case in areas involved in the wartime economy, as civilians living there are
likely to prioritise securing their livelihood before anything else.
The effect of wartime economies on insurgent violence should be even more emphasised in
a post-conflict context, where the power asymmetries between insurgents and the state are
likely to have increased. Thus I expect insurgents to retract to areas of resource extraction and
mount more attacks against the state in these areas, because civilian support reduces the costs of
attacking a much stronger state and the state in turn may want to defeat the insurgent but due to
lack of intelligence faces high costs of counterinsurgency, which likely result in the state pursuing
a strategy of containment rather than actively fighting the insurgent as the government’s main
goal is to retain political power on a national level (cf. Mukherjee, 2014). From this I derive the
following testable hypothesis:
H: Areas which were involved in the extraction of labor-intensive lootable resources during war,
i.e. the wartime economy, see more violent clashes than other areas post-conflict.
3.4 The Case of Peru
Case Selection I evaluate the theoretical framework using the case of post-conflict Peru. I
argue that areas which were involved in the coca cultivation during the armed conflict see more
violent clashes between remnants of Sendero Luminoso and state security forces after conflict
termination. The case of Peru is interesting to study for several reasons. First, Peru displays
interesting variation the continuation of armed violence across conflict-affected areas. But apart
from news reports linking drug-trafficking to the presence of Sendero Luminoso, there has been
45
no systematic analysis as to whether legacies of the war or simply criminal opportunities explain
these patterns. Second, the Peruvian state displays high coercive state capacity (see Dargent
et al., 2017), particularly in areas where Sendero is present. For instance, the state has placed
52 military bases in one of the most violent areas, the Valley of the Rivers Apurimac, Ene and
Mantaro (VRAEM), and staffed them with 8,000 soldiers (Caretas, 2018). Additionally, Peru
has had repeat democratic elections and experienced economic growth and reduced poverty
since the end of armed conflict, all factors the literature considers relevant for understanding
onset or recurrence of armed conflict. Third, the armed conflict in Peru lasted for two decades
and is likely to have had lasting effects on state-society relationships and other social dynamics.
Fourth, Sendero continues to espouse a Marxist-Leninist political rhetoric and pursues a political
agenda. Lastly, to test micro-level arguments, I have been able to create a new dataset on armed
violence using disaggregated reports on political violence and access data on coca cultivation
during and after the conflict. Fine-grained data like this can be particularly difficult to obtain
for post-conflict countries, as these often lack the infrastructure to collect high-quality data.
Before I analyse why violence has ceased in some previously affected areas but not others, the
following provides relevant case information.
3.4.1 The armed conflict in Peru
Peru experienced a two decade long armed conflict, involving two different insurgent groups:
Sendero Luminoso and Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA). However, they varied
significantly in size, capacity, territorial control, deadliness and their survival. According to
Peru’s Truth & Reconciliation Commission, 46% of 69,000 casualties were caused by Sendero,
30% by state forces and only 1.5 % by MRTA (CVR, 2001). In the following I will focus on
Sendero because they a) controlled the wartime economy and b) continue to operate until today.
24
Sendero Luminoso, more formally known as PCP– Partido Comunista del Peru, was founded
by Abimael Guzman in the 1970s and had planned and set the ground work for its take over
in the department of Ayacucho years before. Sendero initiated its armed struggle on the eve
of Peru’s first democratic elections in 1980 in Chuschi, a rural area in Ayacucho 25. It quickly
rose to power in many rural parts of Peru in the early 1980s and managed to gain control of
various parts of the country. Whereas in 1981 six provinces were declared to be in a state of
24MRTA started its violent campaign in 1984, initially focusing on urban guerrilla attacks in Lima. It remained
comparatively weaker and limited violence against civilians while relying heavily on voluntary collaboration of
civilians. Its insurgency effectively ended after the killing of its last members in 1997 (McCormick, 1993). MRTA
expanded its activity to the Alto Huallaga but was never able to control substantial amount of territory and was
defeated by Sendero, as they were already operating in the area and had won the support of the drug traffickers
(Felbab-Brown, 2005).
25Technically the conflict only started in December 1982, when the state officially started its counterinsurgency
campaign and the number of battle deaths rose beyond 25
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emergency, by December 1989 this figure had risen to 56, accounting for nearly one third of all
administrative units (Taylor, 2017).
Historical state neglect, initial lack of military counter-insurgency until 1983 as well as a very
bloody and indiscriminate counter-insurgency strategy until the end of the 1990s all contributed
to Sendero’s initial success. But as Sendero started to engage more heavily in violence against
civilians and impose a radical rule of law, some local communities started to organise in so called
rondas campesinas (peasant patrols) to resist Sendero Degregori (1998). Once the government
realised how effective the rondas were at defeating Sendero, they were co-opted and communities
that did not have them yet were forced to form rondas (Degregori et al., 1996). The rondas
(or comites de autodefensa, self-defense committees) are an integral part to understanding the
demise of Sendero. On the one hand, they provided the government with better intelligence
and thus their violent tactics were more discriminate and effective. On the other hand, it made
Sendero’s approach to targeting civilians less discriminate and more intense (Degregori 1998;
CVR 2003), which reinforced opposition against the insurgency.
Additionally, the capture of Sendero leader Guzman and other high-ranking members in 1992
significantly weakened the group. The group was highly hierarchical and Guzman’s capture
eroded morale amongst many members. Many members demobilised, mainly also in response to
an amnesty law from 1992-1994 that offered Senderistas to turn themselves in, only having to
dispose of their weapons and serve a short period of military service, in return for impunity. Re-
maining members decided to retract and regroup under the leadership of Oscar Ramirez Durand
alias ‘Feliciano’. Since the mid-90s activity has been significantly reduced and concentrated in
two areas: the Alto Huallaga Valley and the Valley of the Rivers Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro
(VRAEM) 26, Peru’s two largest coca-producing regions. However, after Feliciano’s capture in
1999, leadership split. Two factions emerged with rivalling relationships with Guzman. While
the Upper Huallaga faction remained loyal, the VRAEM faction allegedly cut ties with Guzman.
Wartime Economy During the armed conflict Sendero gained control of the then main pro-
ducing coca valley, the Alto Huallaga, in 1987. In contrast, coca cultivation in the VRAEM
mainly evolved as a result of the armed conflict (Heuser, 2019). And while Sendero initially did
not want to extract profits from the drug economy, it eventually started taxing and protecting
the drug trade, resulting in a yearly income of at least $30 million (Felbab-Brown, 2005). Note,
that Sendero was never directly involved in cocaine production. Instead it formed an alliance
with local drug-processing and trafficking groups called firmas) and relied on controlling drug
smuggling routes and exerting “cupos” (taxes) from drug traffickers and coca farmers (Van Dun,
26The M was only added in 2012, and is a designation used by the state (Supreme Decrete D.S. No. 074–




Sendero gained civilian support in coca valleys by protecting farmers from abusive firmas and
helping them negotiate better prices. Additionally, Sendero used part of the resource revenues
to finance public goods such as access to running water. However, its primary source of support
was the protection from anti-narcotics state policies. Success of counterinsurgency operations
in the coca valleys became a function of whether the military credibly signalled that it would
allow coca cultivation as this shifted peasant’s allegiance, who in part saw Sendero as abusive
as well, having imposed a harsh and bloody rule of law (Gonzales, 1994; Felbab-Brown, 2005;
Weinstein, 2006). For instance, Sendero launched one of its most successful attacks in 1989, after
the Peruvian government had started spraying coca fields in the Alto Huallaga with herbicides,
which had provided Sendero with vast civilian support (Gonzales, 1994).
3.4.2 The ‘Post-Conflict’ Era
Armed conflict was officially proclaimed to have ended and won by the state in 2000. But
armed conflict involving Sendero has persisted in some areas to varying intensity. Specifically,
between 2007 and 2010, clashes resulted in more than 25 battle related deaths per year but
overall intensity remained relatively low and clashes have been concentrated in the coca valleys:
Alto Huallaga and the VRAEM, where Sendero continues to control the drug economy 27 as
communities lack opportunities to pursue alternative livelihoods. And even if farmers would grow
other crops or produce other goods, many communities (specifically in the VRAEM) continue
to have difficult access to formal markets.
Although the VRAEM has been under state of emergency since 1999 and most of the military
bases are located in this area (Saffon, 2020), the Peruvian government only admitted to the con-
tinued presence and threat posed by Sendero Luminoso in the VRAEM in 2007. It subsequently
created the Comando Especial de las Fuerzas Armadas to tackle drug trafficking and terrorist
activities in the area. Operacion Excelencia 777 was launched and according to state sources suc-
cessfully raided and destroyed several insurgent camps in 2007. Nonetheless, Sendero Luminoso
has maintained its stronghold in the VRAEM and specifically in Vizcatan del Ene (Interview
Devida, 2020). In this area they also have active collaborators, who share intelligence about
counterinsurgents with them (El Comercio 2020, IDL 2019). And while the state now considers
itself to be at ‘war in the VRAEM” (Ministry of Defense, 2018), the VRAEM faction appears to
have acquired some degree of legitimacy by garnering support from coca growers directly (van
Dun, 2019). In contrast, the Huallaga faction was more actively targeted by counterinsurgents
post-conflict and dismantled with the capture of its leader Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala, alias
27Additionally, there are also reports of Sendero controlling illegal timber trade and illegal mining activities in
the VRAEM.
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Artemio in 2012. As I argue in the analysis, one of the reasons is that Artemio’s strategy em-
phasised close ties to the “higher echelons of the drug industry” over local civilian support (van
Dun, 2019, 1041). This strategy became costly, as the state gained popularity in mid-2011 by
reversing its anti-narcotics policies, e.g., temporarily halting eradication, under the leadership
of Ricardo Soberon as head of Peru’s anti-narcotics agency Devida.
Ideology of Sendero post-conflict Although the state claims that Sendero is only a drug-
trafficking terrorist group (‘narco terroristas’), both expert interviews and also the data I col-
lected for this project through NGO reports and news reports suggests that Sendero factions
remained ideologically focused in their activities. Reports published by the Defensoria del
Pueblo, an independent government agency, repeatedly record political propaganda activities
by Sendero. Additionally, the Sendero faction in the VRAEM published a new manifesto in
2009 (Panorama, 2009). Additionally, it has in recent years shifted its rhetoric towards fram-
ing itself as the defender of the coca leaf. In fact, the VRAEM faction has tried to transform
itself into the Militarized Communist Party of Peru (MPCP), in order to be able to run in
elections and obtain official support from the VRAEM peasant communities that were victims
of Sendero’s violent tactics in the past (Saffon, 2020)
3.4.3 The Drug Market in Peru.
Coca, the raw material for cocaine, has historically been grown in Peru and the Andes. Coca
cultivation is legal in Peru and supposed to be sold to National Enterprise of Coca (Empresa
Nacional de la Coca, ENACO). However, most of the coca production is sold illegally as it is
fairly unprofitable to sell to ENACO. Drug production, however, only really began after the
1970s as the demand for cocaine increased and accelerated during the armed conflict. Before
that, coca was mostly cultivated for traditional purposes.
In contrast to Mexico and Colombia, Peru’s drug production is mainly controlled by family
clans, referred to as firmas (Van Dun, 2016). While Sendero increasingly gained control over
the main coca valleys it cooperated with the firmas rather than fight them (van Dun, 2019).
Nowadays, several international cartels are known to operate in Peru and to be involved in
the drug trade but they do not control territory and there is no record of a Peruvian cartel
as such. This organizational structure reduces the risks of being caught and has also reduced
violence amongst armed non-state actors, including Sendero Luminoso (Balbierz 2015; Beriain
2014; Pachico 2012; Van Dun 2012).
Coca is cultivated on very small parcels of less than one hectare – hence individual ‘cocaleros’
(coca farmers) do not have much control over coca supply nor do they enrich themselves by
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cultivating coca. The crop can be harvested 3 to 6 times a year, depending on field slope, age of
the plantation and the agricultural techniques applied.28 Specifically, in areas aimed to cultivate
coca for illicit markets, like the VRAEM, cocaleros heavily use fertilizers and pesticides. Coca
cultivation is the most labor-intensive stage of cocaine production and sustains the livelihood of
many communities. For instance, 48 percent of total net family income in the VRAEM in 2000
came from coca cultivation (Bedoya, 2003). But coca cultivation is not necessarily as profitable
as many assume. Although, in comparison to local labor alternatives or alternative crops it does
pay better.
In Peru, most of the coca leaves are only processed into cocaine paste (pasta basica de
cocaina–PBC). It is then trafficked to neighbouring Bolivia and Brazil. Most of it is transported
on small planes or on foot by “mochileros” (backpackers), relying heavily on employing mostly
young males. Some of it is also trafficked out of ports and from Lima’s international airport,
either hidden in freight or using drug mules. Today the main destination is Europe and Asia
but also urban areas in Brazil and Chile, rather than the American market (which is catered
to by Colombia after the air interdiction campaign in the 1990s). Anti-drug policies were
actively introduced in 1995, when the National Plan for the Prevention and Control of Drugs
was launched. Peru receives financial aid from the USA to implement this plan as part of the U.S
“War on Drugs”. It is important to note that Peru does not allow the use of chemical spray to
fumigate coca crops with herbicides. Instead, it combines manual eradication with substitution
schemes to encourage farmers to cultivate legal alternatives. These policies, however, have done
little to really diminish production but rather displaced it (at times only temporarily until fields
become fertile again). Only the “Denial Bridge” or interdiction of illegal airplanes and boats
between Peru and Colombia in 1994 plus the collapse of the Cali Cartel in Colombia in 1995 (one
of the main customers of Peruvian cocaine) led to a sudden drop in the demand for coca and
hence a drop in price, specifically in the Huallaga region. As a response, about 60% of formerly
cultivated areas were left abandoned (UNOCD 2002). However, coca farming still represents a
large fraction of income for peasants and cultivation has increased in recent years according to
UNODC, in response to increase in demand for cocaine in Europe, Asia, and more recently also
Brazil .
28In general, the first harvest is carried out between February and March. This is the period of highest
precipitation and, consequently, the volume of coca leaf is higher than for any other harvests. The second
harvest takes place 3 to 4 months later, i.e. between May and June. The third harvest, between August and
September, and the fourth harvest, between November and December, are less productive because they coincide
with the dry season.
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3.5 Research Design
My analysis leverages variation across space in coca cultivation during the conflict, instrumented
using a novel coca suitability index. In the following, I summarise data, identification strategy,
and model specifications. Data is aggregated to district boundaries during the year 1993, yielding
1793 districts. 29
3.5.1 Identification
The decision to cultivate coca is not random and likely depends on socio-economic factors or the
presence of violent actors. However, suitability to grow coca is plausibly exogenous to violence or
other factors that might predict violence. I thus employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach,
using a novel coca suitability index as an instrumental variable to estimate the effect of coca
production on violence, in spite of non-random compliance, meaning that they are not a random
subset of the population. For instance, districts that grow coca are more likely to lack labor
opportunities that offer better wages and thus make coca cultivation an attractive option to
sustain ones livelihood.
Coca Suitability To estimate the effect of coca cultivation on armed conflict, I exploit the fact
that coca leafs are only suitable for drug trafficking if they contain the alkaloid cocaine. Specif-
ically two species of the coca plant called Erythroxylum: i) E.coca and ii) E. novogranatense,
are most commonly cultivated for this purpose since they both produce the alkaloid cocaine
(Plowman, 1984) 30. According to botanical research a certain set of conditions need to be in
place, for coca leafs to contain cocaine:
1. Elevation: 300-2000 meters above sea level Plowman (1984)
2. Precipitation: 500-4000 mm year (Plowman, 1979)
3. Soil: pH 3.5-6.0 (Johnson and Foy, 1996)
4. Temperature: 19-27 degrees Celsius (Acock et al., 1996)
5. Light Levels: PPFD>155 µ mol/m2/s Acock et al. (1996)31
29The year of 1993 was chosen because census data at the district level for the year of 1981, which would have
been ideal because it is pre-conflict, was missing for an extensive set of districts.
30There are different varieties. E. coca var. coca is most common in Peru and Colombia, E. coca var. ipadu aka
Amazonian coca (Bolivia, Colombia, Brazil, and Peru), E. novogranatense var. novogranatense aka Colombian
coca, E. novogranatense var. truxillense aka Trujillo coca (northern Peru) (cf. Plowman and Hensold, 2004;
Restrepo et al., 2019)
31They grew the plants under a 12-hr photo period,. To convert the PPFD to daily light integral, I multiply
the PPFD by 12 hours x 3600 s/hr. Hence, ideal light levels are minimum 6.696.000 µ mol/m2/day. The data
on solar radiation is measured in kJ/m2/day. I use the formula: 1kJ = 2018 µ molFaust and Logan (2018), so
that 6.696.000 µ mol/m2/day = 3318 kJ/m2/day. Across all districts, this condition was met.
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Figure 4: Coca Suitability (mean) across Districts
I build a coca suitability index (CSI) based on these conditions. Data is at a resolution
of 30 arc seconds (1km2). Measures of soil acidity are taken from the Harmonized World
Soil Database version 1.2 (FAO and IIASA, ISRIC, ISS-CAS, 2012).32 Average temperature,
precipitation and solar radiation is computed as the mean across the years 1970–2000 using the
WorldClim version 2.1 dataset (Fick and Hijmans, 2017). Elevation data is taken from NASA’s
Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) (CGIAR-CSI, 2018). To calculate the index I first
assign the value 1 to each grid (about 1km2) within districts that meets all the conditions, and
0 otherwise. I then calculate the share of ‘suitable’ land for each district, resulting in a CSI
that ranges from 0 to 1 (see Figure 4: darker greens denote higher share of land suitable for
coca cultivation). In the analysis however I use a dummy of the CSI to facilitate interpretation,
assigning a 1 when any share of land is suitable for coca cultivation 33
32I use the indicator T_PH_H2O
33CSI is calculated by taking the sum of grids that meet the conditions, divided by the total number of grids.
Hence, CSI is fixed over time given that coca is a “renewable” resource, this suitability can also be understood
as the actual resource that varies across districts.
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3.5.2 Estimation Strategy
To test my hypothesis, I use the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator.
For the first stage I regress actual coca production on coca suitability:
Coca Productioni1994 = α1 + β1 CSIi + β2Xi + ε0i. (3)
I then fit the second stage to estimate violent attacks as follows:
V iolencei = α2 + λ2SLS ̂CocaProductioni + β3Xi + ε1i. (4)
The subscript i denotes a district. Xi is a matrix of district-level covariates, which are the
same set in both stages. I also present results without including covariates. I include robust
standard errors. Operationalisation of the variables is described in the data section.
For the IV approach to estimate the local average treatment effect, several assumptions need
to be met: The exclusion restriction implies that suitability for coca cultivation only affects
violence through its effect on coca production and there is likely no compound treatment effect.
I argue this is a plausible assumption as the exact combination of these climatic and geographic
factors does not predict any other variable that would conceivably explain variation in violence.
While for instance altitude alone could be an indicator for how inaccessible an area is, by
introducing this specific set of conditions, we see a very unique variation of suitability across
and within districts.34 One way this assumption could be violated is through spatial dependence
in the outcome (Betz et al., 2019). I take this into account by additionally estimating spatial
two-stage least squares (S2SLS) models (see Appendix B1). The monotonicity assumption
implies that there are no defiers, meaning districts that are suitable for coca cultivation are not
less likely to cultivate coca as a result of being assigned treatment, i.e. being suitable. This
seems plausible, given that coca cultivation is financially attractive to rural communities. The
instrument is relevant : I show that the coca suitability index reaches an F-statistic over 200 in
the first stage, which indicates that it is a strong instrument (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009).35
I also assume that coca suitability is randomly assigned. Coca suitability is independent of
potential outcomes and potential treatment assignments, this allows me to suggest that the
first stage measures the causal effect of coca suitability on coca production. As suitability was
assigned by nature, this assumption seems plausible. However, to show the robustness of results
I also include a set of covariates that at least would invoke conditional independence (see Sovey &
34While it is impossible to prove the validity of this assumption, the qualitative evidence supports my claim.
35I also show that the CSI is still predictive but less so for coca cultivation in 2017. The data demonstrates
that even though less districts overall produce coca, coca cultivation has expanded to other areas, that are less
suitable. This is probably due to successful eradication in some of the most suitable areas such as the Alto
Huallaga. See Appendix B3
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Green, 2011). Lastly, I also assume that the potential outcomes for each district i are unrelated
to the treatment status of other districts (stable treatment value assumption). This assumption
is problematic because the CSI is based on absolute ideal conditions. Under these conditions,
farmers are able to grow coca plants of high quality. But it is still possible to cultivate coca in
not fully ideal conditions, e.g. at lower altitudes. The caveat is that the alcaloid content of these
leaves is much lower (Soberon, 2012). But at times farmers decide to grow coca anyways because
prices for other products such as cacao, coffee, or pineapples have plummeted and they cannot
survive otherwise. This is also apparent from the smaller amount of hectares that ‘unsuitable’
districts cultivate, relative to suitable ones. As I show in the appendix B3 unsuitable areas
cultivate coca mainly after the war, when the Peruvian government starts to eradicate coca
crops and farmers are displaced to areas less suitable, e.g. lower altitudes. Additionally, since
these ‘practically’ suitable areas are likely located next to the de facto suitable areas, this
concern is also addressed by taking into account spatial interdependence in the instrument and
estimating a spatial two-stage least squares models (see Appendix B1).
3.5.3 Data
Armed Violence I introduce new data based on monthly reports of Peru’s Defensoria del
Pueblo, an independent government agency in Peru from 2004-2020. The reports track social
and political violence and specifically also insurgent activity since 2004 until today 36(Defensoria
del Pueblo 2019). The main dependent variables is the number of violent clashes between Sendero
Luminoso and state security forces at the district level across years. In total I record 186 violent
clashes.
The variable is not a battle deaths count variable. Instead I exploit the detailed nature of
the reports to record various types of events in which Sendero Luminoso and the state violently
confronted each other, such as ambushes, attacks, or violent captures. For most events the
descriptions include who initiated the confrontation. Reports also provide date of occurrence,
the district in which it took place, the identity of the perpetrator, and the number of victims
involved in the incident. Importantly, reports are not only based on open-source data and news
reports but also data collected directly via local Defensoria offices. Staff also travels to remote
areas to collect testimonies from affected areas (Interview with the head of the Defensoria division
of Huanta, Ayacucho). This directly decreases reporting bias often found in other databases that
rely mostly on only news reports from major newspapers. This makes data on events in remote
areas less reliable, which are often the location of armed violence in asymmetric conflict.
36Defensoria defines a social conflict as an event with at least one of the following features: (i) threat to
the integrity of people’s life or health, (ii) damage to private or public property, (iii) obstruction to freedom of
movement, (iv) impediment of the exercise of public authority, and (v) obstruction of public services delivery.
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Figure 5: Areas affected by Armed Violence during and after the conflict
Figure 5 depicts districts in red if they experienced armed conflict between 1980-2000 and
also saw armed violence between security forces and the Shining Path between 2004 and 2020.
Those shaded in light-orange experienced violence during armed conflict but not afterwards. We
can see a clear variation in the continuation of armed violence across previously conflict affected
areas. Note that I record three clashes in areas that did not see violence during armed conflict
(orange).
For purposes of getting a broader understanding of insurgent activity, I also code other
events involving Sendero Luminoso as one of the perpetrators, such as violence against civilians,
incursions, raids and propaganda activity. 37
Location of the Wartime Economy My main independent variable is a measure of which
areas were involved in the wartime economy (see Figure 6). I use data from Peru’s agricultural
census in 1994, which records whether districts cultivated coca and how many hectares (INEI,
37Additionally, the UCDP-GED dataset collects and publishes aggregate figures on violence, which I use to
validate the Defensoria Data. I find that discrepancies between data sources are restricted to nonviolent events.
Violent events that involve state security forces are the most heavily reported and least likely to be missed. By
using the Defensoria reports, however, I gain precision over the exact geolocation of events, since the location of
many events in the GED is often imprecise. For instance, it is quite often coded at the centroid of the province
or department, where the event occurred, rather than the actual location of the event.
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Figure 6: Coca Production during Wartime
1994). The census was conducted a year before anti-narcotics policies started to be enacted in
Peru and while armed conflict was still at levels that would be classified as civil war, i.e. above
1000 battle related deaths. These areas should reflect quite accurately districts that cultivated
coca during the war for the main purpose of financing insurgent activity. As a robustness test I
explicitly estimate the effect of coca production during wartime in areas controlled by Sendero
Luminoso during armed conflict (as opposed to other armed actors such as MRTA,; see Appendix
B4). As mentioned above, I instrument wartime economy using the coca suitability index (CSI)
described above.
Predictive Covariates With a perfect identification strategy, where my independent variable
is completely exogenous from my outcome, I would not need covariates. However, with an IV-
design it is conceivable that there might still be variables that influence both coca cultivation
during wartime and post-conflict armed clashes. I thus include a set of “pre-treatment” covariates
to reduce noise. Note that their effect is not causal and will not be interpreted. Using data from
the national census (INEI, 1981, 1972), I control for the literacy rate, the share of households
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with a dirt floor, and the electrification rate 38. Socio-economic development might explain both,
why people living in this district may become involved in the wartime economy to sustain their
livelihood and could also affect the propensity of districts experiencing post-conflict activity by
a violent non-state actor as trajectories of marginalisation do not necessarily change. I also
consider state capacity as an important determinant of insurgents’ ability to control resource
extraction and establish a wartime economy as well as their ability to establish a stronghold,
enabling to perpetrate violence more easily. I draw on historical data on road density (1973) and
number of state personnel (1972) as proxies for state reach. I also include a measure of exposure
to land reform in the 1970s, which improved counterinsurgency and could influence insurgent’s
ability to establish a wartime economy and also to stage attacks after conflict termination. Data
is taken from Albertus (2020).
Results are robust to other model specifications with additional variables pertaining to the
conflict, which however strictly speaking are not pre-treatment variables and thus not considered
in the main specification. I use data from Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR)
to measure whether the district was declared an emergency zone during the conflict, indicating
high conflict activity and thus more insurgent presence as repeat attacks indicate a more robust
command infrastructure in that area. I also measure whether the district was controlled by
Sendero, by looking at whether the district had a mayor in 1989. This is based on the reasoning
that “the ability of the guerrillas to prevent official elections from being held in the area” is the
best proxy for guerrilla control (McClintock 1998, 80). Rebel control of an area suitable for
coca cultivation, made it more likely that this area in fact cultivated coca during the conflict
(for instance, the highest producing area today, the VRAEM, was not a traditional site of coca
cultivation pre-conflict), this could make it more likely to see post-conflict violence. Results are
reproducible using replication files.
3.5.4 Interview Data
Capturing the underlying causal mechanisms linking past structures such as the legacy of a
wartime economy to current processes of political contention requires understanding of the
political context, security context and also people’s beliefs and living situations. In an effort to
build and substantiate theoretical claims made in this paper I collected data using interviews
during three months of field work in Lima and Ayacucho. Combined with the secondary sources,
these interviews provide the basis for understanding to which extent civilian support plays a role
in explaining why areas involved in the wartime economy continue to be focal points of armed
38For the 1981 census data is missing for several districts. I therefore use the 1972 literacy rate as the main
covariate in the main specification. I check the robustness of results using the 1981 data available. Both effect
size and significance levels remain consistent. Results are reproducible using replication files.
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violence. The qualitative analysis included in this papers is by no means exhaustive as this
would extend far beyond the scope of one paper. Instead qualitative data is used to illustrate
the causal mechanisms put forward and substantiate the quantitative analysis.
I collected in total 41 interviews. 20 interviews were conducted with experts related to the
armed conflict or the drug trade, the majority in Lima and some in Huamanga, the capital
city of Ayacucho (one of the most conflict-affected departments). The other 21 interviews
were conducted with community members and local officials in Huanta and Llochegua39, two
districts in Ayacucho, located close to or in the VRAEM respectively. This provided different
insights from which to understand the organisation of the drug trade today, the logic of insurgent
operations as well as the organisation of communities linked to the drug trade, social relations,
their understanding of the armed conflict and Sendero Luminoso today, current local security,
politics and also structures of marginalisation.
I selected the two sites based on the high conflict intensity they experienced during conflict.
Yet, the two sites vary in terms of actual coca cultivation and extend to which the local popu-
lation economically relies nowadays on the drug trade. While Huanta is not directly involved in
coca cultivation, many people in and around Huanta own chacras (parcels of land) in the jungle
area where coca can be cultivated. But mostly many businesses rely on the drug trade indirectly
as Huanta is one key transporting route for the drug trade. Nonetheless, not all livelihoods are
directly linked to the drug trade as Huanta is also very close to Huamanga, the department
capital. In contrast, Llochegua is today one of the biggest producers of coca leafs. Most people
depend on the drug trade directly or indirectly. Not everyone cultivates coca but local businesses
and livelihoods depend highly on revenue streams from the drug trade.
To identify interviewees I followed two strategies: For expert interviews I followed a snowball
system and asked interviewees to recommend others whom they believed I should speak with.
The primary goal was to obtain contextual and background information. For interviews in the
communities I worked with a research assistant, who was familiar with the areas and who could
identify relevant community members and leaders to speak to. This I also combined with a
snowball system. Across the potential pool of interviewees I explicitly made sure to include
women as interviewees. On the one hand, male interviewees would not necessarily recommend
women to talk to and on the other hand women themselves would often not consider themselves
relevant to talk to. The interviewees also spanned a spectrum in terms of their role within the
community.
The interviews were conducted in person and in Spanish (without a translator). Expert inter-
views were semi-structured but tailored to each interviewees’ background. Interviews in Huanta
39Llochegua used to be part of the district Sivia
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and Llochegua were semi-structured but left room for interviewees to elaborate on questions or
issues they found relevant, at times leading to prolonged conversations. All interviews started
with a detailed informed verbal consent procedure and interviewees were aware that they could
terminate the interview at any point. The interview protocol is included in the appendix B5.
I analyzed the interview data qualitatively with a view towards identifying commonalities
and variation in interviewees responses across and within communities or fields of expertise. My
analysis combines the interview data with field notes on informal interactions and observations
as well as secondary qualitative data. I do not necessarily claim to have interviewed enough
people as to have reached a point of saturation where additional interviews did not yield any
or little new information (cf. Small 2009). However, across the number of interviews one could
conceive a consensus in terms of important mechanisms and issues highlighted independent of
each other, which I use in the analysis as supportive evidence of the quantitative findings.
3.6 Analysis
In the following I want to estimate the effect of the wartime economy around coca cultivation
in Peru on the prevalence of armed violence after conflict termination. I begin the analysis
by looking at descriptive statistics to illustrate the tactics remnants of Sendero Luminoso have
employed and map changes in the nature of armed violence between the state and Sendero. I
then analyse the relationship between the wartime economy and armed violence post-conflict.
First, I look at the relationship cross-sectionally, aggregating across time the number of armed
clashes districts have seen and employing coca suitability as an instrument. Second, I put forward
qualitative evidence to analyse to which extent these results are in fact driven by civilian support
as suggested in the theoretical section. The analysis demonstrates that areas involved in the
wartime economy remain focal points for armed violence. This is the result of economic inter-
dependencies between the civilian population and Sendero Luminoso, which appear to mainly be
a function of the absence of access to formal markets in areas of coca cultivation and continued
marginalisation across different dimensions, economic just being one analysed here.
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Based on Defensoria reports I code both violent and non-violent events associated with Sendero
between 2004 and 2020 (these are the years for which reports were produced). Overall I record
482 events, of which 38,59% are violent clashes between state security forces and Sendero Lumi-
noso. Only seven of these violent clashes are directly related to coca cultivation or eradication,
i.e. attacking eradication personnel or security forces protecting eradication efforts. Two events
involved the killing of civilians (one cacao farmer and one local leader), possibly for being in-
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Figure 7: Violent Clashes by Initiator
volved in voluntary eradication programs.
Of the 186 violent clashes recorded since 2004, over 75% are initiated by Sendero Luminoso
(see Figure 7). Only in 15% of clashes state security forces clearly initiate an attack against
Sendero Luminoso. In most of these clashes (70%) Sendero Luminoso killed or at least injured
state security forces. Meanwhile, across all violent clashes, Sendero Luminoso members were
killed or injured in only 20% of clashes. This discrepancy may be in part the result of the targeted
recruitment of recently trained soldiers to become members of Sendero Luminoso, specifically
often snipers (Interview in Ayacucho, 2020). Additionally, this distribution in who initiates
clashes may also reflect the state’s counterinsurgency campaign being driven by a focus on
containment rather than active military defeat because it does not have sufficient intelligence to
mount attacks against insurgents. That is because lack of local intelligence has often resulted in
high numbers of casualties on side of the military. For instance, after one of the bloodiest attacks
in 2008 in Huancavelica, the only surviving military reports in an interview, that the community
members knew of an armed column that was prowling the area the previous week and preparing
a revenge attack (Vera, 2019). Additionally, the reports indicate that throughout the years,
state forces have managed to capture or kill 21 high-ranking members of Sendero Luminoso
during operations planned by state security forces, relying mostly on local intelligence. Only a
third of these resulted in an actual clash between the two actors. However, there were only two
significant hits: the capture of ‘Artemio’ in February of 2012, which led to the fall of the Alto
Huallaga faction as he was the leader of the faction operating in that area, and the killing of
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Figure 8: Number of clashes by district 2004-2020
‘Alipio’, military strategist and second in command of the faction in the VRAEM, in August
2013.
Across all 1,793 districts included in the analysis, 40 only 128 districts have seen activity
by Sendero after 2004. The most affected areas are the province of Huanta and La Mar in
Ayacucho (VRAEM; center-south of Peru) and the province of Leoncio Prado in Huanuco (Alto
Huallaga, center-North of Peru). Areas that see more attacks, likely exhibit a robust insurgent
infrastructure to be able to perpetrate attacks repeatedly. In the following I will analyse whether
this pattern is the result of the legacy of the wartime economy around coca cultivation.
3.6.2 Results
Table 2 presents the results of a 2SLS approach using the Coca Suitability Index (CSI) as the
instrument and also the reduced form estimates (regressing coca suitability index on armed
40Today more districts exist, for the analysis they have been aggregated to the 1993 district boundary
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clashes). I report first and second stage estimations with and without covariates. Whether
certain additional covariates are added or dropped does not change the estimates.
The IV approach estimates a local treatment effect (LATE), which is the effect of the wartime
economy on armed clashes for compliers, meaning districts that are suitable for coca cultivation
and cultivated coca during the war. The control group includes all districts that did not cultivate
coca during the war. Thus, this design helps us understand whether districts that cultivated
coca during wartime see more violence compared to those that do not.
We see in Table 2 in the first stage estimation that if a district is suitable for coca cultivation,
coca cultivation increases by approximately 42.5%, this effect is highly significant (p < .001).
The F statistic at 200 is sufficiently high (cf. Lee et al. 2020), suggesting the CSI is a strong
instrument. In the second stage, I use the fitted values from the first stage and find that
districts which cultivated coca during the conflict see 1.2 more violent clashes. This may seem
like a minuscule effect but given that the average district only sees .1 armed clashes and the
standard deviation of armed clashes is 1.3, this effect is quite large. The results remain stable
from the basic bivariate specification to the full model. As a robustness check, I use the intensity
of armed violence as an outcome, measured as the number of casualties or injured in violent
clashes (see Appendix B2). The results are in line with the main specification and show that
districts involved in the wartime economy see 3 to 4 more casualties or injured persons as a
result of violent clashes.
Further, the data shows that 26 districts did not cultivate coca during wartime but do so
today. These districts, however, see no armed clashes over the entire period of observation.
This lends support to my argument, which suggests that ’feasibility’ of violence, e.g., access to
lootable resource to finance violence, is not sufficient to explain where we see violence. Instead
violence is a function of the legacy of the wartime economy because this facilitates insurgent
operations post-conflict. This is also apparent if we analyse which districts witness violent
clashes even though they never produced coca during war or peace time. Only districts that
have been and remain key along transporting routes of the drug trade, see violent clashes. This
makes sense given that also along transporting routed civilians rely heavily on the economic
benefits provided by sustaining the wartime economy and thus staging violent attacks against
the state is less costly in these areas than it would be in areas where civilians do not benefit
from the drug trade (Interviews in Huanta and Luricocha, Ayacucho, 2020).
Through the protection of the wartime economy and consequently local livelihoods, insur-
gents can create a relationship with the civilian population based on economic ties. Post-conflict
insurgents are able to maintain this inter dependency if the wartime economy continues to finance
local livelihoods. If anything, post-conflict the relationship between insurgents and civilians is
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likely to improve given the necessity of insurgents to not threaten civilians’ physical survival
and exert too much coercion. A look at the tactics employed by Sendero in the post-conflict era
sustain this claim. Sendero has mainly refrained from engaging in repressive or very violent be-
haviour towards local populations in areas where they operate. The second most recorded type
of event involving Sendero Luminoso between 2004 and 2020 is political propaganda ( 34% of
events). This includes activities like the distribution of leaflets, painting of walls or the holding
of speeches in front of communities. Most of them are non-violent. 41 In several interviews with
community members in the VRAEM, respondents tell stories about encounters with Senderis-
tas. They recount the surprise of realising that they were not trying to forcefully recruit new
members but would only try to convince them to join and explain why they are fighting the
state security forces.
41Propaganda events are recorded as including the threat of violence, when Sendero members were visibly
heavily armed but did not injure or kill anyone or if the leaflet included a direct reference to killing. Only
5 propaganda events were violent and left behind leaflets after the use of explosives to destroy infrastructure
(2 events), or the killing of civilians they accused of being whistleblowers, and one event included the forced
recruitment of children (across all events this is the only one that includes children). All of these took place in























































































































































































































































































































































































Although Sendero does engage in civilian targeting, it does so rarely compared to during the
war. Additionally, targeting is very discriminate against people accused of being whistleblowers
(soplones). The majority of civilian targeting is committed in early post-conflict years in the
Alto Huallaga region. In contrast, the VRAEM faction explicitly changes its strategy in the
targeting of civilians. Staring in October of 2007 they actively communicate a new strategy
across communities where they operate. They distribute leaflets, where they vow to no longer
target civilians and exclusively engage in a fight against the state. This is also accompanied
by a stop in raids of local communities, where they used to steal food, medicine etc. Instead,
communities report Sendero Luminoso members coming to buy necessities and leave again. From
the data and interviews conducted in the VRAEM it appears that they hold by their promise
.42
We see from the results that districts that were suitable for coca production were more likely
to produce coca as part of the wartime economy in 1994 and those that produced coca are
associated with more armed clashes after conflict termination, compared to districts that were
unsuitable for coca production and did not cultivate coca. The estimates are arguably biased,
because there are districts that do not get treatment (are unsuitable), yet do produce coca. I
thus also estimate a spatial-two-stage-least squares models and demonstrate that the results are
robust to accounting for possible spatial interdependence (see Appendix B1).
3.6.3 Mechanisms
The main mechanism proposed here is that insurgents rely on civilian support to survive and that
the state requires civilians cooperation to garner intelligence to be able to defeat the insurgent. I
propose that the presence of existing economic ties between Sendero and the civilian population
explains why areas involved in the wartime economy, namely the production of coca for the
drug trade, have remained focal points of armed violence, while other conflict-affected areas no
longer see armed violence.
For insurgents local support means shelter, easier taxation of lootable resources (meaning
employing less coercion to extract rents) and also possible access to recruits. In a post-conflict
context, where armed groups are likely to have reduced capacity to fight, e.g. reduced number
of members or limited military capacity, these are very important goods to an insurgent trying
to fight the state. In turn, losing popularity also means that community members may share
intelligence with the state in order to avoid being exposed to a violent non-state actor. In the
following I provide qualitative evidence for these mechanisms.
There is extensive evidence of the Sendero faction in the VRAEM engaging in activities to
42Note that there have been reports of Sendero keeping captive civilians of the indigenous group Ashanika. In
2015 the military rescued 39 people, some of them had been abducted in the 1980s (BBC, 2015)
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actively win over communities support post-conflict. Aside from actively refraining from tar-
geting civilians, as I reported in the previous section. The Sendero members in the VRAEM
started in early 2002 to signal communities their willingness to have an amicable relationships.
For instance, they offered seeds and other supplies as well as money to local farmers (El Comer-
cio, 2002). Additionally, they were buying goods from communities and paying them over price
and in dollars (EL Comercio, 2002).
Meanwhile, state officials repeatedly claimed in the early 2000s that the remnants in the
VRAEM were not an active threat. Yet, the Sendero faction remains active until today and
according to the government consists of about 300 to 400 members. And this in spite of the
Peruvian state having placed 52 military bases in the VRAEM, and staffed them with 8,000
soldiers (Caretas, 2018). But the military forces rely heavily on the intelligence work of the
local police (Yaranga, 2019) and communities are not willing to provide such intelligence. For
instance, after one of the bloodiest attacks in 2008 in Huancavelica (an area within the VRAEM),
the only surviving military reports in an interview, that the community members knew of an
armed Sendero column that was prowling the area the previous week and preparing a revenge
attack, yet did not give this information to the security forces (Vera, 2019). Additionally, in
interviews conducted with community members in the VRAEM, people describe security officials
and specifically police as corrupt and abusive and only interested in drug-related crimes, as a
way to secure bribes. In turn, some describe Sendero as “fighters of the coca leaf”. That is
because the faction in the VRAEM appears to have learned from past mistakes and is starting
to claim legitimacy based on what we could also consider a cultural identity: the coca leaf.
This way, they are further reinforcing, not only an economic alliance but creating a common
ground based on a cultural notion around the cultivation of coca. Meanwhile strengthening the
boundary between the state, aka “outsiders” who, local say, do not belong to them and their
culture (cf. Kasfir, 2015). In this view, Sendero is also only gaining further legitimacy through
the forced eradication programs that the Peruvian state has pursued in the last decades in the
Alto Huallaga and recently initiated in the VRAEM. So even if some of these communities
never experienced forced eradication, they still perceive the state as hostile. Specifically also,
because they see themselves as marginalised and wrongfully framed as “narcoterroristas” (drug
terrorists), as most previous governments have framed coca cultivators.
Further, areas involved in the drug industry in the VRAEM have seen increases in living
standards in comparison to other marginalised rural areas not involved in the drug trade. The
population wants to protect their livelihood and therefore sees Sendero Luminoso not as a threat
but as an ally. Many communities also organise their own self-defense groups. In the absence of
effective state security forces, which local communities describe as corrupt and only interested
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in making a financial gain out of the existing illicit activity, community-organised defense forces
protect local businesses, i.e. prevent crime, and also secure order. They are called for domestic
disputes, sexual assault and other issues which should be dealt with by the state. The self-defense
forces do not fight Sendero, although they strongly believe that they would have the capacity
to do so, as they were key in defeating Sendero in the first place and know where remnants are
hiding. But they have no incentive to share intelligence about Sendero because they do not see
them as a threat. Instead, the state is the predatory actor in their view (Interview VRAEM,
2020).
In contrast, the Alto Huallaga faction was dismantled in 2012. What happened? As I
described above, the Huallaga faction continued to target and kill civilians they claimed had
shared intelligence on them, often targeting community leaders in areas that had decided to agree
to voluntary eradication programs offered by the state. During war civilian compliance is usually
based on a mixture of coercion and persuasion (Kalyvas, 2006). But as I argued previously, in
the post-conflict context, relying on coercion does not bode well. Civilians can easily defect and
share intelligence with the state that can result in the end of the insurgency. Particularly, if
the state is offering an alternative to sustaining local livelihoods, some communities or even just
a few members could decide to share intelligence about the insurgent with counterinsurgents.
And in fact although communities remained dependent on the wartime economy in the early
2000s, the region was being increasingly targeted for development programs (in contrast to the
VRAEM).
Yet, what ultimately led to the dismantling on the Alto Huallaga faction was the capture of
their leader Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala, alias Artemio, in early 2012. His capture was the
result of intelligence work conducted by the Special Investigations Division of the Anti-Drug
Directorate (Dirandro) of the National Police of Peru (PNP). According to Dirandro, their
strategy mostly entailed leaving Sendero without any local support (Gob, 2018). Potentially,
here a temporary but very credible shift in Peru’s anti-narcotics policy in the summer of 2011
may have been key in swaying some community members to inform on Sendero or at least refrain
from sharing intelligence about police advances in area.
Then newly elected president Ollanta Humala appointed Ricardo Soberon as head of Peru’s
national anti-drug agency DEVIDA (Comision Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida sin Drogas)
on 6th of August 2011. This was a surprising move. Soberon was seen by conservatives as a
bad choice due to his prominent opposition towards US-supported and financed anti-narcotics
policy. In turn, prior and during his appointment he enjoyed support by the national coca
growers’ union CONPACCP (the National Confederation of Agricultural Producers of the Coca
Valleys of Peru), which had its strongest support in the Alto Huallaga at the time. According
67
to drug policy expert Kathryn Ledebur “For the first time in Peru you had a drug control chief
with legitimacy with the affected coca-grower population”.
Soberon had worked closely for years with many coca growers, specifically in the Alto Hual-
laga, and wanted to implement a new strategy with an emphasis on arresting the big drug
traffickers and money launderers, seizing illegal drug shipments and halting the influx of chemi-
cals used to process cocaine, and stopping to penalise peasants who grow coca. And in fact, on
16th of August 2011 it was announced that eradication would be put on halt until the govern-
ment would have time to re-evaluate its anti-narcotics approach. This move came as a surprise
to observers and even U.S. officials (BBC, 2011); the U.S. Ambassador at the time, Rose Likins,
said she had not been informed of this policy change prior to its announcement and said it had
not been coordinated with the U.S. government, who pays for Peru’s eradication program and
considers it integral to combating the illegal drugs trade.
Although, this halt was reversed after only a month and was met with calls for an “indefinite
national strike” by CONPACCP, Soberon continued to enjoy their active support, 43 as he
continued to lobby U.S. officials in favor of alternative development programs for coca farmers,
and insisted on reducing forced eradication. In an interview just months before Artemio’s
capture he states “We have reached a basic understanding with the United States about Peru’s
new policy, which implies a bit less funding from them for eradication and interdiction, and
a bit more funding for alternative development” (Stauffer, 2011). It is conceivable that the
appointment of Soberon in conjunction with development programs credibly signalled to at least
some community members, that the presence of Sendero was no longer necessary, specifically if
it entailed being exposed to a overtly violent non-state actor, unable to provide the necessary
protection to local livelihoods. Another factor which might explain differences between the Alto
Huallaga and the VRAEM is their history of coca cultivation and involvement in the drug trade.
While the Alto Huallaga has historically been the main producing coca valley and thus already
was controlled by drug traffickers by the time Sendero took control in 1987, coca cultivation
in the VRAEM mainly evolved as a result of the armed conflict (Heuser, 2019). Consequently,
differences in power structures between Sendero, existing firmas and the local population could
come to explain some of the variation as well.
43In their communique in response to the reversal of the eradication halt, CONPACCP writes:“Agents of US
interests, like [former interior minister] Fernando Rospigliosi have unleashed a campaign of destruction against
one of the few specialists in drug traffic, Ricardo Soberon [...] They say that Soberon’s closeness to the cocaleros
is a defect, when in reality, it is a logical consequence of his work as an analyst who has studied deeply the
problematic of coca leaf cultivation and who could, if they let him do his job, propose solutions that transcend
mere repression and criminalization of the weakest link in the chain, which in this case is the growers, and not the
grand narcos and the apparatus that they have created around the commercialization of cocaine hydrochloride
and its derivatives” CONPACCP communique, 2011
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Limitations This study has been limited to understanding a context in which there are no
competing violent non-state actors. In contexts where the insurgent group is in competition
with other rebels, paramilitaries and other types of non-state actors, the weight of popular
support might decrease because power balance among these actors is more symmetric and hence
territorial control to secure rents becomes more important (see Dell, 2015; Duran-Martinez,
2015). But in absence of ‘turf wars’, the costs of armed violence is likely dependent on civilian
support.44
3.7 Conclusion
Containment of violence can only be a first step towards building sustainable peace in a society
emerging from violent conflict. This paper has been aimed at understanding when the use of
violence is constrained in conflict-affected societies. Empirically, I studied the case of Peru and
analysed why some previously conflict-affected areas still see armed clashes, while others do
not. I have argued that civilian support has been key in understanding this dynamic and that
the wartime economy has played a crucial part in the post-conflict context for shaping civilian
attitudes vis a vis the insurgent and the state.
I showed that intensity of violence is a function of how costly it is for insurgents and the
government to employ armed violence against one another. At the core of my argument stands
that both the state and insurgents are predominately dependent on local civilian support in
order to operate. While the state requires civilians to access intelligence to reduce the costs of
its counterinsurgency campaign 45, the insurgents require civilians to at least stay quiet about
where they are. Hence, in a sense civilians can both constrain and facilitate violence in a
post-conflict context.
These findings also indicate that dependence on civilians puts insurgents and the state into a
“no war, no peace” state. Since both seek to secure their political survival and civilian support,
they cannot simply engage in excessive violence without threatening their own survival. Why?
Because the government cannot simply escalate violence without possibly risking political sur-
vival on a national level. In turn, insurgents cannot escalate violence beyond areas where they
enjoy support and also not beyond a point that would destabilise the area to an extent which
would threaten economic activity in the area because this would limit civilian support.
The continuity in armed violence, although at lower levels, clearly also indicates the fragility
of this state of ‘stability’. The economic explanation would be that lootable resources are used
to only reap economic benefits. In this view, we should expect that solid territorial control
44This is the quintessential difference to when we observe violence in criminal markets because criminal actors
will not employ violence for political motive.
45Terrorist attacks or violence against civilians more broadly could legitimise a state’s use of force at the
potential cost of further instability, specifically even in democracies (Huddy et al., 2005).
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leads to limited use of violence, both by criminal and insurgent groups in order to protect the
market (Cockayne and Lupel, 2011; Krauser, 2020, cf.). However, I suggest that what really
matters is in fact civilian attitudes. By “protecting” coca cultivation and the drug trade, Sendero
Luminoso is able to maintain financial flows but mostly it garners civilian support. Arguably
even gaining somewhat of a legitimate presence. They do so, it appears in their quest to conquer
the state, once the moment is ripe (Interview in Huanta with affiliate of Sendero Luminoso).
If civilian support did not matter, Sendero would have already accumulated enough resources
to finance warfare in other areas and actively destabilise Peru as a whole. This suggests how
important local legitimacy is to understand the behavior of an armed actor – specifically one that
continues to be ideologically motivated. The findings thus also point to additional questions:
Under which conditions do low-intensity conflicts flare up into full-scale conflicts or wars, while
others do not? Why do some low-intensity conflicts last longer than others? How can the state
regain its monopoly over the use of violence?
Moreover, a narrative focused on the relevance of civilian attitudes has important policy im-
plications. It encourages approaches that actively consider local needs, beyond typical economic
development programs. Trust in the state and its institutions needs to be rebuild. To achieve
this militarized responses and discourses that frame cocaleros as ‘narcos’ need to be limited.
These approaches have stigmatised and victimised populations in coca cultivating areas, to an
extent which makes it incredibly difficult to address the root causes of armed conflict. Unfor-
tunately, it appears that since the insurgent does not pose a threat to the political survival of
the incumbent government, nor is seen by most Peruvian voters as a relevant problem, the state
is likely to continue to militarily contain Sendero remnants, rather than winning over the local
population.
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4 Rebounding after Conflict: Collective Civilian Victimi-
sation and Trajectories of Development
Abstract
Armed conflict has devastating effects on development. Extant theories highlight the
destruction of infrastructure or human capital as relevant channels largely ignoring the
effect patterns of violence might have. This article studies how and why patterns of civilian
victimisation affect local trajectories of socio-economic development, e.g., education levels,
access to water, or electrification rates. I emphasise the role of civilian agency and argue
that collective victimisation inadvertently affects the rate of development by reinforcing
collective mobilisation capacity in targeted communities. This translates to more successful
demands for public services after conflict ends. I test this argument empirically using the
case of Peru. Leveraging subnational data on civilian victimisation and socio-economic
development pre-and post-conflict, I show that collectively targeted communities see higher
rates of development. To causally identify this effect, I exploit geographic variation in the
type of violence civilians were predominantly exposed to using a regression discontinuity
design. The results suggest that collectively targeted communities see faster post-conflict
development rates than comparable communities.
4.1 Introduction
Do differences in patterns of civilian victimisation explain diverging rates of socio-economic de-
velopment, e.g., the rate at which education levels, access to water and sanitation, or income
levels improve, across conflict-affected communities? This question is crucial for understanding
how patterns of violence relate to economic, social and political trajectories in post-conflict so-
cieties. Armed conflict has a detrimental effect on social and political institutions and economic
development (Collier, 1999, 2009; Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Deglow, 2016; Wong, 2016). Yet,
existing studies offer little insight beyond emphasising the destruction of infrastructure and hu-
man capital as the mechanisms linking armed conflict to slow economic growth and poverty (cf.
Collier et al., 2003).
Armed conflict is a very local phenomenon: conflict dynamics differ across space and often
also change as conflict evolves. Similarly, local level development is often contingent on factors
beyond national economic performance. Namely, local capacity to effectively organise to demand
public services from the state; for instance by acquiring political representation or becoming
politically relevant to the incumbent government. This article seeks to understand whether some
conflict-affected areas are better at recovering from armed conflict as a result of experiencing
collective civilian victimisation.
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Collective civilian victimisation refers to the imperfect targeting of various members of a
community in contrast to selective victimisation, where only specific individuals within a com-
munity are targeted (see Kalyvas, 2006; Steele, 2009; Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood, 2017).46 For
instance, the massacre in the district of Socos (province of Huamanaga, Ayacucho) that occured
during the armed conflict in Peru (1980-2000) is an example of collective victimisation. On 13th
November 1983 several community members were celebrating an engagement. The celebration
was brought to an unexpected end after the arrival of a special police force called Sinchis. 33
people were tortured, raped, and killed, including children. Only one survivor was able to hide
and flee and share her story with other community members the following day (CVR, 2003:
Tomo VII, p.55).
Civilian victimisation is often employed to enforce compliance and establish territorial control
and has important ramification for conflict dynamics (Balcells and Stanton, 2020). Existing
literature offers little guidance on whether differences in targeting could come to affect post-
conflict recovery although there is good reason to believe that they would. Namely, scholars
find that communities who are collectively targeted are more likely to reinforce social cohesion
and collective action capacity as a response to violence, while selectively targeted communities
are more likely to grow mistrust amongst each other (Voors et al., 2012; Gilligan et al., 2014;
Schubiger, 2021; Hager et al., 2019; Cassar et al., 2013).
I argue that collective victimisation inadvertently shapes local capacity to successfully de-
mand public services and economic inclusion in the long run by reinforcing collective mobilisation
capacity, which facilitates access to state-provided public services or even political representa-
tion. When communities are collectively targeted, members share a threat and are more likely
to have to rely on each other to survive. Social cohesion is therefore maintained or even rein-
forced as a result of victimisation. This effect is further amplified if armed groups do not offer
them protection and is likely to endure long after the initial threat has vanished (Schubiger,
2021; Steele, 2009; Osorio et al., 2021; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017). Social cohesion is crucial
for accessing state-provided public services such as schooling, health facilities, or infrastructure
programs, because it helps to successfully communicate existing grievances and even gain po-
litical representation (e.g. Carter, 2021). Differences in patterns of civilian victimisation could
thus explain variation in socio-economic development post-conflict.
To study this argument empirically, I use the case of Peru which experienced armed conflict
between 1980 and 2000. In the first part of my analysis I draw on subnational data on civilian
46I refrain from using the term indiscriminate, as targeting is never fully random and thus not completely
indiscriminate (cf. Kalyvas, 2006). Instead I emphasise that targeting is often imperfect and victimises civilians
without precise knowledge on who is a collaborator with the opposing armed group. Note that for this paper the
conceptual emphasis lies in the collective threat triggered by “imperfectly” targeted violence within a community,
not the logic of targeting per se.
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victimisation and newly collected data on socio-economic development. I estimate a linear model
using OLS and find that areas exposed to collective civilian victimisation see a higher rate of
development. Yet, estimating the relationship between patterns of targeting and post-conflict
development through linear regression poses several challenges to inference given that targeting
is not exogenous to development.
To address these concerns the second part of my analysis employs a regression discontinuity
design. Exposure to collective civilian targeting was geographically confined to certain areas
as a result of changes in the state’s counterinsurgency strategy (see Fumerton, 2001; De la
Calle, 2017; Schubiger, 2021). Areas declared emergency zones in the initial period of conflict
(1982- July 1985) saw 70% of all collective civilian victimisation. In contrast, areas subject
to emergency zones after July 1985 saw far less collective victimisation and were exposed to
more discriminate forms of violence against civilians. I reduce the sample size to only consider
areas ever declared emergency zones and use the distance to emergency zone borders as a
local instrument to estimate whether differences in collective targeting impacted subsequent
development rates. The results suggest that collectively targeted areas see higher growth in
literacy rates post-conflict. Peru makes a theoretically and methodologically fitting case study
for several reasons. First, marked geographic variation in civilian targeting allows me to rely on
a regression discontinuity design as an additional identification strategy. Second, I am able to
isolate the effect of collective targeting from one of the most studied factors in explaining patterns
of civilian targeting and differences in subnational development rates: ethnicity (e.g., Fjelde and
Hultman, 2014; Alesina et al., 2016; Weidmann, 2011; Theisen et al., 2020). Although, violence
predominantly affected non-white communities, conflict was not fought along ethnic lines (CVR,
2003). Similarly, politics in Peru is not organised around ethnic identity (Degregori, 1998; Carter,
2021). Third, studying the effect of armed conflict on development subnationally offers a way to
hold constant other national-level factors relevant in understanding post-conflict development,
while contributing to understanding the effects of armed conflict on microeconomic inequalities
across victimized societies rather than the often studied macroeconomic stability (e.g. GDP
growth).
The findings of this paper are central to understanding how and why adverse conditions such
as armed conflict shape socio-economic development today (cf. Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011;
Dell, 2010). It also relates to one of the most fundamental questions in Political Science: Why
do some groups organise and others do not (cf. Olson, 1965)? The findings of this paper suggest
that collective victimisation can enable a restrengthening of social bonds which then can help
communities improve their livelihood post-conflict. This also contributes previous literature
that explores the origins of variations in subnational development. Predominantly, research has
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been focused on understanding institutional determinants as well as other structural conditions
such as corruption, labor markets, resource extraction or ethnic ties to the government to un-
derstand variations in development within countries (Dell, 2010; Guardado, 2018; Alesina et al.,
2016). I add to this body of literature by explicitly accounting for civilian agency. The analysis
demonstrates how divergent exposure to security threats can come to affect local development in
conflict-affected areas. This is particularly relevant to understand since armed conflict tends to
disproportionately reinforce marginalisation and thus is is important to emphasise not only the
legacy of historic events such as war but how and why adverse conditions perpetuate exclusion
(see for instance Acemoglu et al., 2011; Lin, 2021).
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section I shortly summarise previous research
on the welfare effects of conflict and then introduce my theoretical argument. Subsequently,
I give a short overview of the patterns of civilian victimisation in Peru. I then introduce my
empirical strategy and data and present my results. This is followed by an analysis of the
channels through which collective victimisation has affected development in the long run. I
conclude with possible avenues for future research.
4.2 The Effect of Civilian Victimisation on Development
How could patterns of civilian victimisation come to influence socio-economic development,
(e.g., education levels, access to water and sanitation, life expectancy or income)? Inequali-
ties in socio-economic development are usually the result of unequal provision of state-provided
services, i.e. public services, such as schooling or potable water and tend to reflect larger in-
equalities within the political system. Public services provision is often responsive to political
imperatives: Politicians want to stay in power. In particular, in developing countries public
services provision is funded with transfers from the central government and not through local
taxation. Consequently, areas that are politically relevant will often receive better access to
public services (e.g., Schady, 2000; Alesina et al., 1999; Lee, 2018). It would thus be unsurpris-
ing if armed conflict which often disproportionally victimises the most marginalised reinforced
patterns of marginalisation (Acemoglu et al., 2011; Lin, 2021).
Previous research has emphasised the costs of conflict in terms of its negative effect on eco-
nomic growth, human capital development and physical destruction (e.g., Collier, 1999; Collier
et al., 2003; Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Hegre et al., 2017; Costalli et al., 2017). In fact, one of
the most robust findings is that the experience of armed conflict slows down economic growth
by around 2 % (e.g., Collier, 1999). Yet there are good reasons to expect possible heterogeneous
welfare effects of armed conflict at the local level. Differences in patterns of violence could
have different effects on the local capacity to recover from the negative welfare effects of armed
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conflict. To date there has been little systematic analysis of possible subnational dynamics.
One notable exception is Lin (2021), who links wartime bombing and remaining unexploded
bombs on high-fertility land to underdevelopment in Cambodia. This paper thus improves upon
existing literature on the welfare effects of armed conflict by demonstrating how differences in
patterns of violence matter. Specifically, I study the effects of collective civilian victimisation
and emphasise the formation and destruction of social cohesion.
Civilian victimisation is often employed to enforce compliance and establish territorial control
and has important ramification for conflict dynamics (for an excellent review see Balcells and
Stanton, 2020). But from previous literature it is not necessarily clear that how civilians are
targeted would matter for understanding outcomes such as the levels of education, access to
water or electricity, health outcomes or income levels in a post-conflict community. I posit
that collective targeting of various members of a community, referred to as direct collective
victimisation from hereon out, can positively affect the post-conflict socio-economic development
of a community by reinforcing collective action capacity. I consider both lethal and non-lethal
violence against civilians as both forms of violence can translate into the perception of a possible
threat to ones survival. However, whether victimisation translates to a higher collective action
capacity depends on the threat being perceived as shared with other members of the community.
This is a function of whether civilians are exposed to collective or selective victimisation.
Several studies find that exposure to armed violence increases trust and cooperative behavior
towards community members post-conflict (e.g. Blattman, 2009; Voors et al., 2012; Gilligan
et al., 2014). Nonetheless, others show the opposite: exposure to violence reduces cooperative
behavior, both towards out-group and in-group members (Hager et al., 2019; Cassar et al., 2013).
To reconcile these findings, differentiating between types of violence studied is important. The
ability to differentiate between friend and foe during exposure to violence matters for explaining
social cohesion, often measured as trust or willingness to cooperate with others. If one cannot be
sure that ones neighbor will inform on them, this increases suspicion and can reduce trust and
cooperation within a group in the long run. Hager et al. (2019) find that selective victimisation
which resulted in the targeting of some group members and not others fostered a sense of
suspicion and mistrust towards in-group members. Correspondingly, Cassar et al. (2013) find
that exposure to selective violence reduced trust as targeting was a function of having been
informing on by others.
Contrastingly, imperfect collective targeting reduces the possibility that violence is a function
of informing. The threat is more likely to be perceived as shared with others and sought to be
collectively addressed to secure survival. For instance, Schubiger (2021) shows that state-led
collective civilian victimisation in Peru facilitated communal violent resistance campaigns by
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facilitating civilians to overcome collective action problems in an effort to survive. Meanwhile,
Voors et al. (2012) find that individuals exposed to high levels of collective victimisation47
during war in Burundi display more altruistic, risk-seeking preferences and higher social capital
measured as trust towards others. Similarly, Gilligan et al. (2014) find that communities with
greater exposure to violence during the Maoist rebellion in Nepal displayed higher levels of trust
and collective action capacity.
In line with my proposition, Krakowski (2020) looks at Colombia and finds that symmetric
conflict, which is more highly associated with collective victimisation, increases social cohesion
by triggering “collective coping” while asymmetric conflict, which is more highly associated with
selective victimisation, reduces social cohesion by fostering mistrust because there is constant
fear of denouncement (on collective coping see also Gilligan et al., 2014). Importantly, the
reinforcement of collective action capacity can persist long after conflict ends (see Osorio et al.,
2021; Daly, 2012). Further, it is not necessary for a given individual to be directly affected
by violence to feel threatened. The experience of selective or collective victimisation of some
members in a community can be sufficient to either reduce trust or reinforce social cohesion
within a community as a survival mechanism. But how does this relate to socio-economic
development?
Social cohesion within communities structures their social, political, and economic life. I
argue that collective civilian victimisation is likely to affect post-conflict socio-economic devel-
opment by increasing levels of social cohesion, e.g. trust or altruistic behavior, which in turn
facilitates the access to public service provision because of the ability to overcome collective
action problems (see Putnam, 2000; Anderson et al., 2004). More generally social cohesion can
facilitate the election of favorable candidates to political office, specifically across marginalised
communities which would otherwise not be able to achieve political representation (Carter,
2021). It can also help facilitate the pursuit of other non-violent strategies such as protest in
demanding public service provision. Communities where members trust each other are more in-
clined to act collectively to organise themselves and become politically relevant, make demands
to the state and see economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Algan
and Cahuc, 2010; Carter, 2021). Social cohesion is also linked to more efficient provision of
public services and better overall governance (Nannicini et al., 2013; Glennerster et al., 2013).
This is because the provision of public services fundamentally relies on the ability of community
members to coordinate. If communities display little social cohesion or in other words collective
action capacity they face problems of advocating for public services provision or agreeing on
which public services they need access to (Tajima et al., 2018).
47They refer to it as indiscriminate violence.
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Particularly, in a post-conflict context where reconstruction is the main focus, not all com-
munities manage to access funds and receive help. For instance, Peru started implementing a
development project called FONCODES (Fondo Nacional de Compensacion y Desarrollo) in the
1990s just as armed violence was decreasing. In the early 1990s FONCODES predominantly
funded community-based projects around malnutrition, construction or rebuilding of schools,
health posts, water and sanitation systems, rural roads,electrification schemes,and small-scale
irrigation work (Schady, 2000). The majority of funds were given to communities directly based
on proposals they hand in. Funds were then directly given to a group of specifically elected
community members, who are responsible to spend funds accordingly (see Schady, 2000). This
means that communities need the capacity to prepare a successful proposal which requires or-
ganising to understand the conditions under which a project will be funded. Communities who
act collectively, are more likely to be able to overcome these hurdles. More importantly, for the
funds to actually end up fostering socio-economic development, communities need to be able to
hold elected members accountable and make sure that funds do not end up in private pockets.
One of the key mechanisms linking collective victimisation to socio-economic development
is reinforced local capacity to mobilise collectively to hold local politicians accountable for de-
livering public services and not just cash in for themselves. Post-conflict contexts usually see
the influx of development funds and projects as armed conflict comes to an end. Lack of local
accountability not just in terms of which projects are funded (e.g., does this community need
this particular development help48), but also in terms of ability to hold accountable whoever
manages the funds to comply and deliver certain goods to the community is crucial. Corruption
is widespread across countries (developing and industrialised), particularly public service provi-
sion often falls victim to this as local politicians for instance choose worse quality products, give
contracts to uncertified personnel, or end up buying machinery or providing infrastructure only
to a certain subset of the population. This is most likely the case if there are few repercussions
in doing so. Communities with stronger social bonds will be more likely to rely on each other
to organise access to public services but also makes sure that funds are used more efficiently.
For instance, in Peru there is a saying that implies acceptance of corrupt politicians as long as
they deliver: “Roba, pero hace obra“ (roughly translated as “He steals but he does the work”).
Corruption without giving back to the community is punished, for instance through voting (e.g.
Vera, 2020) but also by force. When politicians do not hold their promise, communities have
been found to organise collectively to literally kick them out of office by using or threatening
48One example is the community of Uchuraccay. After conflict termination they received reparations in form of
financial benefits and public service provision such as sanitation and water. Yet, another reparation they received
was cattle. These had either escaped or had died shortly after they were delivered to them as the conditions to
hold such animals was not given and the community members had no experience in caring for and using such
animals.
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violence (Defensoria, 2020). However, accountability is more likely if community members are
able to organise collectively to organise their local politics.
Additionally, other research also highlights the importance of secure property rights for
economic development in particular (Dell, 2010). Yet, in developing countries enforcement of
property rights is often difficult given weak contract or law enforcement, specifically in rural or
peripheral areas. Communities with strong social cohesion are more likely to resolve disputes
over land or similar issues such as access to common water resources peacefully. For instance,
through commonly shared customary institutions. Importantly, people will be more likely to
trust one another to act fairly and are also more likely to rely on each other for other purposes
(e.g., the provision of security) and share other interests beyond the resolution of this particular
dispute (e.g., trade relations).
In comparison, selectively targeted communities are more likely to experience growing mis-
trust within their communities as a result of armed conflict and are thus worse equipped to
recover from war. If individualistic behavior becomes the best survival strategy, collective ac-
tion – even if favorable to everyone – is more difficult. This can result in problems of public
services provision and thus lower socioeconomic development as communities will struggle to
successfully demand public services or existent public services will not be properly maintained
(e.g. Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990; Trounstine, 2016). For instance members of a community
will be less able to coordinate with each other to maintain public goods such as water wells
or collective farming resources. This might particularly be the case post-conflict where many
communities are given development aid in the form of communal goods such as a shared facility
to farm or process agricultural products or produce local goods. The utility and return of such
investments on local development depends a lot on communal capacity to coordinate with each
other (Ostrom, 2000; Bunselmeyer, 2020).
Particularly communities which were historically excluded by the state require coordination,
often also amongst several smaller communities, to be able to access public services. For instance,
Carter (2021) shows that indigenous communities in Peru who rely on reciprocity institutions
are more likely to coordinate with co-ethnics in order to agree on one indigenous candidate to
run for local government. This results in an increased likelihood of public services provision
for all participating communities, as it is more likely that a candidate of a marginalised, pe-
ripheral community gets elected into political office. Similar dynamics occurred across Peruvian
communities in collectively targeted areas. During episodes of violence smaller communities
bound together to be able to counter the threat (Fumerton, 2002). Thus, in areas where a high
share of communities was collectively targeted, the effect of civilian targeting on subsequent
rates of development might be particularly high. It is important to consider that my argument
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aims to understand differences in growth rates subnationally: Collectively targeted areas see
higher growth rates relative to areas where communities experienced selective victimisation or
no civilian victimisation. From this I derive the following testable hypothesis.
H: Districts exposed to collective targeting see a higher rate of socio-economic development post-
conflict.
4.3 Collective Victimisation and Development in Peru
To examine the effect of collective civilian victimisation on socio-economic development rates
I study the case of Peru, which makes an interesting case for several reasons. First, different
areas experienced notably different rates of collective civilian victimisation as a result of the
state’s initial counterinsurgency strategy. This allows me to identify whether differences in
the form of targeting impacted subsequent socio-economic development, despite the fact that
targeting is never fully random. Second, ethnicity is usually a crucial factor in understanding
patterns of violence and development rates (e.g., Fjelde and Hultman, 2014; Alesina et al.,
2016; Weidmann, 2011; Theisen et al., 2020). However, in the case of Peru armed conflict was
not fought along ethnic lines and ethnic identity is also not a major factor in policymaking
(CVR, 2003; Degregori, 1998; Carter, 2021). This allows me to isolate the effect of patterns
of violence away from the role of identity, which tends to be a salient explanation in other
contexts and get closer to understanding how collective targeting can come to strengthen social
bonds and affect development. Lastly, Peru saw one of the highest economic growth rates in
Latin America and has seen significant strides in economic development compared to other
post-conflict countries. Yet it continues to be marked by subnational inequalities. It is thus
an empirically interesting case to understand post-conflict development while accounting for
national-level factors which have contributed to an increased budget catered towards addressing
poverty and economic development. In other post-conflict countries lack of development in
conflict-affected areas is more likely to be the result of overall weak state capacity and lack of
funds. Peru offers and empirically and theoretically relevant case to study if patterns in civilian
victimisation explain why some communities were better at capturing state-provided services
and see higher rates of socio-economic development post-conflict.
4.3.1 Armed Conflict and Civilian Victimisation in Peru
Armed conflict was initiated by the insurgent group Sendero Luminoso in the rural highlands
of Ayacucho. Between 1980 and 2000 an estimated 48,000 to 70,000 people were killed and
over half a million people were displaced as a result of armed conflict (CVR, 2003; Rendon,
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Figure 9: Conflict-affected areas in Peru by number of violent events (Source: CVR (2003))
2019). Violence mostly affected impoverished rural areas and at the height of conflict spanned
over half of the country, though armed violence varied significantly across space (see Figure
9). Yet, several contemporary accounts of the conflict and also the data collected by the Truth
Commission document differences in the nature of civilian victimisation across different areas of
the country as a result of the state’s initial counterinsurgency strategy. At the onset of armed
conflict, civilian casualties remained low. Sendero’s violent strategy was focused on targeting
public infrastructure such as electricity networks and police posts (Desco, 1989). To gain civilian
support it relied on strategies such as the distribution of land or cattle in marginalised peas-
ant communities and administration of ’justice’ through popular courts, which targeted rapists,
thieves and the like but employed little violence against civilians (Degregori, 1987). Meanwhile,
President Belaunde declared zones of emergency in the provinces of Huamanga, La Mar, Can-
gallo, and Victor Farjado in Ayacucho, but was reluctant to use military force (Fumerton, 2002).
Yet, as Sendero was gaining popularity and territory, Belaunde sent in the military after Sendero
rejected an ultimatum in December of 1982 to just turn themselves in.
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With this the government’s incredibly harsh counterinsurgency campaign began and a cycle
of violence as Sendero started unleashing more guerrilla attacks (Desco, 1989). The state’s
counterinsurgency strategy relied on the declaration of zones of emergency, which were put under
complete political-military command and effectively restrained all human and civil rights. Due
to very poor intelligence on Sendero state forces relied heavily on collective targeting of civilians
such as mass killings, kidnappings, torture, extra-judicial executions and disappearances, with
little regard of whether these were in fact insurgent supporters or not (CVR, 2003). State
forces assumed that everyone and anyone that looked indigenous had been recruited by Sendero
Luminoso (Tapia, 1997). This resulted in the highest rates of collective civilian victimisation in
the years of 1983 and 1984 and was majorly confined to areas under state of emergency (Coronel,
1996; Degregori, 1998).
Although insurgent violence was not confined to emergency zones, Sendero did dispropor-
tionately also target these areas in 1983 and 1984 (Desco, 1989). Mainly because the state often
‘cleared’ an area of insurgents without effectively establishing control and offering protection
to civilians. Thus, Sendero would frequently return to target “collaborators” in areas, where
the state had just inflicted heavy violence against civilians and insurgents (Tapia, 1997). Yet,
rather than selectively targeting civilians they would resort to collective victimisation such as
mass killings to enforce compliance. This explains the significantly higher rate of collective
victimisation in areas put under state of emergency in the early years of conflict (Desco 1989).
While some targeted communities chose to collaborate with Sendero out of fear, and some
civilians responded by fleeing, many collectively targeted communities chose to actively mo-
bilise against Sendero (Fumerton, 2002; Schubiger, 2021). Communities formed civilian defense
groups called rondas campesinas as a way to protect themselves. Facing heavy collective civil-
ian victimisation by both sides, many communities assumed it was more likely that the stronger
state forces would win and thus wanted to signal non-alignment to the state (Del Pino, 1993;
Fumerton, 2002, 2001; Schubiger, 2021). Moreover, Sendero did not offer protection from state
violence in areas it had taken control but was enforcing harsher rules, e.g., they banned local
markets and fairs due to the capitalistic exploitation they represented, making survival very
difficult (Del Pino, 1993). 49 (McClintock, 1984; Degregori, 1998; Coronel, 1996). While, civil-
ian mobilisation against Sendero further spurred retaliation attacks on civilians and resulted
in extremely high rates of civilian victimisation, these communities demonstrated to be highly
resilient (Fumerton, 2002; De la Calle, 2017).
Patterns of violence shifted when President Alan Garcia took office on 28 July 1985 and
pledged to end the “dirty war”. Although diffusion of insurgent activity led to the declaration of
49Plus, Sendero increasingly targeted civilians for breaking those rules.
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more provinces under state of emergency, state violence reduced significantly. Garcia aimed to
reduce military involvement: Most Marines were withdrawn from emergency zones and replaced
with conscript soldiers of the Army’s 2nd Infantry Division, meaning that many security forces
were from rural areas and spoke Quechua. This already improved relations and communica-
tion with civilians and facilitated selective repression (Fumerton, 2002). But Garcia strained
relationships with the military by not only threatening to punish state forces found guilty of
violating human rights but actually arresting high-ranking military officers (Desco, 1989). Con-
sequently, not only state-led violence against civilians reduced but also overall counter-insurgent
activity because security forces feared that they might be arrested (Del Pino, 1993).
Sendero Luminoso was able to use the lack of state action to further expand its reach and
started to increasingly directly attack state security forces. Though they continued to target
civilians, targeting became more selective (Tapia, 1997). Specifically in newly declared areas of
emergency such as the departments of Junin, Puno and Ancash or the coca-cultivating areas of
the Alto Huallaga Valley, Sendero was able to establish territorial control without relying too
much on collective civilian targeting (Fumerton, 2002; Weinstein, 2006). Additionally, at the
end of the 1980s Peru spiralled into hyperinflation, which helped Sendero gain more support
across these areas (Fumerton, 2002). Nonetheless, in areas where civilian self defense forces had
already formed in the early stages of conflict (1983/84), communities continued to be collectively
targeted (Del Pino, 1993).
In 1988 the state altered its counterinsurgency strategy once again. This time realising
the potential of civilian self defense forces, the military cooperated much more closely with
communities but also started co-opting local village patrols and rondas, where they had not
been formed yet (Degregori, 1996; Fumerton, 2002; Garcia-Godos, 2006, McClintock 1999). 50
Particularly after the election of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) the military was also allowed
to ‘crush’ the insurgency without the possible burden of being persecuted for human rights
violations (Tapia, 1997; Fumerton, 2002), though now counterinsurgency relied heavily on local
intelligence and cooperation with civilian self-defense forces and more selective violence by the
state. Meanwhile, Sendero started to loose power, not only with the capture of its leader in
1992 but also because of popular dissatisfaction. When the government offered amnesty in 1994,
many Senderistas demobilised, causing a significant downward trend in violent attacks after the
mid-1990s. 51
In sum, throughout conflict violence was majorly concentrated in zones declared under state
50In fact, often communities that refused to organise in self defense committees risked harsh punishment at the
hands of the military (Fumerton, 2002). Consequently, rondas that had been self-organised in the early 1980s
differed from those rondas forced into existence due to military pressure (Fumerton, 2002).
51Weakened on all fronts, what remained of Sendero retreated to its strongholds in the two main coca producing
valleys: Alto Huallaga and Valle de los Rios Apurimac y Ene. While remenants of Sendero continue to operate
today the conflict is considered to have ended in 2000.
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of emergency. Nonetheless, areas declared emergency zones while Belaunde was in office experi-
enced disproportionately high levels of collective victimisation. Areas declared emergency zones
after Garcia took office experienced higher levels of selective targeting. The difference results
mostly from the state’s initial counter insurgency strategy being reliant on non-selective collec-
tive targeting of entire communities and subsequent increased collective targeting by Sendero
in order to enforce compliance across defecting communities (see Fumerton, 2001; De la Calle,
2017; Fielding and Shortland, 2012).
4.4 Empirical Strategy
In the 2000s (after conflict termination) Peru experienced steady and one of the highest economic
growth rates in Latin America thanks to mining and natural resource exploitation. But economic
policy was not directly aimed at addressing socioeconomic grievances in conflict-affected areas
or post-conflict reconstruction (Orihuela, 2012). Instead, already in the early 1990s, under the
government of Fujimori (1990-2000), structural reforms were implemented to reduce poverty
across the country. The Peruvian Social Fund (Fondo Nacional de Compensacion y Desarrollo
Social – FONCODES) was initiated in 1991 to expand public services provision. Under this
scheme more than US$ 2 billion were invested in rural development. Most projects funded rural
public infrastructure such as water and sanitation, electrification or establishment of health posts
(Schady, 2000; Orihuela, 2012). Funds were targeted at marginalised areas and eventually also
chosen with the help of “poverty maps” that were compiled on the basis of the 1993 population
census. Thus it is plausible that conflict-affected areas were more likely to be targeted as the
origins of the conflict have been attributed to dire economic conditions and lack of access to
public services (McClintock, 1984; Palmer, 1986; CVR, 2003). Plus protracted armed conflict
is likely to have exacerbated these conditions. Yet, would it be possible that some areas were
better at accessing public services and see a higher rate of development in comparison to similarly
impoverished areas as a function of the patterns of violence they experienced?
4.5 Estimation Framework
My unit of analysis is the district, which are usually the smallest political units and the low-
est administrative level for which data on armed conflict and socioeconomic development is
consistently available.52 I aggregate variable values to 1993 district boundaries, yielding 1,793
districts. To study the effect of different types of civilian victimisation on development I first
employ a simple OLS estimation to establish a correlation between collective victimisation and
52Note: assignment to emergency zones varies at the province level
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socio-economic growth rates. I specify the following model:
Yi = α1 + β1CollectiveV ictimisationi + β2Ci + ε1i, (5)
where Yi is the development rate observed in each district i, CollectiveV ictimisationi in-
dicates whether a given district experienced collective victimisation during armed conflict, Ci
is a matrix of pre-treatment covariates which could explain both collective victimisation and
development trajectories. ε1i is the error term. Variables are described in the Data section.
Although the inclusion of covariates helps to assess whether collective victimisation correlates
with the socio-economic development rate, the results of this model are only suggestive. Violence
is never exogenous to development itself. Most of the deaths and violent attacks were recorded
in some of the most marginalised areas within Peru, so there is likely unobserved confounding
even when accounting for an extensive set of covariates. To address this challenge, I leverage
that collective victimisation was majorly confined to districts declared areas of emergency early
on in the conflict, due to the state’s counterinsurgency strategy (as described above). Across
eventually designated areas, declaration of an emergency zone before or after July of 1985 can
be thought to be “as if random” very near the boundary, making treated and control groups
near the boundary good counterfactuals for each other.
Note that for clean identification, in this part of the analysis I only consider districts which
were ever declared under state of emergency as close to no violent attacks were perpetrated
outside emergency zones. This makes sure that conflict-affected districts serve as counterfac-
tuals to collectively targeted areas, rather than peaceful districts. I also exclude Lima and the
special administrative region of Callao, where both exposure to civilian victimisation and its
development rate are likely related to state capacity and their urban character. Figure 10 shows
which areas are included in the analysis and highlights in red early emergency zones and in
orange later emergency zones.
The analysis utilises the discontinuous shift in treatment probability (i.e. likelihood of expe-
riencing collective victimisation) as one moves across the boundary between emergency zones to
estimate the effect of collective victimisation on subsequent socio-economic development rates.
The forcing variable is determined by latitude and longitude: a district’s treatment probability
for collective civilian targeting depends on distance to the boundary between emergency zones
declared before or after July of 1985. Districts get a negative score when they are located outside
an early emergency zone and positive scores if they are inside an early emergency zone.
But the discontinuity I analyse is fuzzy rather than sharp as the treatment probability
does not shift from 0 to 1 as one moves across the boundary: Some areas declared emergency
zones post July 1985 had a nonzero probability of experiencing collective civilian victimisation.
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Figure 10: Emergency Zones
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Additionally, even if a district is located within an early emergency zone, it did not necessarily
experience collective civilian, or in more formal terms: not all districts assigned to treatment
take treatment. Thus, similar to an IV design, I estimate a treatment effect for compliers using
two-stage least squares but limit observations to be within a certain bandwidth of the boundary.
I divide the jump in the relationship between the outcome Y and the forcing variable X (distance
to the boundary) by the fraction induced to take the treatment at the boundary (see Hahn et al.,
2001; Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Cattaneo et al., 2016).To estimate the treatment effect of collective
civilian victimisation I define the estimand as follows:
τF =
limx↓0E[Yi|Xi = x]− limx↑0E[Yi|Xi = x]
limx↓0E[Di|Xi = x]− limε↑0E[Di|Xi = x]
, (6)
where Yi is the socio-economic development rate observed in each district i, Di is the potential
treatment status of district i, and Xi is the distance between each district’s centroid to the
nearest emergency zone boundary. Note that Di is used as an instrument and indicates whether
a district experienced collective victimisation. I fit the two regression functions on the two
sides of the cutoff (i.e. one for districts in later emergency zones and one for districts in early
emergency zones), using nonparametric local polynomial methods. This is to help approximate
the unknown functional form. I also include relevant covariates (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008;
Skovron and Titiunik, 2015; Keele and Titiunik, 2015). The estimated effect is calculated as the
difference between the two separate regression intercepts.
I then employ local linear regression to estimate the following:
Yis = α+ τ̂FEi + β1Xi + β2Ei ∗Xi + β3Ci + φs + ε, (7)
where Yis is the outcome of interest for district i along segment s of the emergency zone
boundary; Ei is an indicator equal to 1 when a district is within an early emergency zone
and equal to 0 otherwise; Xi is the distance of the district’s centroid to the nearest boundary
point b for districts located within a bandwidth h of the emergency zone boundary; Ci is a
vector of covariates for district i; φs is a set of boundary segment fixed effects that indicate
which of six equal length segments of the boundary district i is closest to. This ensures I
compare observations in close geographic proximity and captures geographic treatment effect
heterogeneity (see Dell, 2010).53 I estimate treatment effects for different bandwidths ranging
from 15 to 100km from the emergency zone boundary.54 I employ a triangular Kernel weighting
function, which gives observations outside the bandwidth h a weight of zero and maximises
53By construction the design satisfies the boundary positivity assumption as I only include boundary segments
where there are sufficient districts on either side of the cutoff, as to assure that non-treated districts can serve
as counterfactuals (see, Imbens and Zajonc 2011).
54The bandwidth controls which observations are used to fit the the local polynomial.
86
weight at the boundary between emergency zones: Xi = x0. The weight declines symmetrically
as the score of district i is farther away from the boundary. I compute robust standard errors,
clustered at the province level because treatment to emergency zones was assigned on this
administrative level.
Identification assumptions The geographic fuzzy regression discontinuity approach used in
this paper requires several identification assumptions to be valid. While it is not necessary that
the emergency zones were randomly assigned, it is crucial that all covariates vary smoothly at
the boundary to ensure continuity of potential outcomes at all points of the boundary (Skovron
and Titiunik, 2015; Calonico et al., 2015; De la Cuesta and Imai, 2016; Keele et al., 2017). Put
differently, I assume that the average potential development rate under treatment (control) for a
unit located near a point of an emergency zone border is very similar to the average development
rate under treatment (control) that would be observed exactly at this boundary point, regardless
of the direction in which we approach the boundary.
This identification assumption assures that districts located just outside early emergency
zones are appropriate counterfactuals for districts located just inside an early emergency zone.
Differences in means across pre-treatment covariates between treatment and control areas do
not necessarily constitute a violation of the continuity assumption (cf. De la Cuesta and Imai,
2016). Instead, to assess the plausibility of the continuity I estimate “placebo” treatment effects
on pre-treatment covariates. I employ the same estimation as for the main analysis (replacing Yi
with each covariate) (see Figure 10). There is no evidence of a treatment effect for an extensive
set of covariates except state personnel and land reform. Balance is therefore similar to what
one would expect if the treatment had been randomly assigned and I condition on unbalanced
covariates (see De la Cuesta and Imai, 2016; Keele and Titiunik, 2015), invoking conditional
ignorability.
I also assume Compound Treatment Irrelevance under which potential outcomes are only a
function of the treatment of interest and not other possible treatments that change along the
boundary (Keele and Titiunik, 2015). This assumption is similar to the exclusion restriction in
IV design. We must assume that the boundary has an effect on the outcome but only through
the treatment of interest (i.e. collective civilian victimisation) but does not affect the outcome
directly. The emergency zone boundary under study overlaps with administrative boundaries,
particularly departmental borders, at which certain factors relevant to the outcome might change
in addition to the level of exposure to collective civilian victimisation. While it is impossible
to prove this assumption, I provide several elements of evidence that trajectories in subnational






Figure 10: Placebo Treatment Effects of Covariates
Foremost, Peru has been and continues to be a very centralised state. Although, there have
been efforts of decentralisation in the early 2000s, Peruvian departments have little influence over
national policy-making (particularly for years under observation). Peru has a highly centralized
taxation and budgeting process, departments are merely administrative units to the central
government and supervise the implementation of central government schemes(Monaldi, 2010).
Particularly when it comes to schemes regulating public service provision, which could affect
levels of socio-economic development post-conflict. For instance, under Fujimori (1990-2000)
development funds were allocated to the most impoverished areas as a way to capture votes
(Schady, 2000). Departmental governors had no sway over how many funds communities in
departments would receive.
Further, Figure 10 shows that infrastructure, i.e. road density, which is a very important
predictor of future development (e.g. Donaldson, 2018) does not jump at the discontinuity.
Similarly, there is no jump for being inside a mita zone, which Dell (2010) finds to be an
important factor in explaining long-term development in Peru. Three relevant variables where
there is a jump are land reform, number of state personnel and Spanish language penetration.
While, I acknowledge this possible additional treatments in the analysis, it is worthwhile to note
that land reform and state personnel might cancel each other out. Albertus et al. (2020) show
that land reform led to lower levels of human capital development. In contrast, it is conceivable
that the number of state personnel could have increased local capacity to see higher growth
rates in socio-economic development.
Another plausible threat to inference is sorting around the boundary into treatment or con-
trol. What sorting behavior is possible and relevant? Districts themselves were not necessarily
able to influence where emergency zones were declared – specifically in the early stages of con-
flict – for instance by fending off insurgents. The government itself only had very incomplete
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information about insurgent presence and consequently particularly initial emergency zones do
not map precisely onto insurgent presence (see also Schubiger, 2021). Further, as mentioned
previously, Peru was and continues to be a very centralised state. In the early 1980s regional
or local governments had little if any policy influence – even less in the context of military
operations (see also Arce, 2014) 55
Figure 11: Donut RDD – Included Observations
Yet, post-treatment sorting could potentially influence outcomes. I consider (temporary)
displacement after the declaration of early emergency zones a very important sorting mechanism
affecting outcomes. Accounts of conflict dynamics and community behavior suggest that this
was very likely (Fumerton, 2002). Within this identification strategy, it implies that civilians
who would have been exposed to a high probability of collective victimisation end up with a
low probability of being collectively targeted, creating a discontinuous jump in the conditional
expectation function of the potential outcomes at the boundary (see continuity assumption).
To tackle this issue, my main specification relies on a so-called Donut RDD and does not use
observations within 15km of the emergency zone boundary. Districts depicted in orange are
included in the analysis while districts in white are excluded (see Figure 11). Removing districts
within 15km of the border is a rather conservative approach as this is a reasonable distance
55Additionally, even if pre-sorting existed amongst provinces, they would have needed to be be able to predict
with extremely high precision where emergency zones would be declared for this factor to matter (Eggers et al.,
2015; De la Cuesta and Imai, 2016).
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to flee on foot without having to completely abandon land, which is an important factor in
explaining why many targeted communities did not flee; they did not want to loose their land
and livelihood (Fumerton, 2002). I am also not dropping too many observations. In Appendix
C3 I also show results including observations directly at the cutoff.
Further, several other assumptions need to hold for the validity of this identification strategy.
I verify a strong first-stage relationship: a discontinuity exists in the relationship between civilian
victimisation and the emergency zone boundary. Additionally, I assume monotonicity and rule
out local defiers. This implies that no district ends up being selectively targeted as a result of
being in an early emergency zone assignment, while it would have been collectively targeted had
it been put in an emergency zone later on.
4.6 Data
Emergency Zones A district’s exposure to high levels of non-selective targeting is deter-
mined by district’s geographic location inside an emergency zone declared up until July of 1985
(treatment, in red) or in an emergency zone declared in following years (control, in orange) (see
Figure 10). I rely on cross referencing various qualitative accounts, which indicate when and
where the Peruvian government declared states of emergency during the armed conflict (Desco,
1989; McClintock, 1984, Amnesty International, 1985; Palmer, 1986; Strong, 1992; CVR 2001).
For the analysis I also compute the distance of a district’s centroid to the nearest geographic
boundary between emergency zones.
Civilian Victimisation Districts within early emergency zones experienced a much higher
probability of being subject to collective civilian targeting, yet not all districts were subject to
collective targeting. Similarly,some districts outside early emergency zones experienced collec-
tive targeting. To capture which districts in fact experienced collective civilian victimisation, i.e.
the compliance rate, I draw on data collected by Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion - CVR). The CVR collected evidence and testimonies
on killings and human rights abuses during the conflict. The CVR cross-checked information
and created the most comprehensive databases on political violence during the Peruvian armed
conflict. Data includes information on the location, victim(s) and perpetrator(s). This data has
been used extensively by other researchers to study the civil conflict in Peru and is widely recog-
nised as a credible source (e.g., De la Calle, 2017; Albertus, 2020; Schubiger, 2021). Nonetheless,
the data as such is incomplete as not all violence perpetrated was reported as up until this day
survivors of human rights are coming forward. To address this concern and approximate the
extent of violence others scholars have applied different methods to estimate intensity of vio-
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lence.56 This requires however the imposition of additional assumptions about the way through
which violence developed to capture violence correctly.
To avoid introducing more bias, I rely on the raw data and carefully compute a dummy vari-
able based on intensity, i.e. number of victims in an event, following other work on this subject
(cf. Fjelde and Hultman, 2014; Steele, 2017). A dummy variable is less informative but more
reliable and indicates whether a district ever experienced collective victimisation as I expect the
experience of one event of collective targeting to be enough to trigger some sort of collective
mobilisation to prevent future attacks. I consider all violent events targeting civilians, including
both lethal (killings and assassination) and non-lethal violence (such as sexual violence, torture
or forced disappearances) as both are theoretically relevant. I first code events of collective
civilian victimisation based on whether the number of victims targeted in a given district-year
is above the 75th percentile, which is more than 6 victims. 57 Figure 12 depicts the geograph-
ical distribution of civilian victimisation, classified into selective and collective victimisation.
Districts in early emergency zones saw 70% of all collective victimisation. 58
Rate of Socio-Economic Development My main dependent variable is the rate of socio-
economic development. To measure development, I rely on census data collected by the National
Institute for Statistics (INEI). I look at the rate of change to account for the fact that across
time, development at least to a certain extent is almost inevitable, regardless of policies enacted
or other factors that might explain levels of development. 59 According to my argument,
differences in exposure to different types of violence can explain the rate at which (marginalised)
areas develop. Due to data restrictions, the main analysis draws on literacy data from the 1972
census (data is taken from Albertus, 2020). I compute the rate of development contrasting
literacy rates in 1972 to 2007 as follows:
Literacy Rate = Literacy2007−Literacy1972Literacy1972
60
Ideally I would use the 1981 census as the baseline for which I have data on several other
variables such as access to water or electrification rates to assess socio-economic development.
56For instance, Ball et al. (2003) used capture-recapture methods. But their approach has been recently
criticized for overestimating the number of deaths while simultaneously underestimating violence perpetrated by
the state and falsely attributing most deaths to Sendero Luminoso (see Rendon, 2019).
57Note that despite the very rich information about the victims contained in the CVR dataset, this variable
remains a proxy for collective victimisation. It is not directly possible to ascertain if violence followed a very
selective targeting strategy.
58Note also that 93% of all districts subject to any form of civilian victimisation are located within emergency
zones. Further, districts in early emergency zones saw on average 32 civilian victims, districts in later emergency
zones saw on average 8 civilian victims, while districts outside of any emergency zone saw on average 0.6 civilian
victims.
59Arguably a jump from 40% to 50% educational attainment is considerably a larger feat in terms of develop-
ment, than a shift from 80% to 90%.
60In some instances the literacy rate in 1972 was 0. Because it is mathematically impossible to divide by 0 I
divide it by 0.00000000001 instead of 0, since these are conceptually the same in this context
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Figure 12: Civilian Victimisation and Rate of Socio-Economic Development
(a) Civilian Victimisation (b) Growth in the Literacy Rate
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However, too many theoretically and empirically important observations are dropped if using
the 1981 census. During the digitization process data for three departments was destroyed:
Apurimac, San Martin, and Loreto. In effect this leaves not too few observations ‘close’ to the
boundary as Apurimac and San Martin are crucial within the regression discontinuity design.
Several districts in these departments were subject to the initial emergency zone and affected
by collective victimisation. To address concerns of the robustness of results, I draw on the 1981
census data for which I have data to assess socio-economic development measured as education
levels and living standards (access to water, dirt floor etc.) (see Appendix C2).
Notwithstanding, literacy rates although imperfectly correlated with overall socio-economic
development do predict whether the state provides public services in that area. Historically
speaking, increasing literacy rates have been indicative of the presence of state-provided school-
ing (Darden and Grzymala-Busse, 2006; Wimmer, 2016). Additionally, literacy is key for state-
society relations as it is crucial for citizens to navigate and access state services, e.g. registering
for benefits (Zhang and Lee, 2020). Thus it is conceivable that more literate areas will also be
more capable to demand other public infrastructure and interact with the state bureaucracy
(e.g., get a license to trade agricultural product).
Covariates I also collect data on pre-treatment covariates to account for the possibility that
differences in civilian victimisation and development rates could be reflecting variation in certain
characteristics prior to armed conflict such as population density, elevation, state capacity mea-
sured as road density and number of state personnel, Spanish language penetration and exposure
to relevant state policies such as mita (see Dell, 2010) and an extensive land reform in the 1970s,
as well as data on previous collective action (i.e. previous social movements and autonomous
communal uprisings). Data comes from Albertus (2020) and (Dell, 2010). While higher state
capacity could potentially either facilitate better counterinsurgency and make it more discrimi-
nate, it could also increase development rates. Spanish language penetration could have perhaps
facilitated communication with military forces to prevent collective targeting and could also im-
pact access to state-provided services as most state officials do not speak indigenous languages
such as Quechua (making it very difficult for those populations to voice their grievances). His-
toric extractive institutions such as the mita could make populations more vulnerable to being
exposed to armed groups, while also reducing development (Dell, 2010). Interestingly, land re-
form seems to have improved counterinsurgency by raising support for the state but it appears
to have negatively affected development (Albertus, 2020; Albertus et al., 2020). I also include an
original measure of suitability of land to cultivate coca, which is highly correlated with wartime
cultivation around the drug trade. Involvement in the wartime economy could affect treatment
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of civilians (cf. Weinstein, 2006) but also affect post-conflict development.
4.7 Results
I begin my analysis with two simple graphs, depicting the relationship between civilian victim-
isation and post-conflict socio-economic development rates (i.e. how fast did a districts socio-
economic development grow?). In Figure 13 we can see an upward trend in the socio-economic
development rate for districts which experienced higher levels of civilian victimisation (selective
and collective). The black line indicates the national average socio-economic development rate
(1972-2007).
Figure 13: Civilian Victimisation and Post-Conflict Development
Figure 14 could suggest that this effect is driven by districts in which civilians were col-
lectively targeted. In fact, most of the districts, which experienced extreme levels of civilian
victimisation (e.g., more than 200 civilian victims) are located in the department of Ayacucho,
where Sendero began its insurgency campaign – but only within provinces that were declared
an emergency zone at the onset of conflict. Figures 15 and 16 show the relationship between
collective victimisation and socio-economic development rates, measures using only data on lit-
eracy and data on a wider range of indicators of socio-economic development such as access
to clean water or secondary education (see Appendix C1 for a description of the data). Both
figures indicate that there might be relationship between collective victimisation and subsequent
socio-economic development rates.
To test this effect more systematically I use a linear model estimated using ordinary least
squares (using data on all districts in Peru). The outcome variable is the socio-economic devel-
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Figure 14: Collective Civilian Victimisation and Post-Conflict Development
Figure 15: Collective Victimisation and Socio-Economic Development in Ayacucho
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Figure 16: Collective Victimisation and Socio-Economic Development in Ayacucho
opment rate (measured using literacy data). The results are reported in Table 3 and suggest
that districts which experienced collective civilian victimisation saw on average a close to 11 per-
cent higher socio-economic development rate, controlling for an extensive set of covariates. The
results are robust to measuring socio-economic development in a more comprehensive manner
(e.g. including also access to water and completion of secondary education) and are reported in
the appendix C2, alongside a more detailed description of the alternative data (see Appendix
C1). They are also robust to only including districts which were ever affected by armed conflict
(i.e. excluding districts that were never within an emergency zone). This would suggest that
collectively targeted districts have been better at recovering from armed conflict than other
conflict-affected districts. While, conflict-affected areas remain widely marginalised, it is puz-
zling that some districts have been experiencing far larger strides towards development than
others. My theoretical argument suggests that these effects might be driven by communal ca-
pacity to demand public services from the state, such as access to water, education facilities
or health posts and also communities’ ability to hold politicians accountable that misuse funds
allocated for development. I argue that collectively targeted districts are more likely to reinforce
social bonds and therefore see higher rates of development than other conflict-affected districts.
While the linear model lends some support to this claim the results are only suggestive.
The main concern regarding these results is that exposure to violence or collective victimi-
sation is not exogenous to socio-economic development. Historically excluded areas were more
likely to be targeted during the armed conflict (CVR, 2003). Similarly, collective victimisation
is often argued to be a function of lack of intelligence, which makes it difficult to target defiers
97








Population Density (1972) 0.0001
(0.0002)
Shate of Land subject to Land Reform 0.199∗∗∗
(0.021)
Inside Mita Catchment Area 0.085∗∗∗
(0.013)
State Employees (1961) −0.022∗∗∗
(0.004)
Road Density (1973) −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001)
Previous Social Movements 0.0002
(0.006)
Previous Communal Uprisings 0.046∗∗∗
(0.011)






Adjusted R2 0.061 0.313
Residual Std. Error 0.238 (df = 1789) 0.204 (df = 1780)
F Statistic 117.618∗∗∗ (df = 1; 1789) 82.534∗∗∗ (df = 10; 1780)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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of insurgent rule or supporters of insurgents (depending who is the perpetrator). For instance,
the state would have had little capacity to gather local intelligence in such areas, e.g., they do
not have an established relationship between state officials and locals . Similarly, Sendero Lumi-
noso started its insurgency in the most excluded areas of the country (i.e. Ayacucho) and used
historic exclusion to mobilise against the state, possibly making these areas more vulnerable to
targeting by the state, which eventually led to a spiral of violence against civilians as Sendero
tried to hold on to territory (McClintock, 1984; De la Calle, 2017).
I thus take into account that exposure to targeting is non-random by applying a geographic
regression discontinuity design, effectively comparing districts with similar potential outcomes
(socio-economic development rates) but which differed in their probability of experiencing collec-
tive victimisation. Figure 17 and 18 show estimates across different bandwidths. The bandwidth
determines which observations are used. Smaller bandwidths significantly limit the number of
observations, which reduces power and explains small fluctuation in the point estimates at
smaller bandwidths. Nonetheless, point estimates remain fairly consistent between 0.1 and 0.2
through all model specifications, similar to the results in Table 3. This effect can also be under-
stood as the weighted treatment effect for compliers at the border, i.e. districts within initial
emergency zones that were exposed to collective civilian victimisation and are located within
the employed bandwidth. The weights reflect the ex ante likelihood that the district is near the
emergency zone border.
In Figure 17a I do not include any covariates or border fixed effects. The results suggest a
significant and positive effect of collective civilian victimisation. As we move further from the
border, the point estimate increases from around 0.2 to 0.3, suggesting that districts which expe-
rienced collective victimisation saw between 20 to 30 percent higher socio-economic development
rate. However, districts far away from each other are not necessarily good counterfactuals for
each other. Ideally we would compare districts that are located very close to the emergency zone
border because here assignment can be considered “as-if-random”. In other words, districts very
close to the emergency zone border are more likely to have had similar odds of being declared
an emergency zone early on in the conflict or later. This makes a better comparison as potential
outcomes (i.e. the socio-economic development rate) would have changed continuously at this
border if it had not been for the declaration of emergency zones. To make sure these results are
robust, I progressively extend the model in subsequent estimations. Note that all figures show
effect estimates within a 90% confidence interval.
In Figure 17b I include border fixed effects, which assures I am comparing districts geo-
graphically close to each other. This should to a certain extent account for other unobservable
characteristics that might vary with geography. Districts close to each other are more likely
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to share similar history of collective action, development, state involvement, or even cultural
aspects such as language or religion, which all may come to affect the relationship between
civilian victimisation and socio-economic development. The point estimates remain fairly stable
slightly above 0.2, suggesting that collectively targeted communities see around a 20 percent
higher socio-economic development rate.
In Figure 18a I include the following covariates alongside the border fixed effects: Share of
land subject to land reform, Spanish language penetration and number of state personnel. The
placebo treatment effect test (see Figure 10) had indicated that there might be a discontinuous
change in these covariates at the emergency zone border. By including them, I account for a
possible violation of the continuity assumption required for identification. We can see that the
point estimate remains fairly similar to previous model specifications and gives support to the
hypothesis: communities exposed to collective civilian victimisation see around 15 to 20 percent
higher socio-economic development rate.
Next, Figure 18b shows results of a model specification which drops the border fixed effects
and instead includes an extensive set of covariates (as described in the data section). Inclusion of
an extensive set of covariates is not necessary for identification but should help to control for any
residual imbalance attributed to differences between districts within the early emergency zone
and those assigned to an emergency zone later in the conflict. Across different bandwidths, point
estimates are significant and similar in size compared to other model specifications. Notwith-
standing, the results could be driven by differences between treatment and control groups in
unobservable characteristics. There might be significant differences in unobserved character-
istics that can account for why the initial stage of conflict took place in some areas and not
others. Consequently, being declared an emergency zone early on may have been the result of
these imbalances. While it impossible to know whether this is true, the covariates account for
obvious differences that have been shown by other researchers to be relevant, e.g., land reform
(Albertus, 2020) or levels of social cohesion.
These are specifically relevant within the context of this paper because it would be plausible
that communities with high levels of social cohesion will be less likely to be targeted at all.
Krause (2018) documents this for communities in Nigeria exposed to communal conflict and
argues that leadership, social control over internal youth, and refusal to collaborate with external
armed groups prevented civilian victimisation. Similarly, however, communities with strong
social cohesion might in fact be more likely to be collectively targeted because community
members are less inclined to share intelligence with violent actors (La Serna, 2012). While some
of the covariates, such as previous social movements and previous communal uprisings, are able
to account for collective action capacity, which would indicate social cohesion, these might not
101






be sufficient. As I mentioned previously, including border fixed effects can somewhat address
a possible imbalance across unobservable characteristics – although even communities close to
each other may still have very different levels of social cohesion or other characteristics which
may confound the findings.
Finally, Figure 18c includes all covariates and border fixed effects. Point estimates are
consistent with previous model specifications at around 0.15, indicating that collectively targeted
communities see a 15 percent higher socio-economic development rate. Nevertheless, the effect
is only significant at the 90% confidence level across certain bandwidths. In the following I
give a case example to demonstrate the proposed mechanisms linking collective victimisation to
post-conflict socio-economic development in a collectively targeted district.
4.8 Mechanisms
The results from the OLS specification and the geographic regression discontinuity design (GRD)
indicate a positive effect of collective victimisation on subsequent development patters. In the
theory section I have argued that the collective threat experienced by community members rein-
forces social bonds as members are more likely to perceive that survival hinges upon collectively
acting against the threat. During the conflict reinforced social bonds can facilitate peaceful in-
teraction with violent non-state actors or if that is not possible, violent resistance against them
(Kaplan, 2017; Schubiger, 2021).
Post-conflict communities with stronger social cohesion are better equipped at recovering
from the armed conflict. For instance, it could even facilitate psychological recovery by col-
lectively finding meaning in what has happened. Socio-economic recovery, however, requires
accessing public services or autonomously providing governance. Some districts in Peru appear
to have recovered remarkably well. Apart from the analysis provided above, anecdotal evidence
suggests that collective victimisation reinforced social bonds and accumulated in many cases in
violent resistance against insurgents, which facilitated community organisation structures that
helped communities recover from armed conflict better than others. In the following I discuss
the case of the district Tambo in the province of La Mar, Ayacucho.
In the district of Tambo 173 civilians became victim to state or insurgent violence during the
conflict. Throughout all years of conflict, civilians were subject to a high rate of victimisation
and specifically collective targeting. Despite the unfavorable conditions of armed conflict the
district has seen an incredible recovery compared to other districts that were as impoverished
at the onset of conflict. In 1972 Tambo’s literacy rate was at 36%, while the national average
was at 64%. However, today it stands at 72%, quite close to the national average of 83%. The
same holds true for other indicators of development. Electrification rates improved from only
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6% in 1981 to 66% in 2017. Access to sanitation rose from 2% to 45%. Secondary education
only improved from 22 to 29%. Thus, while these numbers show that Tambo still has room
for improvement in terms of development and also has not improved along all dimensions, they
demonstrate a significant improvement in development 61 compared to other conflict-affected
areas.
One explanation, is the district’s social cohesion and strong local leadership that was rein-
forced due to the constant collectively shared threat to survival. During armed conflict Tambo
experienced collective victimisation from state forces and Sendero Luminoso. These are crucial
in understanding why existing community organization came to be replaced with self-defense
forces called comite de autodefensa (CAD) (García-Godos, 2006, 125). The CADs were essen-
tial in giving security to community members across settlements. The first settlement within
the district to organise a community defense force was Ccarhuapampa, a settlement created
by displaced rural communities from the district, which had been targeted by the state at the
beginning of the military’s counterinsurgency campaign in February of 1983 (Fumerton, 2002).
The military had set fire to homes across several villages and was collectively executing fleeing
peasants.
While other communities within the district followed in forming defense forces, Ccarhua-
pampa remained a stronghold of violent resistance against Sendero Lumimoso throughout the
conflict. But therefore was also continously attacked – often experiencing collective forms of
targeting. Fumerton (2002) gives a recount by a community member of the dynamics during
the conflict in his work on peasant counter-rebellion in Ayacucho:
“Ccarhuapampa has been despised by the Senderos because it was the first to rebel against
them. For this reason the terrorists always came. [...] When they gained entrance into the
community, the Senderos butchered with axe, with knife. There is one woman, she’s still alive,
whose breast they even cut off. In Ccarhuapampa when the Senderos attacked, they burnt the
houses. Murdered fathers, mothers, children. They always left people dead, widowed mothers,
orphans [...] In spite of such adversities, however, it seems that the effect has been to draw
the inhabitants of Ccarhuapampa closer together in spirit. Their social and economic hardship,
for which they largely blamed Shining Path as the primary underlying cause, became a bonding
experience that merely strengthened their determination to jealously guard their scarce resources
against any attempts by the guerrillas to take or to steal them. They took pride in pointing out
to me that they have consistently resisted [the] Shining Path [...]” (Fumerton, 2002, p. 161).
61from 16.5 to 48 %, measured using the socio-economic development index as described in Appendix C2. The
national average today is 51%.
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But also beyond Ccarhuapampa, communities in the district organised together across var-
ious defense groups to stay safe. In 1993 the groups were officially recognised as the district’s
Comite Central de Autodefensa y Desarrollo “San Juan Bautista” and consisted of twenty-six
bases (Fumerton, 2002). Alongside the retreat of Sendero Luminoso, a new era of reconstruction
began. But the national economic crisis had not been lost on Tambo and surrounding areas.
People were faced with widespread famine. However, by the mid-90s the president Fujimori had
started to implement social expenditure programs, such as FONCODES, that were aimed at
benefiting poor areas.
From the data it appears that Tambo recovered from the political violence and socio-economic
marginalisation better than other districts. This might be beacuse of the communities social co-
hesion and local leadership. Particularly also the CADs came to play a vital role in post-conflict
reconstruction. For instance, CADs assisted in lending security to internally displaced commu-
nities within the district to relocate back to their home villages. This also facilitated access to
development workers and NGOs, who were providing humanitarian assistance to repopulated
areas Fumerton (cf. 2002, 258). In general their presence provided security for reconstruction
to begin but also many communities that were key in organising resistance against Sendero still
rally around the collective memory of having defeated Sendero. For communities such as Tambo
the CADs and organisation against insurgent violence remained a focal point of community re-
lations in the post-conflict era. For instance, the founding of the CADs is celebrated annually
on the 24th of May.
Additionally, Tambo’s mayor was crucial for securing socio-economic development and facil-
itating the reconstruction of the communities within the district. He applied for and managed
financial assistance from government agencies and international donors to bring electricity to
rural areas, build roads and water reservoirs. While Tambo was not the only district to benefit
from development programs, it is a prime example of how social cohesion enabled community
members to collectively elect politicians who will ensure funds towards reconstruction are in fact
allocated towards the community. The quantitative analysis suggested that Tambo might not be
the exception. Yet, social cohesion alone may not always be sufficient to secure socio-economic
development – even if communties manage to hold local politicians accountable. I thus discuss
limitations to these findings and highlight possible conditional factors.
4.9 Robustness and Limitations
Overall the results have supported the main hypothesis: collectively targeted districts see a
higher socio-economic development rate. Across all model specifications, the point estimates
have remained consistent and significant. Nevertheless, there are concerns about whether these
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results might be driven by having dropped observations close to the border. I argued that
historic accounts of the conflict dynamics document active sorting after the declaration of the
emergency zone, i.e. communities or community members temporarily migrated to areas they
knew to not be under the state of emergency. This justified relying on a Donut RDD as my
main specification and dropping observations 15 km within the border.
This was to ensure that there would be continuity of potential outcomes right at the bound-
ary. In other words, for communities in districts very close to the cutoff it was much easier to
migrate to areas close by to avoid targeting but without actually experiencing displacement, as
they would go back to farm their land. Consequently, this violated the SUTVA and also made
observations right at the cut-off were not ideal counterfactuals for each other. Nonetheless, I
also conduct the same set of model specifications as described above but including observations
right at the border. Results can be found in Appendix C3.
While the point estimate is consistent at around 0.1, it is smaller and more importantly the
effect is no longer significant. I can thus not distinguish whether the true effect might be 0. This
could be reflective of several issues. First, the most obvious: there is sorting and this makes it
difficult to consistently detect an effect. Second, the data should ideally capture development in
conceptually more rich manner. While I test robustness of the OLS specification using a richer
dataset on other factors that indicate levels of socio-economic development and find that results
hold, this is not possible within the geographic regression discontinuity design as too many
treated observations are dropped. Third, the effect of collective victimisation on development
rates might be conditional on other factors. Particularly anecdotal evidence suggests that while
collective targeting might have reinforced social bonds, it is important to consider which response
mechanisms communities chose.
Specifically, there might be differences between communities that ended up siding with in-
surgents, those that mobilised against insurgents or those that were displaced – regardless of
the fact that overall social cohesion might have increased because of the collective threat they
faced. For all three responses, social cohesion can play a key aspect. For instance, Kaplan (2017)
shows how communities protect themselves by negotiating with armed actors – this requires so-
cial cohesion and strong leadership (see also Krause, 2018). Similarly, violent resistance requires
collective action (Fumerton, 2002; Schubiger, 2021). However, also displacement is often only a
choice available to those that have the resources to do so and communities often flee together if
they can because this increases chances of survival (Steele, 2017).
For within Ayacucho Fumerton (2002) argues that the reason civilians were more likely
to mobilise and stay close to their homes rather than flee far away was because they were
protective of the land many of them had just gained through the land reform in the 1970s (see
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also Albertus, 2020). Additionally migration to other parts of the country appeared too costly
or out of reach as many were illiterate and did not speak Spanish. 62 Thus even if different
pathways help in protecting community members, whether communities stay or flee is likely to
matter for post-conflict development. Mainly, historical account on the armed conflict highlight
that communities which were collectively targeted chose different pathways to be able to protect
themselves.
The main protection mechanisms were: displacement, siding with insurgents, or violent
mobilisation. Yet, these trajectories resulted in very different local security and economic condi-
tions. Foremost, socioeconomic rehabilitation and exercise of democracy is only possible if there
is a certain degree of security. Fumerton (2002) shows that the communal defense forces (CADs)
played a crucial role in creating the conditions that allowed governance and reconstruction to
take place after 1992. He also highlights differing dynamics between displaced populations –
even within the same district – and those that were able to stay in their homes.
One prominent example is the community of Uchuraccay, which became very famous because
villagers killed 8 journalists in the early 1980s thinking that they were Senderistas (members of
the guerilla group Sendero Luminoso). But communal self defense spiralled into bloody attacks
by Sendero, killing 130 out of 470 community members. All survivors fled. In the mid 1990s the
government launched a re-population program and 70 families decided to go back. The state
put a school, a small health post and gave them three computers (which is ironic because they
did not give them access to electricity). Since 1993 nothing has changed. 27 years later, almost
all homes remain without access to running water. Anemia runs high and women die during
childbirth due to lack of medical attention. Villagers would like the government to provide basic
services but they say they have been forgotten. Despite strong social cohesion and community
organisation within the village, e.g. the village meets weekly to discuss issues and organise its
defense force, socio-economic development has been stagnant at best. Social cohesion, while
useful, appears a necessary condition but not always sufficient when it comes to historically
marginalised communities. 5 years ago the state created the district of Uchuraccay, due to its
national fame the district carries the communities name but the district capital is the town of
Huaynacancha, which is where the money for development goes.
Future research would benefit from more refined data on socio-economic development at the
village level and additional microlevel data on local trajectories during armed conflict. These
trajectories, however, are often quite complex. Some communities may initially side with in-
62Some civilians fled violence in the highlands but disproportionately migrated to nearby areas (i.e. in the
same province or department) such as the jungle areas of the Valley of the Rivers Apurimac and Ene, cooperation
tended to be high with many forming civilian defense forces (del Pino, 1996; Fumerton, 2002). Plus many of
them already owned small landholdings in those areas, which facilitated their survial. Meanwhile, those that did
not have land, often decided to return home, where they founded new civil defense forces nearer to their own
agricultural fields (del Pino 1996)
107
surgents and defect later on. Others may flee preemptively, before they are even targeted.
While the analysis has lend support to my hypothesis that collective victimisation increases
socio-economic development rates, the mechanisms underlying this relationship are incredibly
complex and require more profound qualitative data collection. Collective victimisation appears
to be one surprising factors in contributing to reinforced social bonds. This makes communities
more resilient as they cooperate with each other to deal with adverse conditions. For instance,
even the villagers of Uchuraccay – after years of violence and marginalisation – remain hopeful
that one day they too will be seen.
4.10 Conclusion
Armed conflict has profound effects on communities and their social organisation. This paper has
demonstrated that how communities are targeted has long term effects on their local capacity to
recover from armed conflict and can create differential trajectories in post-conflict socio-economic
development. I find that communities which were collectively targeted see higher development
rates. I attribute this to reinforced social cohesion and collective action capacity.
Given the importance both researchers and practitioners attribute to socioeconomic devel-
opment for peace building as well as the vast resources dedicated to post-conflict reconstruction,
the findings contribute to an initial understanding of the relationship between patterns of con-
flict and development in a more disaggregated manner. Yet, I caution that while collective
victimisation may have generally reinforced social bonds and facilitated development, its impact
on socio-economic development is likely shaped by other conditions which affected the political
marginalisation of conflict-affected communities. Closer analysis of post-conflict development in
collectively targeted communities suggests that social cohesion may at times be insufficient, for
instance if communities were displaced during conflict this further marginalised them within the
local political sphere. Thus despite displaying strong social cohesion, they are unable to access
public services or funding.
Furthermore, poverty, inequality, or relative deprivation are one of the most common causes
of armed conflict denoted by both policymakers and scholars and can explain where we witness
the outbreak of conflict (e.g. Gurr, 1970; Stewart, 2016; Østby, 2008; Justino, 2009; Braithwaite
et al., 2016; Tollefsen, 2017; Buhaug et al., 2011). I contribute to this literature by examining the
channels through which collective victimisation enables a collective response and restrengthening
of social bonds which then can help communities improve their livelihood post-conflict. However,
this could potentially result in the manifestation of new inequalities. It is thus unclear whether
differences in targeting reduce the risk of conflict recurrence or the permanence of other forms
of violence after conflict termination, or in fact may aggravate local tensions that could result
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in further violence. Moreover, it is important to caution against possible conclusions that the
gap in development could close as a result of collective civilian victimisation. Conflict-affected
areas lag behind substantively in their development when compared to those never affected by
conflict.
The findings also inform our understanding of links between adverse conditions to survival
and the perpetuation of exclusion. Future research could study whether these dynamics translate
to other life-threatening situations, e.g, when communities face adverse environmental conditions
as a result of climate change. For instance, Cassar et al. (2017) find that people affected by
the 2004 Tsunami in Thailand are, more trusting and risk averse four and a half years after
the event. Could this potentially have repercussions for development depending on whether the
event is perceived as a collective threat?
There are several questions that still remain to be answered in order to understand how
collective victimisation links to socio-economic development. While my empirical strategy aimed
to address core threats to inference more fine grained data would help in more closely scrutinising
the validity of the assumptions made. Generally, future research would benefit from tracing more
closely scope conditions and gathering more refined data. Particularly qualitative data would be
be useful to be able to evaluate causal mechanisms better and understand how to quantitatively
operationalise complex concepts such as social cohesion, political accountability or development
and refine quantitative tests of the existence of patterns across space.
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5 Conclusion
This dissertation has set out to analyse the economics of armed violence and development in
post-conflict societies. It provides new insight into how the socio-economic context shapes
post-conflict stability and how patterns of violence against civilians affect local trajectories of
socio-economic development. The findings of the first two papers put into perspective existing
work on the relationship between inequality and political violence by putting the long-standing
debate on grievances/inequality vs. feasibility/opportunity into the context of post-conflict so-
cieties (Gurr, 1970; Tilly, 1978; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Stewart,
2016). A question that arises when considering the scholarship on grievances would be: Is (eco-
nomic) equality the answer when inequality is a cause of violence? Of course this remains a
hypothetical question as perfect economic equality does not exist in reality – but it is an impor-
tant thought experiment. The findings do not give a direct answer to this question but discern
how the structure of inequality and economic marginalisation facilitate the conservation of the
organisational structures that make armed conflict feasible. They consequently relate back to a
crucial critique made against the grievances argument, namely grievances only matter if there
is “opportunity for mobilisation”, e.g. presence of lootable resources, external financing or weak
state capacity (cf. Tilly, 1978). Yet, the second paper shows the limitations of this argument:
even if grievances coincide with opportunity structures, this does not necessarily lead to the
escalation of violence into armed conflict. Economic explanations of armed conflict need to be
considered within a local context. The findings suggest that even when the opportunity struc-
tures of violence remain intact in post-conflict societies, the local human and social geography
determines if escalation of armed violence is feasible. Civilians and their support matter. Un-
derstanding how they perceive inequality and the need to engage in armed violence, which would
bring instability to their lives, is crucial if we want to understand continuation or escalation of
post-conflict violence.
The third paper investigates a widely understudied relationship: how does political violence
and specifically intrastate armed conflict shape inequality? The findings shed light on the
mechanisms that affect local level trajectories of development in post-conflict societies. While
others have proposed that armed conflict is destructive and can be a leveler of inequality by
mere force of destruction of the capital of the most rich (cf. Scheidel, 2018), the paper takes
a micro-level perspective to understand differences in the ability of communities to recover
from armed conflict. It focuses on civilian behavior and emphasises the role of social cohesion.
I find that areas which experienced collective civilian victimisation see higher rates of socio-
economic development. The findings speak to a body of literature within Political Science that
looks at how social organisation and trust between community members are linked to outcomes
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such as political organisation (Putnam et al., 1994; Putnam, 2000). The theoretical argument
contributes to a growing literature of the role of civilians in shaping their surroundings when
faced with adverse conditions such as war. For instance, civilian attitudes can shape insurgent
tactics and conflict dynamics (e.g. Arjona, 2016; Kaplan, 2017; Hirose et al., 2017; Schubiger,
2021). The findings also add to a relatively new body of literature that looks into the legacies of
violence. Scholars show that the organisational capacity acquired due to exposure to organised
violence can endure for centuries (cf. Daly, 2012; Osorio et al., 2021). Similarly structural
violence can have long term psychological ramifications that can carry over generations and
affect levels of trust and political attitudes and behavior (e.g. Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011;
Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017).
The limitations of the findings are driven by lack of direct measurement of civilian pref-
erences and behavior to trace causal mechanisms. This was not possible with available data
but the respective analyses try to address this concern by incorporating illustrative case studies
or provide interview data to give evidence of civilian perceptions. Future research would gain
much from studying more closely attitudes and preferences of civilians, which also other studies
suggest to be a crucial aspect in understanding violence (Linke et al., 2015; Rustad, 2016; Hille-
sund, 2015). Similarly, future investigations into the effects of armed conflict on development
would gain much from measuring social cohesion and discerning other conditions that affect the
organisation of communities, for instance through surveys or experiments. While I do provide
case study evidence, it is difficult to know how far reaching the proposed mechanisms are, even
across communities in Peru, let alone in other societies.
Despite several limitations, this dissertations advances many important questions and pro-
vide answers that give rise to other interesting research questions and avenues for future research.
The results highlight the need for more microlevel data and research on attitudes and perceptions
of civilians on violence and marginalisation in conflict-affected areas to trace causal mechanisms
(cf. Rustad, 2016; Hillesund, 2015; Linke et al., 2015). They also call for more refined oper-
ationalisation of peace within the conflict literature. Simply assuming a dichotomy between
armed conflict and peace, as is common practice in econometric studies, does not give justice
to the diversity of post-conflict environments and limits our ability to truly discern what helps
societies prevent future organised violence. For instance, Bara et al. (2021) make an interest-
ing observation in a systematic analysis of research on post-conflict stability: various factors
that are found to decrease the risk of conflict recurrence, increase the risk of other forms of
post-conflict violence such as organised crime or violence against civilians, e.g. peacekeeping
operations (see also Di Salvatore, 2019). While it is difficult to disentangle causes of conflict
onset from those of recurrence or low-intensity continuation, the findings also show that we need
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to consider more carefully the contextual factors in which political violence arises. Although
post-conflict contexts are very different from each other along many dimensions they do often
share similarities, which we need to acknowledge in order to understand political and economic
dynamics in post-conflict societies. As already suggested by Daly (2012), conflict research needs
a “a reorientation [...] back to the human and social geography that determines if rebellion is
organizationally feasible”. We can learn much by going back to fundamental questions posed
by Political Scientists for decades in order to construct answers around the functioning and
dynamics of post-conflict societies: 1) Why do some groups organise and others do not? 2)
What are the origins of the monopoly over violence? (Olson, 1965, 1993; Weber, 1948; ?). This
opens up many other questions for future research such as: Why does armed violence escalate
into recurrence in some cases but not in others? How do the organisational legacies of armed
conflict contribute to the persistence of other forms of violence? How do they affect political or-
ganisation? Do different dimensions of inequality matter in explaining variation? For instance,
post-conflict countries often see high levels of organised crime or intimate partner violence (cf.
Deglow, 2016; Cheng, 2018; Østby et al., 2019). In the case of Peru, intimate partner violence
is quite prevalent but communities deal with it in different ways across contexts, e.g. in areas
where comites de autodefensa (CADs) are still present, women often know they can rely on the
CADs to step in and resolve domestic disputes, while in areas where the state provides security,
experiences of police misconduct and abuse lead many women to avoid reporting issues. Yet,
areas where the CADs are still present today are predominantly areas that are involved in the
cultivation of coca and the drug trade. Further, an interesting literature has developed around
understanding how to create social cohesion in conflict affected societies. Future research should
consider more carefully how armed conflict has affected social cohesion in order to understand
other outcomes such as political competition or communal conflict (e.g., land disputes).
Additionally, the data collected here can be useful to further discern other factors such as
insurgent tactics. For instance, how do insurgents target their propaganda? Why do they target
civilians in some areas but not others? Also the coca suitability index is useful for studying
links between the drug economy and political or criminal violence and local politics across
Latin America, specifically: Colombia, Bolivia and Peru where most coca for drug production
is cultivated. The data collected on socio-economic development can also be useful to study its
relationship to other forms of violence but also political behavior: To which extent do legacies
of armed conflict and levels of development come to shape political competitiveness?
Finally, I end this dissertation with a note on external validity. Particularly the second and
third paper gain from analysing the case of Peru and investigating micro-dynamcis. Yet this
comes at the cost of the following questions. How similar is Peru to other post-conflict countries?
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How well do these mechanisms and findings translate to other contexts? In recent years, there
has been a wave of research into the micro dynamics of armed violence. While these are necessary
and crucial to get a better sense of detailed mechanisms, they have also created a call for taking
these questions back to the macro level. But this requires better data. Precisely the reason
why this dissertation relied extensively on the case of Peru is the exceptional availability of data
on important variables this study was interested in, i.e. armed violence and socio-economic
inequality. I can only speculate about the ability of these findings to explain dynamics in
other contexts such as Liberia, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, Azerbaijan, the Philippines or
Afghanistan. However, I do believe that many of these mechanisms travel well to other contexts.
For instance, in the case of Afghanistan civilians lack alternative economic opportunities in areas
in which opium is produced and controlled by the Taliban. This is likely to affect their ability to
sustain control, even if the Taliban would be militarily defeated. The drug economy provides a
vital lifeline for Afghans and as long as their government and the international community does
not recognise the need to provide viable alternatives to secure the survival of local communities,
they are unlikely to be successful in securing the monopoly over violence – regardless of how many
millions are poured into training security forces and buying weapons. Take also as an example
the case of Northern Ireland. It has been decades since conflict parties signed the Good Friday
Agreement and yet paramilitaries and violent extremists remain an issue alongside social and
economic divides between Catholics and Protestants. Particularly Brexit has raised the concerns
of a possible escalation of violence. It demonstrates how important it is to tackle socio-economic
development but also highlights that there appears to be an interesting variation across space
in the permanence of the organisational legacies of armed conflict (cf. Deglow, 2016). Thus a
final research agenda would be to not only test these arguments and mechanisms more carefully
across other contexts but also on other levels of analysis: Why does low-intensity armed violence
continue in some areas and not others? Why did armed conflict in some countries lead to more
socio-economic equality than in others? How does spatial inequality within subnational areas
affect the risk of conflict recurrence?
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A Appendix: Spatial Inequality and the Risk of Conflict
Recurrence
Figure A1: Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Effect of Conflict Outcome on Conflict Recurrence
Figure A2: Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Effect of Inequality on Conflict Recurrence
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Figure A3: Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Effect of Inequality (Gini) on Conflict Recurrence
B Appendix: Linking Wartime Economies to Armed Vio-
lence in Post-Conflict Countries: The Role of Civilian
Support
B.1 Spatial 2SLS
Table B1: The Wartime Economy and Armed Violence (S-2SLS)
Model Bivariate Multivariate



















*p <.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
In the following I address possible bias in the estimates introduced by ignoring spatial inter-
dependence in the outcome. I take this into account by additionally estimating spatial two-stage
least squares models (S-2SLS) including a spatial lag for the outcome and the instrument (see
Betz et al., 2020). Spatial connectivity (W) is modelled based on continguity (geographic prox-
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imity) given that this is the theoretically most appropriate variable through which units in the
data are related to each other.
Table B1 reports the results from the bivariate model and the full specification with all
controls. The estimated effect size and significance level remain consistent with the main 2SLS
specification in the paper and supports the hypothesis that districts involved in the wartime
production of coca (instrumented) see significantly more armed violence in the post-conflict
era. The standard errors are smaller though, suggesting efficiency gains in the estimate when
accounting for spatial interdependence.
B.2 Intensity of Armed Violence
In the following I employ the same specification as described in section 5.2 but use intensity of
violence as the dependent variable. Intensity is measured as the sum of casualties and injured
people as a result of armed clashes between Sendero and state security forces. The results
remain in line with expectations and demonstrate a positive effect of the wartime economy on
intensity of armed violence. Namely, districts suitable for coca cultivation that were involved in
the wartime economy see on average 3.5 victims as the result of armed violence. In contrast the
average district only sees 0.3 victims. The effect size is as big as one standard deviation, which




































































































































































































































































































































































































B.3 Coca Production and Suitability During War and Peacetime
In the following I show that the coca suitability index is more predictive of production of
coca during wartime than today by regressing the CSI on coca production in 1994 and 2017
respectively. I also include as covariates indicators of socio-economic development (literacy rate,
dirt floor and electrification rate) for the years 1993 and 2007 respectively (INEI). Table A3
shows that while the CSI predicts 41% of coca cultivation during wartime, this decreases to 25%
during wartime. This decrease is likely the result of eradication campaigns by the state, which
have significantly reduced the ability and or incentive of farmers to cultivate coca in some of the
most suitable areas, e.g. the Alto Huallaga. The lower predictive power supports the claim that
the results in the main text are not simply a demonstration of a popular claim that resource
extraction as such is violent but rather that legacy of the wartime production matters.
In addition, figures B1 and B2 show the spatial variation of coca cultivation by suitability
of land for coca cultivation. Figures also include bubbles to depict the amount of hectares
cultivated in each district and it is visible that in general unsuitable districts produce much
less coca. When comparing A1 and A2 one can also see that during wartime coca cultivation
was more spread out geographically and different regions produced substantial amounts of coca.
Nowadays coca production has become heavily centered in the VRAEM. The Alto Huallaga,
which was the traditional coca cultivation valley barely produces any coca today. This is the
result of the combination of eradication campaigns and development programs. In comparison,
districts in the VRAEM have increased their production far beyond levels previously seen thanks
to fertilisers and heavy pesticides.
During peacetime cultivation of coca has substantially expanded in border regions between
Peru and Colombia. This may be the result of the expansion of Colombian actors into these areas.
However, cultivation has been limited in quantity due to the mostly unfavorable conditions or
growing high-quality coca leafs for cocaine production. Coca cultivation has also expanded into
the border region between Peru and Bolivia. Here involvement in the drug trade has become
more lucrative due to the proximity to Bolivia, where today most of Peru’s coca paste is being
processed into cocaine for further export into Brazil and Europe. In contrast to the border
region with Colombia, these areas are highly suitable and farmers can produce coca with high
alcaloid content.
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Table B3: Predictive Power of the Coca Suitability Index









*p <.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Figure B1: Coca Production and Suitability during Wartime
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Figure B2: Coca Production and Suitability during Peacetime
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B.4 Territorial Control
Figure B3: Wartime Economy and Sendero Strongholds
As a further robustness test I compare the effect of coca production during wartime in areas
controlled by Sendero Luminoso during armed conflict with the effect in areas that were not
controlled by Sendero. Across the 188 districts that produced coca during conflict, only 44 were
under Sendero control (see B3). As in the main specification, I instrument coca production using
the coca suitability index (CSI) described above. Territorial control is measured by looking at
whether the district had a mayor in 1989. This is based on the reasoning that “the ability of the
guerrillas to prevent official elections from being held in the area” is the best proxy for guerrilla
control (McClintock 1998, 80). B3shows that cultivation of coca in areas not under Sendero
control during wartime are positively associated with armed clashes post-conflict but this effect
cannot be distinguished from zero and is also substantially small. In contrast, areas involved in
the wartime economy and under Sendero control see on average 2.4 armed clashes. This effect
is statistically significant at the 95% level and also substantially quite large (almost double the
standard deviation). These results suggest that it was likely easier to maintain control over
resource extraction also during ‘peace time’ in areas where Sendero had previously established
control and build a relationship with the civilian population (regardless of whether this was
necessarily a positive relationship).
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Table B4: The Wartime Economy and Armed Violence by Areas of Control
Model Under Sendero Control No Sendero Control













*p <.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
B.5 Interview Questionnaire
All interviews were conducted in Spanish. The following questions are translated into English.




(d) Year of Birth
(e) Since when have you lived here?
(f) Where did you use to live?
2. Professional occupation: How do you make a living? (Can name various jobs)
3. Do you have an ID? (Why not?)
4. Did you go to school?
If yes, what is your highest earned degree?







• health services (specify what kind)
6. Are these services provided by the state? Which ones aren’t?
7. Can you tell me more about the quality of these services?
8. If children want to attend secondary school, where do they have to go?
9. To go to university, where do young people from this district go?
10. What is the state for you?
11. How can you feel the presence of the state in this district?
12. Does the state play an important role in this district? In what sense?
13. Do you think the state cares about the people in this district?
14. Do you think the needs of people like you are important in current politics? Why?
15. If you wanted to influence policy making, would you have the option to do so?
16. What are ways to participate politically?
17. How are important decisions that affect this district taken? Who takes them?
18. Who participates in making political decisions in this district?
19. How do people make a living in this district?
20. What are the economic opportunities in this district?
21. Do many young people migrate to other areas in order to find economic opportunities?
22. Are you happy with the quality of life you have?
23. Would you say the quality of your life has improved or worsened in the last ten years?
24. Would you say the quality of your life is comparatively better or worse than that of your
parents?
25. Do you think the quality of life of your children will be better or worse than yours?
26. What is the relationship between the state and the local population in this district?
27. Do people trust the state? Why (not)?
28. How corrupt is the police here?
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29. How corrupt are other state authorities?
30. Is there trust in the judicial system?
31. Who is responsible for bringing justice?
32. Is justice being made in a just way?
33. Who has the right to arrest someone?
34. Who holds people accountable if they have done something wrong?
35. Who is the highest authority in this district?
36. How do they get to that post? Are they elected? By whom?
37. What are their responsibilities?
38. Are there other responsibilities they should have?
39. Do you receive any social welfare benefits or do you participate in any state funded pro-
gram? If yes, which program(s)?
40. Would you say the state...
• Is there to help you
• Fulfills its responsibilities
• Does not do anything
• Only makes things worse
Why?
41. What could the state do to create legitimacy?
42. What are the biggest problems this district has?
43. Which social organisations exist in your community? What is their role?
44. Do they have the ability to influence local decision making and politics?
45. Does this district depend much on coca cultivation for its economic survival?
46. What happens in times when the price of coca plummets?
47. Are there social conflicts because of public service provision or bad governance within
Peru? From your perspective, would you say that your community has similar issues?
48. How are problems of bad governance resolved?
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49. How likely is it that such disputes will turn violent?
50. Is this district safe?
51. Who is responsible for bringing safety?
52. What kind of crime exists in this areas? Is there much crime? item Is it common or even
necessary to be involved in illicit activities in order to make a living?
53. Have there been problems between the police or military and organised groups in this
area?
54. Is there a group in this area, whose activities are watched by the state?
55. According to news reports, there an armed group operates in this are called Sendero
Luminoso. Have you heard of any incidents related to them?
56. Are they violent with people like you?
57. Do they only attack state forces?
58. What do you think motivates their activity?
C Appendix: Rebounding After Conflict: Collective Civil-
ian Victimisation and Trajectories of Development
C.1 Additional Information on Covariates
Data on all covariates, except for the coca suitability index and mita, were collected by Albertus
(2020) and taken from the replication data.
1. Road density in 1973: Date is from Touring and Automobile Club and the Banco de
Crédito del Peru: Touring and Automobile Club and the Banco de Credito del Peru.
1973. Carreteras del Peru. Lima, Peru.
2. Number of state personnel in 1961: Data is from INEI. Direccion Nacional de Estadística
y Censos. 1964. Sexto censo nacional de poblacion. Lima, Peru.
3. Spanish language penetration: 1961 census (ibid.)
4. Land reform: Land reform (share of private area affected). Data is from Albertus (2020).
5. Mita: Dummy variable taken from Dell (2010).
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6. Previous social movements data is from Kammann (1982): Kammann, Peter. 1982.
Movimientos campesinos en el Peru: 1900-1968. Lima: Universidad Mayor de San Marcos.
7. Communal uprisings (ibid)
The Coca Suitability Index is a dummy variable indicating whether land is suitable for coca
cultivation based on the following climatic and geographic conditions:
1. Elevation: 300-2000 meters above sea level Plowman (1984)
2. Precipitation: 500-4000 mm year (Plowman, 1979)
3. Soil: pH 3.5-6.0 (Johnson and Foy, 1996)
4. Temperature: 19-27 degrees Celsius (Acock et al., 1996)
5. Light Levels: PPFD>155 µ mol/m2/s Acock et al. (1996)63
Data is at a resolution of 30 arc seconds (1km2). Measures of soil acidity are taken from
the Harmonized World Soil Database version 1.2 (FAO and IIASA, ISRIC, ISS-CAS, 2012).64
Average temperature, precipitation and solar radiation is computed as the mean across the years
1970–2000 using the WorldClim version 2.1 dataset (Fick and Hijmans, 2017). Elevation data
is taken from NASA’s Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) (CGIAR-CSI, 2018). To
calculate the index I first assign the value 1 to each grid (about 1km2) within districts that
meets all the conditions, and 0 otherwise. I then calculate the share of ‘suitable’ land for each
district, resulting in a CSI that ranges from 0 to 1 (see Figure 1: darker greens denote higher
share of land suitable for coca cultivation). In the analysis I use a dummy of the CSI.65
C.2 Socio-Economic Development Rate measured using 1981 census
To address concerns of the robustness of results given the limitation of only relying on literacy
as a measure for socio-economic development, I draw on the 1981 census data for which I have
data to assess socio-economic development along two dimensions66:
1. Education levels:
(a) Share of the population that completed secondary education
(b) Literacy rate
63They grew the plants under a 12-hr photo period,. To convert the PPFD to daily light integral, I multiply
the PPFD by 12 hours x 3600 s/hr. Hence, ideal light levels are minimum 6.696.000 µ mol/m2/day. The data
on solar radiation is measured in kJ/m2/day. I use the formula: 1kJ = 2018 µ molFaust and Logan (2018), so
that 6.696.000 µ mol/m2/day = 3318 kJ/m2/day. Across all districts, this condition was met.
64I use the indicator T_PH_H2O
65CSI is calculated by taking the sum of grids that meet the conditions, divided by the total number of grids.
Hence, CSI is fixed over time given that coca is a “renewable” resource, this suitability can also be understood
as the actual resource that varies across districts.
66This closely approximates efforts to track human development as done by the Human Development Index
that looks at health, education and living standards.
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2. Living standards:
(a) Share of the population with access to an improved water source within their home
(b) Share of the population with no dirt floor in their home
Similar to above, I calculate the rate of development by first computing an additive index of
the level of development in a given census year67. Subsequently I contrast levels of development
before emergency zones were declared (1981) with post-conflict levels (2007).
Rate of development = Development2007−Development1981Development1981∗100
I then use the same model specification of the linear model as used in the main analysis but
replace the outcome with the socio-economic development rate using 1981 census data. Table
C1 shows that the results are robust to using this data, despite that fact that observations
are reduced and no longer include a high number of districts which were subject to collective
targeting. Districts, where communities experienced collective victimisation see on average 7
percent higher socio-economic development rates, taking into a substantive set of covariates.
This effect is statistically significant.
67I divide the sum of all variables by four, resulting in an indicator that theoretically ranges from 0 to 100.
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Table C1: OLS Regression
Dependent variable:
Socio-Economic Development (1981 census)
(1) (2)




Population Density (1972) −0.0001
(0.0004)
Share of Land subject to Land Reform 0.146∗∗∗
(0.034)
Inside Mita Catchment Area −0.077∗∗∗
(0.022)
State Employees (1961) −0.035∗∗∗
(0.006)
Road Density (1973) −0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001)
Previous Social Movements −0.001
(0.009)






Adjusted R2 0.006 0.123
Residual Std. Error 0.344 (df = 1587) 0.323 (df = 1579)
F Statistic 10.467∗∗∗ (df = 1; 1587) 25.729∗∗∗ (df = 9; 1579)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure C1: Rate of Socio-Economic Development Rate and Growth in Literacy Rate
(a) Socio-Economic Development Rate using 1981 census (b) Growth in the Literacy Rate
Figure C1 demonstrates development rates using the broader data available from the 1981
census as the baseline or just using literacy rate data from 1972. We can see that data on
broader development results in slightly more refined variation in development but eliminates
many districts, which would be necessary to conduct a test of the second part of empirical
analysis using the geographic regression discontinuity approach.
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C.3 RDD with all observations
C.3.1 Placebo Effect on Covariates





Figure C2: Placebo Treatment Effects of Covariates
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C.3.2 Replication of Main Results using all observations





Figure C4: RD Effect of Collective Civilian Victimisation on Development
(a)
(b)
